Detection-only triage for Puppet Enterprise / OpenVox CVE-2026-115731 (report deserialization RCE, CVSS 9.4) and CVE-2026-115732 — version grading, port 8140 probe, report/log IOC hunt. No payloads.
puppet-enterprise-scannerDetection-only triage for Perforce Puppet Enterprise / OpenVox CVE-2026-115731 (report deserialization to server RCE, CVSS 4.0 9.4) and its companion CVE-2026-115732 (certificate-name authorization bypass, CVSS 4.0 9.0). Grades your Puppet version against the fixed releases, probes a live server's port 8140 the way a defender would (one TCP connect, one TLS handshake, one plain GET that expects a 401/403), and greps saved reports and logs for the exploitation markers the advisories name. No client certificate, no report body, no payloads, no exploit traffic: nothing here can trigger the flaw.
What it checksCVE-2026-115731 — Puppet agents send a JSON report to the server after every run, PUT /puppet/v3/report/<certname>. The server rebuilds each event with Puppet's rich-data deserializer, which honours a __ptype key: it parses the value as a Puppet type expression and builds an instance of that type. A type expression can define a new object type inline, and a RubyMethod annotation on one of its functions has its body pasted into a generated class and run through class_eval. Ruby executes backticks in a class body at definition time, so a crafted report runs a shell command as the puppet service user the moment the server parses it. CVSS 4.0 9.4 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H), CWE-502 deserialization of untrusted data + CWE-94 code injection. Neodyme found it while preparing a red team engagement; the fix landed 2026-11-03.8140 can enrol a certificate and then run code on the server. Code execution as puppet gives access to the CA signing key, so the attacker can mint certificates for any node — and, where PXP orchestration is configured, run commands as root on managed nodes.CVE-2026-115732 — trapperkeeper-authorization, the library that enforces auth.conf, matched exact-hostname rules like prefix wildcards: a certificate for evil.target.example.com passed a rule written for target.example.com. Neodyme pulled PostgreSQL credentials and admin API tokens from a catalog during their engagement. Same fixed releases as above, plus trapperkeeper-authorization 2.5.0.CVE-2026-115731 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-11-17, with a federal remediation deadline of 2026-12-01. CISA publishes no exploitation details, actors or victims, and no public attack report was found — the KEV entry is the exploitation evidence.Fixed versions, per the Perforce advisory and the OpenVox advisories (all released 2026-11-03):
Product | Upgrade to |
|---|---|
Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.x | 2023.8.13 |
Puppet Enterprise 2025.x | 2025.12.1 |
Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.x | 2026.0.1 |
Puppet Core | 9.1.3 / 8.22.1 |
OpenVox Server | 9.2.0 / 8.18.0 |
OpenVox agent | 9.3.0 / 8.32.0 |
OpenVoxDB | 9.2.0 / 8.18.0 |
trapperkeeper-authorization | 2.5.0 |
Community open-source Puppet and Puppet Server have no fix at any version. Perforce moved Puppet off its open-source licence in 2025, and Vox Pupuli says the open-source builds will not receive security updates. Migrate to OpenVox or Puppet Core.
Usage# grade a version string for a named product
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --product pe --version "2025.12.0"
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --product openvox-server --version "9.1.1"
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --product puppet --version "8.10.0"
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --product trapperkeeper-authorization --version "2.4.1"
# on the Puppet box itself (packages + version commands + autosign)
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --local
# a live server: port 8140 reachability + TLS cert + status probe
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --host puppet.example.com
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --host puppet.example.com --port 8140
# hunt saved reports / logs for the exploitation markers
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --logs /var/log/puppetlabs/puppetserver/
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --reports /opt/puppetlabs/server/data/puppetserver/reports/
# a whole fleet at once
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --inventory-json fleet.json
# machine output / the fixed-version table
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --product pe --version "2025.12.1" --json
python3 puppet_enterprise_scanner.py --list
--product takes pe, puppet-core, openvox-server, openvox-agent, openvoxdb, puppet, puppetserver, or trapperkeeper-authorization (default pe). --local reads puppet / puppetserver / openvox --version, the VERSION files under /opt/puppetlabs, and the rpm / dpkg package lists, then checks whether the server autosigns certificate requests. --host connects to port 8140, reads the presented TLS certificate (subject CNs + SHA-256 prefix, never trusted), then GETs /status/v1/simple without a client certificate: 401/403 is the expected answer, and the version is not disclosed to unauthenticated callers, so a remote probe can only confirm exposure — grade the version locally. --logs / --reports walk files and directories (including .gz logs) for __ptype with an inline Object[ type, RubyMethod, or annotations, and flags certnames on report PUTs that look like another certname with an extra leading label (the CVE-2026-115732 impersonation shape).
fleet.json is a list of {"host": "pe-a", "product": "pe", "version": "2025.12.1"} objects. Entries can use "version_file" to point at a saved version string and "autosign": true to record that the host autosigns.
Exit codes: 0 patched / not affected / not exposed / clean, 1 vulnerable or suspicious, 2 unknown, 3 usage error.
The traps