
A slightly more robust version of MaherAzzouzi's POC, created by my agent on the fly during testing.
An adapted version of MaherAzzouzi's VsockDrop exploit for CVE-2026-53365, modified for reliability on busy systems where the original PoC's page reclaim race is unreliable.
These modifications were written autonomously by an AI model during a penetration testing engagement. No human wrote or reviewed the exploit code before it was compiled and executed. See How This Came About for the full story.
A reference-count underflow in the Linux kernel's io_uring zerocopy send path
over AF_VSOCK. When a large message is fragmented into multiple skbs, the
zerocopy completion tracking (uarg) is only attached to the final skb. The
earlier skbs carry pinned user pages with no completion callback, so each
send-and-drain cycle applies one extra put_page to those pages.
After enough iterations the pin bias drops to zero, the pages hit the per-cpu
page (PCP) free list, and a cold read of a setuid binary (e.g. /usr/bin/su)
reclaims one as pagecache. The attacker still holds an alias through the
io_uring fixed buffer and rewrites the ELF .interp string to point at a
controlled stub, which runs as root when su is exec'd.
io_uring enabled, vsock_loopback module loaded,
/dev/vsock accessible (typically mode 0666)The original VsockDrop PoC hardcodes 1024 sends to exhaust the io_uring pin refcount and assumes the freed page lands cleanly in the su pagecache on the first try. On a quiet VM this works reliably. On a busy system (multiple services, memory pressure, PCP churn) two things go wrong:
The refcount bias at pin time depends on kernel config and runtime state. On Ubuntu 6.8.0-136 with default settings, the drain point was ~1994 sends rather than 1024. This version probes dynamically: each iteration dumps the io_uring fixed buffer through a snapshot file and scans for an ELF header, stopping at the exact iteration where reclaim succeeds.
After the page is freed to PCP, another allocation (not the su pagecache read) may grab it first. The original PoC has no recovery path for this. This version implements a page-level heap feng shui technique:
mmap
MAP_ANONYMOUS, tagged with a unique byte (0x01 + (n & 0xFF))0xAA pages
(the buffer was initialized to 0xAA)This makes the exploit reliable on systems where PCP has active churn from other allocators.
/var/tmp/.s (the original uses /tmp), since
Ubuntu 26.04 mounts /tmp with nosuidod/sed, no xxd dependency) so the binary is fully self-containedThis exploit was not written by a human. It was produced autonomously by Qwen3.8-Flash-Next (~170B parameter model, uncensored) running on a Halogen Flash Server backend, during an unassisted penetration testing engagement against a Hack The Box challenge machine.
The model was operating inside an autonomous pentesting harness (OpenCode + custom plugins) with no human guidance during the exploitation phase. After gaining an unprivileged shell on a Hack The Box target, it found CVE-2026-53365 via web search, downloaded the original PoC, identified that the target kernel was in the affected range, and ran it. When the original failed (drain point mismatch), the model diagnosed the issue, adapted the drain logic, added the sacrificial page technique, and iterated until it achieved reliable root — all without human input. The exploit development took approximately 4 hours of autonomous operation.
Requires liburing (static library + headers). On Ubuntu/Debian:
apt-get install liburing-dev
Or build from source:
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/axboe/liburing.git
cd liburing && ./configure && make -j$(nproc) && cd ..
Then:
# If liburing is installed system-wide:
make LIBURING=/usr
# If built from source alongside this directory:
make LIBURING=./liburing
This produces a single static binary exploit with the interp stub and rootsh
helper embedded.
# Default: probe up to 1024 iterations
./exploit
# Specify max iterations (use higher values for kernels with larger pin bias)
./exploit 2500
The exploit will print HIT at send <N> when it successfully reclaims su's
page 0, or DIG aa=<N> elf=<page> when the sacrificial page technique fires.
On success, you get a root shell. On failure, it prints a diagnostic
(no elf page, no interp, etc.) and exits non-zero.
After the exploit runs, the target's su binary has a corrupted pagecache and the marimo/application server may OOM. Run this only in disposable environments (CTF boxes, lab VMs).
MIT — see LICENSE. Same license as the original VsockDrop.
This software is provided for authorized security testing, research, and educational purposes only. Do not use it against systems you do not own or have explicit written permission to test. The authors are not responsible for misuse.