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GitHubqcg5olf5zu9l2w/cve-2026-119618-yara

CVE-2026-119618-YARA

YARA rules to inventory Apache mod_http2 presence, HTTP/2 config directives and source markers for CVE-2026-119618 exposure triage, with a fixed-build hash allowlist.

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6 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-119618-YARA

YARA: Search for vulnerable

CVE-2026-119618 – YARA inventory rules for Apache mod_http2 (v4.4)

Rule file: CVE-2026-119618-mod_http2-detection-v4.4.yar Date: 2026-11-14

What these rules are

An inventory and exposure aid for CVE-2026-119618, the race condition in assign_headers() of Apache mod_http2 that can lead to remote code execution.

The rules find where mod_http2 exists on disk and where configuration files refer to HTTP/2. They leave out binaries you have verified as patched.

What these rules are not

  • Not a vulnerability proof. A patched and an unpatched mod_http2.so carry the same markers. A match means "the module is here", nothing more.
  • Not exploit or compromise detection. No attacker IoCs are published for this CVE. Exploitation attempts show up in logs and process activity, not in files these rules can see.
  • Not a runtime check. The rules do not know whether a running httpd has loaded the module or offers h2/h2c.

Affected and fixed versions (upstream)

ComponentAffectedFixed
Apache HTTP Server2.4.55 – 2.4.702.4.71 (commit 824beab)
Standalone mod_h22.0.8 – 2.0.42sources disagree on whether a fixed release exists

Distributions backport the fix without changing the upstream version number. Example: the fixed RHEL 9 package is mod_http2-2.0.26-7.el9_9.1, which is still "2.0.26". Never conclude "vulnerable" from a version string alone.

Rules

Every rule has a tag, so output can be filtered with yara -t <tag>.

TagRule (prefix CVE_2026_119618_)ClassificationMeaning of a match
modulemod_http2_ELFMODULE_PRESENTLinux/Unix shared module or static httpd containing mod_http2
modulemod_http2_PEMODULE_PRESENTWindows build containing mod_http2 (file may be named .so)
modulemod_http2_MachOMODULE_PRESENTmacOS build containing mod_http2
modulemod_http2_Generic_Binary_CandidateMODULE_CANDIDATEmod_http2 markers in other binary data: archives, image layers, core dumps, object files
proxymod_proxy_http2_BinaryPROXY_MODULE_PRESENTmod_proxy_http2; inventory only, not a finding for this CVE
configmod_http2_LoadModule_ConfigCONFIG_LOAD_DIRECTIVENon-comment LoadModule http2_module line
configHTTP2_Protocols_h2_ConfigCONFIG_H2_TLSProtocols line listing h2 (HTTP/2 over TLS)
configHTTP2_Protocols_h2c_ConfigCONFIG_H2CProtocols line listing h2c (cleartext HTTP/2)
configHTTP2_Additional_Directives_ConfigCONFIG_H2_DIRECTIVEOther H2… directive; not proof that HTTP/2 is on
sourcemod_http2_SourceSOURCE_PRESENTmod_http2.c in a source or build tree
sourcemod_http2_Source_VersionSOURCE_VERSIONh2_version.h; yara -s prints the version literal
sourcemod_http2_Source_Affected_FunctionSOURCE_AFFECTED_FUNCTIONSource file containing assign_headers(; review it against commit 824beab
versionmod_http2_Embedded_Version_HintBINARY_VERSION_HINTmod_h2/x.y.z string; unverified marker, see limitations

Three private helper rules do not appear in the output:

  • known_fixed_build – hash allowlist of verified fixed mod_http2 binaries.
  • known_fixed_proxy_build – the same for mod_proxy_http2.
  • looks_like_documentation – keeps the config rules quiet on Markdown and ChangeLog files such as /usr/share/doc/mod_http2/README.md.

Suppressing patched systems

The four module rules and the proxy rule do not report a file whose hash is on the allowlist. A binary that is not listed is always reported: unknown never means patched.

