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openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit — Read-only audit script for OpenSSL CVE-2026-121481 (EVP_EncodeBlock overflow). Preliminary: affected range from third-party trackers, unconfirmed. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/quaerendir/openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit
Defensive ToolsVulnerability ScannersContainer SecurityConfiguration AuditingInformation GatheringCryptographyIncident Response
GitHubquaerendir/openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit

openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit

Read-only audit script for OpenSSL CVE-2026-121481 (EVP_EncodeBlock overflow). Preliminary: affected range from third-party trackers, unconfirmed.

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openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit

CVE Component Advisory Published Shell License Version CI

Read-only exposure check for CVE-2026-121481, a heap buffer overflow in OpenSSL's EVP_EncodeBlock(). It inventories every OpenSSL copy it can find on a Linux host (system binaries and libraries, packages, running processes, Python venvs and wheels, bundled copies, running Docker containers) and flags the ones whose version is in the reported range.

Status: preliminary. As of 2026-11-20 I could not find an official OpenSSL advisory for this CVE. The affected range used here comes from third-party CVE trackers and may be wrong or incomplete. Read Open questions before acting on the output. This project is not affiliated with the OpenSSL project.

The bug, as reported

According to third-party trackers (cve.now, strix.ai):

  • Signed integer overflow in the output-size computation 4*((len+2)/3)+1 of EVP_EncodeBlock() for input lengths close to INT_MAX; the result can write past the caller's output buffer.
  • Published 2026-11-18, CVSS 3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
  • Affected: OpenSSL 4.0.0 - 4.0.3 and 4.1.0 (fixed in 4.0.4 / 4.1.1 per the same sources).

The only primary-source artifact I found is the open, unmerged pull request openssl/openssl#33652.

Open questions (read this first)

  1. No official advisory found. Nothing on openssl-library.org (advisories of 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-17, and the vulnerabilities index as far as I could read it). The NVD page returned no record and VulDB returned HTTP 403 when I checked. The tracker pages appear to copy one another, so they are not independent confirmation.
  2. Version range is unconfirmed. PR #33652 is open, maintainers requested changes on 2026-11-20, and it names no affected or fixed versions. 4.0.4 / 4.1.1 as fixed releases are unverified.
  3. Severity is contradictory. Trackers show CVSS 9.8 while the descriptive text calls the issue Low. The CVSS attribution and CWE set differ between trackers.
  4. Reachability is disputed. The PR author says it can be triggered through openssl s_client with a very large -proxy_pass; the tracker text says there is no practical attack path. Whether any real application passes attacker-controlled near-INT_MAX lengths to EVP_EncodeBlock() is unknown to me.
  5. 3.x and older are not covered by any source. The script reports them as OUTSIDE_RANGE, which means "no data", not "safe".
  6. A match is not a vulnerability. The script only reads versions. It does not check whether an application calls the affected function.
  7. Distro backports. Packaged versions may carry fixes without a version bump. Package rows are informational; check your distribution's security tracker.
  8. Statically linked OpenSSL is read heuristically. For wheels such as cryptography, the version comes from the first OpenSSL x.y.z string in the .so. It is usually right, but it is a heuristic.
  9. The Docker path has never run against a live container. It is tested against a fake docker only.

If the official advisory lands and differs from the above, edit is_affected() and AFFECTED_DESC at the top of the script (the only places the range is encoded).

Usage

./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh                  # text report, all sections
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --json           # JSON report on stdout
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --quiet          # only the verdict line + exit code
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --no-banner      # text report without the header line
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --no-system      # skip binaries, libraries, packages
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --no-procs       # skip running processes
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --no-python      # skip interpreters, venvs, wheels
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --no-bundled     # skip the bundled-copy search
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --no-docker      # skip running containers
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --scan-dir DIR   # bundled search only in DIR (repeatable)
./openssl-cve-2026-121481-audit.sh --version

--scan-dir replaces the default bundled-search roots ($HOME, /opt, /usr/local, /srv); the other sections still run on the host. To audit a mounted image or an unpacked tree on its own, combine it with --no-system --no-procs --no-python --no-docker.

Needs Linux, bash 4+ (tested with bash 5) and find, grep, awk, sed, sort, tr, cut, readlink. Run it as the user whose files you want covered; run as root for a host-wide view (/proc/PID/maps of other users' processes needs it).

Verdicts and exit codes

The worst finding decides.

ExitVerdictMeaning
0NOT_IN_LISTED_RANGEno version in the listed range; says nothing about 3.x or older
1MITIGATEDnever used: a distro backport cannot be verified from the version
2VULNERABLEsome OpenSSL copy is in the listed affected range
3UNKNOWNa version could not be read, a container could not be scanned, or a running process uses a library replaced on disk
4ERRORbad usage

Per finding: VULNERABLE, OUTSIDE_RANGE, UNKNOWN, plus the informational NOT_OPENSSL (an interpreter built against LibreSSL) and NO_LIBCRYPTO (a container with no libcrypto file).

What it checks

KindWhat
cliopenssl binaries in PATH, /usr/local/ssl, /opt/*/bin
liblibcrypto from the ldconfig cache and common prefixes
dpkg / rpminstalled openssl / libssl* packages (informational)
processlibcrypto mapped by running processes; a library replaced on disk is UNKNOWN
python-sslssl.OPENSSL_VERSION of each interpreter and venv found under $HOME
py-wheelOpenSSL bundled in wheels (cryptography _rust*.so, *.libs/libcrypto*)
bundledother libcrypto copies under $HOME, /opt, /usr/local, /srv
dockerrunning containers via docker exec ... find/grep (needs sh, find, grep inside)

Not covered: statically linked binaries (Go, Rust), stopped containers, image layers.

Safety

  • Read-only: no files are written or modified, nothing is sent over the network.
  • PATH is pinned. The test hooks (CVE_2026_121481_TEST_PATH, CVE_2026_121481_TEST_ROOT) are ignored for root and for an unknown uid.
  • Python interpreters are started with -I and only print version and site information.
  • docker exec runs a read-only find/grep inside each running container; use --no-docker if you do not want commands executed in containers.
  • Everything read from the host (paths, container names, versions) is cut to 200 plain ASCII characters before it is shown, so it cannot carry terminal escape sequences or break the JSON.
  • Output contains local paths and container names; redact before sharing publicly.

Example output (synthetic)

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