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CVE-2026-129353 — Proof-of-concept and QEMU-mipsel lab for CVE-2026-129353, a pre-auth stack overflow in D-Link DIR-600L authentication.cgi, with crash and saved-RA control evidence. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-129353
Embedded Systems SecurityDynamic Analysis (Sandboxing)IoT SecurityMemory ForensicsVulnerability AnalysisExploitationHardware & IoT SecurityPapers & ResearchFirmware AnalysisBinary Exploitation
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googlesky/cve-2026-129353

CVE-2026-129353

Proof-of-concept and QEMU-mipsel lab for CVE-2026-129353, a pre-auth stack overflow in D-Link DIR-600L authentication.cgi, with crash and saved-RA control evidence.

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CVE-2026-129353 — D-Link DIR-600L authentication.cgi pre-auth stack buffer overflow via unbounded strcpy of id/password

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-129353 (VDB-437416)
ComponentD-Link DIR-600L hardware rev B, firmware 2.17 / 2.17b02 — authenticationcgi_main in htdocs/cgibin, served as /htdocs/web/authentication.cgi
AffectedDIR-600L B1 firmware 2.17, 2.17b02 (shared DIR-600Bx platform image) — EOL, no vendor fix will be released (D-Link SAP10393)
Fixed innothing; the device is end-of-life. This repository's differential uses a bounds-enforcing remediation instead (see §2)
CWECWE-121 (Stack-based Buffer Overflow), CWE-119 (Memory Corruption)
ImpactPre-authentication memory corruption of the login CGI with demonstrated instruction-pointer control; crash of the CGI child per request (the httpd keeps serving) and, on exploitation, arbitrary code execution as the web server (root) on the device
VectorNetwork, unauthenticated — a request whose URL query carries an over-long id (or password) parameter
Triggerid of ≥ ~2100 bytes faults (si_addr=0x47474747); a NUL-free pointer-preserving fill of 2536 bytes reaches the saved $ra and sets it to an attacker-chosen value
CVSS10.0 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (VulDB) — the exploitability metric on real hardware additionally requires knowledge of the target memory layout
Creditruanyi (VulDB user ruanyi101) — original advisory and emulated-evidence disclosure; this laboratory extends the proof to instruction-pointer control on the same MD5-verified firmware image

The DIR-600L web login handler copies the request parameters id and password into fixed stack buffers with unbounded strcpy calls that run before any authentication or session check. Every parameter is taken from the URL query string (REQUEST_URI), which the device's boa httpd sets for GET and POST requests alike, so an unauthenticated LAN-side (or WAN-side-with-management-exposed) client reaches both sinks with one request. This laboratory re-hosts the real firmware binary — the exact MD5-verified image the upstream advisory recorded — under qemu-mipsel behind a front end that reproduces boa's CGI execution model, and proves the complete chain: advisory-matching crash (0x47474747), crash threshold, and saved-return-address control (faulting PC = 0x42424242).


1. Root cause

main (0x00402a30) dispatches on the basename of argv[0]; the symlink htdocs/web/authentication.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin selects authenticationcgi_main (0x0040c230). At the very top of that function, before any credential or session validation (Ghidra 12.1.4 decompilation of the shipped binary):

char local_820[1024];   /* id destination      */
char local_420[1024];   /* password destination */
...
strcpy(local_820, sobj_get_string(parse_uri(FUN_0040bf8c, "id")));
strcpy(local_420, sobj_get_string(parse_uri(FUN_0040bf8c, "password")));

parse_uri (0x00403d84) reads getenv("REQUEST_URI"), takes everything after the first ?, tokenises it on &/=, and hands each key/value pair to the callback; there is no length limit anywhere on the path:

iVar1 = strchr(getenv("REQUEST_URI"), '?');
uVar2 = strlen(iVar1 + 1);
FUN_004039d4(&local_30, iVar1 + 1, uVar2);   /* byte-wise sobj_add_char */

The saved $ra sits 2536 bytes above local_820, past several stack pointers (local_e30, local_ba8, …). Consequences, all reproduced in this lab:

  • ≥ ~2100 bytes of any fill corrupts a stack pointer and faults on the next dereference — with 'G' fill at si_addr=0x47474747, exactly the signature in the upstream advisory's strace capture;
  • a fill of NUL-free pointers into the always-mapped uClibc text region keeps every dereference alive until the epilogue, so the 2536-byte offset lands on the saved $ra and the returning jr ra jumps to the attacker-chosen address (0x42424242 in the PoC) — instruction-pointer control, one step beyond the public advisory's evidence, which itself noted a PC/RA snapshot was still missing.

A second pair of the same strcpy calls into 128-byte buffers (local_d28, local_ca8) exists further down the POST storage-account branch — the same flaw at a shorter distance. The POST body is parsed by cgibin_parse_request into a 128-byte buffer with a size argument of 0x1000; in this build the query-string sink fires first for every request that carries parameters in the URL.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
router-vulncve-2026-129353:lab with LAB_BOUNDS_SHIM=0the firmware rootfs (extracted at build from the MD5-verified vendor image) re-hosted under qemu-mipsel-static — the vulnerable side
router-fixedcve-2026-129353:lab with LAB_BOUNDS_SHIM=1the same binary with LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/bndshim.so (bounds-enforcing strcpy/sprintf, cap 256) — the remediation-shape side
poccve-2026-129353-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

The DIR-600L is end-of-life: D-Link's SAP10393 states all DIR-600/605/605L revisions are EOL/EOS with no further firmware. No vendor patch exists or will exist, so there is no "fixed version" to build. The differential in this laboratory instead contrasts the shipped binary against the same binary with the two dangerous libc entry points interposed by lab/shim/bndshim.c — a freestanding mipsel .so with no DT_NEEDED that loads under the firmware's own ld-uClibc.so.0 and bounds every strcpy/sprintf destination at the smallest affected buffer (256). The shim is a remediation shape, not a vendor patch: it demonstrates that the crashes are exactly the unbounded copies and nothing else. On real hardware the only available mitigations are retiring the device or strictly isolating its management interface.

Provenance of the binary, verified twice: the firmware image DIR-600Bx_FW217b02.bin (md5 2f953ec274caeab6bc643045da56ab29, matching the hash recorded in the upstream research advisory) is downloaded at image build, its vendor-LZMA squashfs is unpacked with sasquatch, and the resulting htdocs/cgibin (md5 e7016496219d73b3be39cad163995fcc) is byte-identical to an independent researcher's committed extraction of the same image. The front end (lab/service.py) reproduces boa's CGI model: one child process per request, headers as HTTP_* variables, REQUEST_URI carrying the query, the POST body on stdin — so a guest crash is a reported SIGSEGV with its si_addr, not a service outage.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # firmware fetch+verify, extraction, lab + PoC images
./run-lab.sh up        # cve129353lab network, router-vuln, router-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

Single mode against one side:

podman run --rm --network cve129353lab cve-2026-129353-poc:local \
    exploit --host=router-vuln

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only; check / exploit / probe / mitigation):

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