Current entries:

FileHashPackage
mod_http2.soSHA-1 47474b88dd405706962bd7b433e7f1a34052da61assumed RHEL 9 x86_64 mod_http2-2.0.26-7.el9_9.1, to be confirmed
mod_http2.soSHA-256 7b0df6ec28d6e7795844bf391c6648f5c67dcedc2a8a93311c7eff4190fc703enot recorded yet
mod_http2.soSHA-256 40bb1ad543422255514c2427e5864211f0d1a60ed02f7397daad8bc21389cd89not recorded yet
mod_proxy_http2.soSHA-256 bb5b961e6979e3aff80312dbbf99c1055e4349ce133849bff07ee40c2b350718not recorded yet

Adding a fixed build

  1. Confirm the package is fixed (vendor advisory, or the CVE in the package changelog: rpm -q --changelog mod_http2 | grep CVE-2026-119618).
  2. Take the hash and the owning package:
    sha256sum /usr/lib64/httpd/modules/mod_http2.so
    rpm -qf   /usr/lib64/httpd/modules/mod_http2.so
    
  3. Add one line to CVE_2026_119618_known_fixed_build, joined with or, and note distribution, package and architecture in the comment above it:
    // RHEL 9 x86_64  mod_http2-2.0.26-7.el9_9.1
    hash.sha256(0, filesize) == "<lower-case sha256>" or
    

Each architecture and each package release has its own hash.

Config, source and version matches are not suppressed on patched hosts. YARA evaluates each file on its own and cannot know that a config file belongs to a host with a patched module. Use the tag filter below instead.

Usage

# Syntax check
yarac CVE-2026-119618-mod_http2-detection-v4.4.yar /dev/null

# Triage view: only module binaries that are NOT on the fixed-build allowlist.
# Empty output on a host whose builds are all allowlisted.
yara -t module -r CVE-2026-119618-mod_http2-detection-v4.4.yar /

# Full inventory with matched strings and offsets
yara -r -s CVE-2026-119618-mod_http2-detection-v4.4.yar /usr/lib64/httpd /etc/httpd /opt

# Configuration references only
yara -t config -r CVE-2026-119618-mod_http2-detection-v4.4.yar /etc/httpd

Requirements: YARA 4.x built with the hash module (standard in distribution packages). No external variables.

From a match to a verdict

A host is exposed only if all of these hold:

  1. mod_http2 is present and the build is not fixed (module match that is not allowlisted, then check the package).
  2. The module is loaded: apachectl -M | grep http2, or httpd -l for static builds, or grep mod_http2 /proc/<pid>/maps for the running process.
  3. HTTP/2 is offered: an active Protocols line with h2 or h2c. Without one, httpd serves only HTTP/1.1. Check from outside with openssl s_client -connect host:443 -alpn h2.

After installing a fixed package, restart httpd. Until then the running process still has the old module in memory, even though the file on disk is patched.

Limitations

  • No patch detection. Fix status comes from the package database or from the allowlist you maintain.
  • Config rules are line heuristics. They do not evaluate <IfModule>, <IfDefine>, includes, inactive virtual hosts, backups or .rpmnew files.
  • The documentation filter is heuristic (code fences, Markdown links, headings, bullet lines) and may need tuning for other doc formats.
  • BINARY_VERSION_HINT is unverified. It is not confirmed that compiled modules embed a mod_h2/x.y.z string. Check with strings mod_http2.so | grep -E 'mod_h2|2\.0\.[0-9]+'; remove the rule if not.
  • SOURCE_AFFECTED_FUNCTION is untested against a real source tree, and patched source contains the function too.
  • Size limits. Binaries above 256 MiB and text files above 4 MiB are skipped.
  • Containers and archives. Compressed archives and image layers must be unpacked by the scanner first.
  • No match is not proof of absence.

Test status

The rule file was written without access to a YARA engine. Field use so far showed that the file compiles and that the allowlist removes the mod_http2_ELF match on a patched RHEL 9 host (observed with v4.2/v4.3). Not yet confirmed on real files: the proxy allowlist, the documentation filter, the tag filter, and the PE and Mach-O rules.

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