Technical writeup and PoC for CVE-2026-21155 (SVE-2026-3546): fail-open signature checks and an unbounded boot-logo JPEG decode in Samsung Exynos S-Boot, with firmware analysis and flashing scripts.
Unsigned up_param flash and an unbounded boot-logo JPEG decode in Samsung Exynos S-Boot
| CVE | CVE-2026-21155 |
| Samsung SVE | SVE-2026-3546 |
| SMRP ticket | I-122133 |
| Vendor severity | High (reduced from Critical during triage) |
| Reported on | Galaxy S25 FE, SM-S731U1, build S731U1UES7BZE1, bootloader S731USQS7BZE1 |
| Class | CWE-347 improper signature verification, chained with CWE-787 out-of-bounds write |
| Reported and credited to | UnsignedChad (github · hackerone · @unsignedbytes) |
| https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb |
Samsung's Exynos bootloader (S-Boot) has a download-mode signature routine that fails open. It verifies a partition only when that partition's name appears in a fixed 28-entry allowlist, and returns "verified" for every name that is not in the list. UP_PARAM is not in the list, so an arbitrary unsigned image can be written to it over USB in Odin/LOKE download mode, on a locked retail device, with no authentication.
UP_PARAM holds the boot-logo JPEGs. S-Boot decodes one of those on every normal boot, before the kernel and before Android Verified Boot. The decoder takes width and height straight from the JPEG SOF marker and runs its scanline loop with the attacker-supplied height as the only bound. There is no comparison against the capacity of the destination.
Two defects, one delivery path:
Both are proven on hardware. An unsigned image reaches UP_PARAM on a locked retail device, and S-Boot's decoder then writes 7,577,504 bytes of attacker-supplied pixel data past a 4096-byte reservation, before AVB. The code that did it is in poc/.
Every listing below is read from one image, S731USQS9BZF9 (sboot.bin md5 c6cbfb2bb4c0e2b8e71add4a87d7eb75, 6,832,944 bytes), and the addresses are file offsets in it. The Affected section records how little those offsets move across builds.
check_signature fails opencheck_signature (FUN_000a0034) walks a 28-entry table of partition-name pointers at 0x1ad068, runtime base 0xf47fc000. The loop terminator cmp x22, #0xe0 is 28 entries times 8 bytes. The allowlist:
BOOTLOADER LDFW PIT NAD_FW NAD_CP NAD_REFER KEYSTORAGE BOOT
RECOVERY DTBO VBMETA VBMETA_SYSTEM UH EDTBO TZSW TZAR
BLCMD RADIO ESC_RADIO RADIO2 MISC HARX DPM VENDOR_BOOT
VDDCAL_FW FLD INIT_BOOT SVM
When the scan runs off the end of the table, the function returns zero, and the caller reads zero as verified:
a0078: cmp x22, #0xe0 ; end of the 28-entry table
a007c: b.ne 0xa0064 ; keep scanning
a0080: mov w20, wzr ; no match, return value 0
a0084: b 0xa0108 ; exit
The write dispatcher _pit_flash_binary (FUN_00096594) blocks only an exact strncmp(name, "PARAM", 0x20) == 0. The logo archive is UP_PARAM_A, PIT id 18, up_param.bin. That name does not match the guard and does not appear in the allowlist, so it is written unsigned.
Cross-checking the shipped PIT against the allowlist, 28 flashable partitions are unsigned-writable, including PVMFW, UL_KEYS, SLD, SSP, DRM_PLUGIN, UHCFG, EFS, SEC_EFS and STEADY. Note that UH is in the allowlist while its configuration partition UHCFG is not.
drawimg (FUN_0005c11c) reads the named .jpg member out of up_param into a 1 MiB input buffer and hands it to GdDecodeImage (FUN_0005c51c). That function reads the SOF dimensions, computes a row stride, and loops:
5ca0c: ldr w9, [x21, #16] ; stride
5ca10: ldr x10, [x21, #48] ; destination base = 0xfb600000
5ca1c: mul w8, w9, w8 ; stride * row
5ca20: add x8, x10, x8 ; dest = base + stride*row
5ca28: str x8, [sp, #80]
5ca2c: bl 0x131dc4 ; read_scanline, writes one full row
5ca30: ldr w8, [sp, #424] ; row counter
5ca34: ldr w9, [sp, #396] ; HEIGHT, from the attacker's SOF marker
5ca38: cmp w8, w9
5ca3c: b.cc 0x5ca0c ; loop while row < height
The sole loop bound is the attacker-supplied height. No capacity check exists anywhere in the loop.
The one size-related string in the function is a decoy. It runs after the decode has already written, and only recenters the later screen blit:
5c77c: adrp x0, 0x176000
5c784: add x0, x0, #0x201 ; "[WARN] %s: JPEG image is bigger than LCD"
5c78c: bl 0x6abec ; log
5c790: cmp w22, w23
5c794: csel w22, wzr, w22, hi ; recenter the blit only
The 1 MiB input cap does not help. A low-entropy image compresses far below 1 MiB while declaring very large dimensions, and libjpeg permits up to 65500x65500.
The logo is drawn on every normal boot, unconditionally, and is not gated on lock state:
cmd_boot (FUN_000340f4) calls drawimg before "Starting kernel".FUN_000322a4, drawLOGO / sbl_load_secureOS) draws early, before avb_main.avb_main (FUN_00030b10) draws up_param device-state logos.A locked retail SM-S731U1 on S731U1UES5AZBB, bootloader S731USQS5AZBB, with ro.boot.flash.locked=1, ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=green, ro.boot.warranty_bit=0, and no OEM unlocking option available.
An unsigned up_param image was written to UP_PARAM_A over USB in download mode, with no authentication and no signature. The image is Samsung's own stock archive with exactly one member replaced, logo.jpg. All 27 members and their order are preserved, and download.jpg is byte-identical to stock.
On reboot, S-Boot rendered the supplied image before Android started. Android then booted normally with lock state, verified boot state and warranty bit unchanged.
The decode overran its destination. The flashed logo_poc.jpg measures 1080x2340, components 3. The decoder's stride is (1080*3+3) & ~3 = 3240, so the full decode is 3240 * 2340 = 7,581,600 bytes against the 4096-byte sboot,mz reservation. That is an overrun of 7,577,504 bytes, all of it pixel data from a file supplied over USB. S-Boot rendering the replacement logo is the proof the decoder consumed that file.
The dimensions come from the flashed file and the reservation size from the firmware image. The overrun figure follows from those two rather than from a write hook on the handset.
A stock logo has the same dimensions, so an ordinary boot performs the same overrun. Android coming up green afterwards is therefore a measurement in its own right: at that extent, the region above the reservation tolerates being overwritten.
Needs a Linux host with adb, lsusb, sha256sum, script, python3, sudo, Heimdall, Python pillow, DejaVuSans-Bold (the builder's default font path is /usr/share/fonts/truetype/dejavu/DejaVuSans-Bold.ttf, override with --font), and the Samsung-Loki Thor-Linux client. The target must be an SM-S731U1 on slot A in the locked/green/Knox-0 state, with USB debugging authorized.
1. Build the image. Supply your own stock up_param, extracted from firmware for your device. None is redistributed here.
./build_control_up_param.py /path/to/stock_up_param.bin up_param.bin
It regenerates logo_poc.jpg at 1080x2340, substitutes only logo.jpg, verifies that member order is unchanged and that download.jpg is byte-identical, then prints the output SHA-256.