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TBP-NETWORK — Theory and implemantation of the TBP protocol to secure networked AI in small to open web networks | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/philippeabraxas-jpg/tbp-network
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GitHubphilippeabraxas-jpg/tbp-network

TBP-NETWORK

Theory and implemantation of the TBP protocol to secure networked AI in small to open web networks

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1141 month agoNot yet reviewed

TBP-NETWORK

Network-level implementation of the Teleological Bounding Protocol (TBP) — attested governance of AI agent actions over a network, from a single machine to enterprise deployments up to WWW scale.

« Existing access control decides whether you get in; TBP decides what you're allowed to do once inside — and proves it. We govern capabilities, not models. »

Never a partnership by trust — only by an attested handshake. That is the goal: the inter-entity handshake (spec §3) lets entities that do not trust each other prove policy, history and liveness to each other. The handshake itself is not built yet (#33). What this repository contains today is what comes before it and what it will rest on — the PEPs, the cell broker and registries, NAC, supervision, the deployment guides — which extends TBP's governance from a single machine to a small network of machines under one organization.

Try it: a DEV-TEST of TBP, on three machines

Not for production. Throw-away keys, machines you can lose, no real data. It exists so that you can try to break TBP before a production release does.

TBP-NETWORK ships a simple deployment to run and attack before a production release exists. Three machines, each deployed by one script: M1 the cell (brokerd and its OPA), M2 an application server (pepd and a small application), M3 an agent. It tests that the whole thing works — an agent enrolled by its certificate, a decision over mutual TLS, a token checked by a server, the server's posture governed by the controllers — with the real binaries and the real enforcement; only the key ceremony is simplified. A one-machine variant lets you look at the cell alone.

Everything is in deploy/dev-test/: what each machine is for and why, the exact procedure from fresh Debian 12 machines, the scenario to test, where to attack, what it does and does not prove — and how to send us your numbers and comments for each environment you try, which we want. Anything exploitable goes through SECURITY.md, not a public issue.

What TBP is — and isn't

TBP does not close every hole; it audits every hole. That's not a limitation to work around, it's the founding postulate (spec §1: "we do not close every hole; we rank holes by impact and mitigate proportionally — governance is allocation, not completeness"). TBP is not a self-sufficient security system — it doesn't replace SELinux, firewalls, IAM, or OS-level sandboxing, and it never will by design. What it does is narrower and non-negotiable: no governed action executes without a cryptographically provable decision, and no decision — allow or deny — escapes the audit chain unprovable and uncorrupted. TBP is a governance and attestation layer over whatever enforcement stack a deployment already has, not a substitute for it.

How much TBP restricts is a deployment choice, not a protocol property. Between allow-all (monitor mode, everything logged, nothing blocked) and deny-all sits a whole spectrum, shaped by which OPA rule packs a cell loads, which scale (below) it operates at, and how far it pushes plan contracts, quorum, and the (planned) risk-scoring layer (#177–#181). A personal lab and a regulated production cell can run the identical protocol at very different points on that spectrum, and that's by design, not a gap — see "Next planned work" below for the rule-pack / posture presets planned for the per-scale admin console.

Exactly two things don't move, at any point on that spectrum:

  1. The three non-derogable invariants carried by the core protocol — F-STABILITY (no autonomous value transfer / market manipulation), I-INTEGRITY (no autonomous agent control of industrial/OT systems), W-MONOPOLY (no integration into lethal kill chains or WMD development) — see tbp4.2.1/README.md. These are the categories where a bad action isn't reversible by revoking access after the fact; no deployment posture, rule pack, or scale ever relaxes them.
  2. Provable audit — that an action happened, and that the record of it hasn't been tampered with, is always provable by construction (hash-only leaves, Merkle-anchored chain, §6.2), independent of how permissive or strict the policy loaded on top of it is.

Everything else — how wide the allowed envelope is, how much friction an operator accepts, which compositions require a human signature — is a choice between complexity, operational need, and what a given deployment can actually run, not a property of the protocol itself.

Note on language: the reference specification is now docs/spec-en-v1.0.md (English) — this is the document code and audits should be built against. Its version number resets to 1.0 deliberately: it's a clean restart into a citable, versioned document (§13: "versioned conservatively; changes pass through signed, attested transitions"), not a continuation of the working note's own count — the higher-numbered working note is not the newer document. The author's working note — denser, less linear, useful for design-rationale digging, but not the one to cite — exists in two languages: docs/spec-v1.4.10.md (English) and docs/spec-v1.4.10.fr.md (original French). The same convention applies across the repo: every document originally written in French now has an English primary at its original path, with the French original kept beside it as <name>.fr.md. The glossary (docs/glossaire.md) is still French-sourced (§14 of the French doc is its terminology source of truth) with an English gloss column for readability — this is unchanged.

Start here

The full specification is docs/spec-en-v1.0.md — it is the source of truth for any design or configuration decision in this repo. This README only summarizes what's needed to get oriented; when in doubt, the spec governs. The working note (docs/spec-v1.4.10.md, English translation of the French original) is not superseded content-wise — it's the same protocol, developed there first — but it is not the citable reference going forward.

Useful landmarks for reading it:

  • §1 Doctrine — the ten non-negotiable rules.
  • §13 Implementation sequence — the order to follow (HSM → OPA → PEP → NAC → translator), and the exact scope of pilot P1.
  • §9.1 Friction budget — the latency and arbitration-rate thresholds that determine whether a TBP deployment is actually working; keep these in view for every configuration decision.
  • docs/glossaire.md — one canonical term per concept, to be used consistently across the code and docs of this repo (see CONTRIBUTING.md).

Relation to the main TBP repository

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