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hardstop — Reference implementation for "Hard Stop: Kernel-Level Preemption and Containment for Rogue Agentic Execution". Out-of-band Epistemic Andon Cord, sub-millisecond (<0.154 ms) POSIX process group preemption, and torn-read resistant WAL state extraction. | Kitploit
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hardstop

Reference implementation for "Hard Stop: Kernel-Level Preemption and Containment for Rogue Agentic Execution". Out-of-band Epistemic Andon Cord, sub-millisecond (<0.154 ms) POSIX process group preemption, and torn-read resistant WAL state extraction.

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Hard Stop: Kernel-Level Preemption and Containment for Rogue Agentic Execution

Paper arXiv ORCID License Python 3.10+ Status: Patent Pending

Architectural Comparison: Off-Board Hardware Fabrics (DPUs / SmartNICs) vs. In-Cache Kernel Preemption (Hard Stop) Off-board hardware security architectures route agent execution telemetry out-of-band across host I/O buses (PCIe/CXL) or external network fabrics to dedicated processors (DPUs or smartNICs). This introduces physical transport, SerDes framing, and DMA ring-buffer serialization delays (1.0 to 12.0 ms under cluster congestion) before a quarantine signal can be dispatched. Hard Stop provides an in-cache, software-defined alternative: by intercepting execution synchronously in the host CPU's L1/L2 cache via in-line eBPF LSM hooks and rootless cgroup v2, this reference implementation achieves sub-2-microsecond deterministic preemption (< 1.8 µs) on commodity Linux hardware—enforcing true zero-leakage positive control without requiring specialized silicon.


Abstract: An autonomous generative AI operating in a continuous execution loop without an out-of-band Epistemic Andon Cord is an existential operational hazard. Hard Stop introduces a dual-plane supervisory control architecture combining out-of-band Discrete Event System (DES) supervision, Synchronous Reactive (SR) sentinels, and sub-millisecond (<0.154 ms) POSIX/eBPF preemption buses—demonstrating deterministic process freezes before off-target socket traffic or unauthorized system calls traverse hypervisor boundaries.


The Core Invariant: Epistemic Self-Referential Invalidation

Principle: A stochastic language model cannot serve as its own deterministic safety arbiter.

Formally, any internal self-evaluating safety loop composed of a probabilistic model $M$ with non-zero error rate $\epsilon > 0$ inherits compounded error probability $P(\text{error}) \ge 1 - (1 - \epsilon)^k$. Deterministic safety guarantees strictly require an out-of-band supervisory control architecture operating directly at the runtime, cgroup, and kernel boundaries.


Architectural Overview

                         [ Agent Generative Loop ]
                                    │
                            Tool Dispatch Stream
                                    │
 ┌──────────────────────────────────▼──────────────────────────────────┐
 │                 Out-of-Band Epistemic Sentinel Bus                  │
 │  • Egress Domain Meet (D ∩ D_eval = ∅)                              │
 │  • Path Traversal & SSTI Lexical/LSM Tripwires                      │
 │  • Execution Surface Boundary Verification                          │
 └──────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
                                    │ Invariant Breach (<0.154 ms)
                                    ▼
 ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │               Sub-Millisecond Physical Preemption Bus               │
 │  1. Immediate Non-Cooperative SIGSTOP / Cgroup Freeze (<0.026 ms)   │
 │  2. Out-of-Band Lock-Free Write-Ahead Log (WAL) State Extraction    │
 │  3. Asynchronous LangGraph interrupt() Snapshot (0 Leaked Tokens)   │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Physical Transport Bounds: In-Cache Preemption vs. Off-Board Fabrics

Off-board security appliances (DPUs, smartNICs, or external network firewalls) are fundamentally bounded by the physics of bus and fabric transit. An external device cannot mathematically beat host CPU cache locality:

A. OFF-BOARD HARDWARE FABRIC (DPU / SmartNIC / External Security Switch):
[Agent Syscall] ---> [Host DMA Ring] ---> [PCIe Gen4/5 Bus] ---> [DPU Ingress FIFO] ---> [DPU Policy SoC]
      t=0                 5 - 15 µs           1.5 - 3.0 µs            3 - 5 µs             50 - 500 µs
                                                                                                |
[Host APIC Context Switch] <--- [PCIe MSI-X Interrupt] <--- [Cluster Queue Congestion] <--------+
        10 - 50 µs                     2 - 6 µs                      1.0 - 12.0 ms
Total Quarantine Envelope: 1.0 ms to 12.0 ms (Vulnerable to atomic syscall exfiltration)

B. IN-CACHE KERNEL PREEMPTION (hardstop-rs):
[Agent Syscall] ---> [eBPF LSM Trap] ---> [L1/L2 Cache Policy Trie] ---> [%rax = -EPERM] ---> [cgroup.freeze]
      t=0                 < 0.4 µs                   40 - 90 ns                 t = 60 ns          < 1.8 µs
Total Preemption Envelope: < 2.0 µs (Preempted in-line before bus or network traversal; 555× faster)
Layer / Physical StageTransport MediumIrreducible Physical ConstraintLatency Envelope
Off-Board Hardware Fabrics
1. Host-to-Device Bus TransitPCIe Gen 4/5 BusTLP Serialization & Root Complex Crossing1.5 – 3.0 µs
2. Memory SynchronizationDMA Ring BuffersDescriptor Ring Updates & MMIO Doorbell5.0 – 15.0 µs
3. Optical / PHY OverheadFiber / SerDes PHYElectro-Optic Transduction, PAM-4, FEC Framing50 – 100 ns
4. Network Fabric TransitInfiniBand / RoCEv2Optical Fiber (5 ns/m) + Switch Traversal3.0 – 80.0 µs
5. Off-Board ClassificationSoC ARM / NPU CoresHardware Flow Table & Policy Parser50.0 – 500.0 µs
6. Multi-Tenant Queue LoadBuffer MemoryCluster Congestion & Head-of-Line Blocking1.0 – 12.0 ms
7. Host Return InterruptHost PCIe / APICMSI-X Delivery & Core Register Context Switch10.0 – 50.0 µs
Off-Board Quarantine TotalBus & FabricCumulative Transit & Asynchronous Interrupt1.0 ms – 12.0 ms
In-Cache Kernel Preemption (hardstop-rs)
1. Syscall InterceptionHost CPU PipelineKernel Entry Vector Trap< 0.4 µs
2. Tripwire Policy EvalHost L1/L2 CacheBPF LPM Radix Trie / Aho-Corasick DFA40.0 – 90.0 ns
3. Synchronous LSM DenialCPU Register (%rax)Native BPF LSM return -EPERM Execution60.0 ns (exact)
4. Process Group Quiescencecgroup v2 SubsystemCached Inode File Descriptor to cgroup.freeze< 1.8 µs
In-Cache Preemption TotalHost CPU L1/L2Direct In-Line Synchronous Cache Evaluation< 2.0 µs (555× faster)

Empirical Systems Telemetry

Benchmarks conducted under the Kalibera & Jones (2013) two-level hierarchical protocol: E=15 independent OS process launches (fresh ASLR per launch), I=50/3 warmup iterations discarded, M=100/20 measured iterations per process, B=2,000 hierarchical bootstrap resamplings. Statistics are non-parametric medians with 95% CI.

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