Educational proof-of-concept (PoC) research tool demonstrating CVE-2026-24090 ABL verification bypass to inspect and test Qualcomm Keymaster RPMB state on Lenovo devices.
[!CAUTION] Prerequisites: Python 3.12 (64-bit) must be installed on your Windows system and added to PATH before running this tool. The bundled offline dependencies and Qualcomm EDL communication rely on Python 3.12.
[!IMPORTANT] Device Compatibility Notice: This tool is strictly verified and supported ONLY on the Lenovo TB520FU. Attempting to run this tool on unsupported or untested devices may result in an unrecoverable hard-brick. Proceed at your own risk.
[!WARNING] Educational & Security Research Disclaimer: This software is distributed strictly for educational, security research, and hardware maintenance purposes on devices you legally own. It performs low-level Firehose EDL operations, raw GPT table manipulation, recovery flashing, TrustZone Keymaster TA invocation, and RPMB modification. The authors and contributors assume NO liability or responsibility for any hardware damage, data loss, permanent bricks, or voided warranties resulting from using this software.
[!NOTE] Requirements for Porting / Adapting to Other Devices: To adapt this tool to other Qualcomm Snapdragon-based Lenovo devices, all of the following conditions must be met:
- Vulnerable / Older Firmware State: The device bootloader/firmware must not have patched the default AOSP test key vulnerability (e.g., AOSP RSA-4096 test key trust patterns such as CVE-2023-45779 / vendor bootloader testkey acceptance), or must run firmware re-signed to accept the test key.
- Matching Firehose Loader: You must extract and provide the exact
xbl_s_devprg_ns.melfmatching your specific device firmware version.- Device Asset Folder: Create a device folder following the model naming convention under
assets/device/<MODEL>(e.g.,assets/device/TBxxxx/).- RSA-4096 Signed Root Recovery: Place the model-matched
xbl_s_devprg_ns.melfand an AVB RSA-4096 testkey-signed (or re-signed)recovery.imginto that device directory. The recovery image must provide root ADB shell access (adbdrunning as root /ro.secure=0/ro.debuggable=1, such as TWRP or an unsecure root-enabled stock recovery) so the tool can deploy its kernel modules and native probe to interact with TrustZone.
Lenovo Qcom RPMB Tool is an interactive TUI engineering tool designed for Qualcomm Snapdragon-based Lenovo devices (specifically TB520FU). It leverages the CVE-2026-24090 Android Bootloader (ABL) verified boot architectural bypass to dump, inspect, test, and verify RPMB-backed Keymaster device state (e.g. Region tags PRC ↔ ROW) with deterministic failsafes.
Current version: 1.0.4
Qualcomm Android Bootloaders (ABL) enforce Android Verified Boot (AVB 2.0) by querying the storage partition table (GPT) for vbmeta and pvmfw partitions before locking the hardware verification milestone (KM_SET_VERIFIED_BOOT_STATE).
vbmeta_a / vbmeta_b → xbmeta_a / xbmeta_bpvmfw_a / pvmfw_b → xpvmfw_a / xpvmfw_bIs_VERIFIED_BOOT_2() fails to locate the verified boot descriptor partitions. Instead of refusing to boot, ABL falls back to NO_AVB mode without establishing the cryptographic chain of trust, leaving the TrustZone Keymaster milestone unlocked for runtime state inspection and modification.On modern Qualcomm chipsets (Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 / SM8650) utilizing Android Boot Header v4:
vendor_boot.fastboot boot <boot.img> bypasses ABL's native partition initialization, preventing DTB/ramdisk resolution and immediately triggering a Qualcomm CrashDump.recovery partition (recovery_a/b, ~100 MiB) is backed up sector-by-sector via EDL, and a verified, root-capable TWRP recovery image is written back through the same EDL session (Firehose ws), then read back and hash-compared. A one-shot Android boot-recovery BCB is written to the live misc partition with its original sectors backed up. Firehose then resets directly into recovery, without Fastboot. ABL natively loads the hardware kernel, vendor modules, and recovery environment without CrashDump faults. The original BCB sectors are restored and verified during cleanup.Once booted into the temporary root recovery environment:
qseecom_dma_heap_phys.ko is inserted, exposing a contiguous physical memory buffer interface at /dev/qseecom_ta_shm.qcom_state_probe) establishes a channel to the TrustZone Keymaster Trusted Application (TA).vendor_boot markers.PRC or ROW token.The tool separates the initial trust decision from the metadata that must be updated during a Region conversion:
SHA256_RSA4096, must use the public AOSP testkey, and must expose a strict Lenovo model fingerprint. Validation stops after that successful live signature; the tool does not scan every top-level vbmeta partition merely to repeat the same trust decision. The packaged recovery is independently checked against the same key and model family.NONE Is a Hash Footer, Not a Signature Failure: Stock and re-signed vendor_boot images may contain an embedded vbmeta block with algorithm 0 (NONE). That block intentionally has no authentication block, RSA signature, or public key. Its hash descriptor still binds the original payload size, salt, and SHA-256(salt || payload) digest. The tool accepts this form only after validating footer bounds, descriptor bounds, declared payload size, and the payload digest..PRC/.ROW and IPRC/IROW markers changes the vendor_boot payload digest without changing its layout. The embedded algorithm-0 hash descriptor is updated while remaining algorithm 0. The corresponding hash descriptor in top-level vbmeta is then updated, its AOSP testkey public-key blob installed, and its authentication digest and RSA-4096 signature regenerated.vbmeta inspection does not remove backup coverage. When a Region change is actually requested, every targeted vendor_boot and vbmeta partition is read in full through EDL and recorded with a SHA-256 sidecar before the first Region image write. Each patched partition is then read back sector-for-sector and compared with the exact staged payload.