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vmware-vcenter-2026 — Indicators and a read-only hunt guide for VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890, from Google's report. One source, not tested, will go stale. Check the dates. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/cyber-bansalai/vmware-vcenter-2026
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GitHubcyber-bansalai/vmware-vcenter-2026

vmware-vcenter-2026

Indicators and a read-only hunt guide for VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890, from Google's report. One source, not tested, will go stale. Check the dates.

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VMware vCenter flaw CVE-2026-123890: indicators and hunt guide

Read first. This package is aggregated from public research and vendor documents by SOC-Lite by BansalAI. It is not tested by us, it comes with no warranty, and it is not professional advice. It is as of 2026-11-19, the day the flaw was published, and it will go stale. See DISCLAIMER.md. We are not affiliated with any company credited in CREDITS.md, and none of them reviewed or endorsed this package.

On 2026-11-19 Broadcom published advisory VMSA-2026-0009. One flaw in it, CVE-2026-123890, lets someone with network access to VMware vCenter get in without a password. Broadcom lists no workaround. The same day, Google's threat researchers (Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant) said a suspected China-linked group had used the flaw since early September 2026, before any fix existed. They describe one break-in: the group got an administrator session on vCenter, copied the directory database and the key that signs single sign-on tokens, then moved on to ESXi hosts and copied files out of virtual machines.

This repository copies the indicators the report publishes (with credit) and adds a guide to checking your own systems.

Not technical? Start with the plain-language version: VMware vCenter Update: What to Ask Whoever Runs Your Servers on the SOC-Lite blog. It gives five questions to put to your IT person or provider.

What is in here

FileWhat
iocs/iocs.csvOne row per indicator, with the source, the date, how fragile it is, and a review date
docs/hunt-guide.mdHow to check your version, the network, vCenter, ESXi hosts and the Linux machines near vCenter, what the results do and do not mean, and what to do if something looks real
CREDITS.mdThe research and documents this is built from, and what we took from each
DISCLAIMER.mdThe full disclaimer

Where the indicators come from

Rows: 32 · verified (two or more sources): 0 · single source: 32

These counts match iocs/iocs.csv; we check them every time we change the file (a test checks them in our private working copy). Every value was read from the publisher's own copy of the report. One source means no row is verified yet. What we took, and where it came from, is in CREDITS.md.

Copied into iocs.csv (indicator values, with credit)

SourceRowsRows by typeWhat we tookLink
Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant3211 ip, 5 filename, 6 file-path, 3 string, 1 account, 6 behaviourThe report's two indicator tables (eleven addresses and six file names), and the paths, ports, account-name prefix, SSH banner, tool file names and described behaviour that the report's text giveshttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere
Total32

What is not here, and why

  • No file hashes, domains or key fingerprints. The report does not publish them in its text. Google says its full list is in a collection "for registered users", which we have not opened: the Google Threat Intelligence collection. If you have access, load the hashes from there, because that is Google's own copy. We do not guess or reconstruct values.
  • No detection rules. Google published six rules for the group's tools. They are code under Google's terms, so we link to them: see the report's "Detections" section (link above).
  • The rest of the account name. The group created a local administrator whose name starts sps-. The report redacts the rest, and so do we.

Read the results carefully

  • A match is a reason to look, not a verdict. Most of the file and path rows describe where the report found a tool on a separate Linux machine, not on vCenter. The group can rename every file.
  • The eleven addresses are a suspected network of other people's hacked firewalls and routers. The report gives no date, no port and no link to a victim. Such addresses change hands quickly. Do not mass-block them; look each one up against your own logs first.
  • The report describes one break-in. We found no public count of victims.
  • Your own records may not reach back far enough. vCenter keeps its own task and event history for 30 days by default, and the report says the group removed its tools after use. A clean result is not an all-clear.
  • This is one source. Every row comes from one report, so no row is marked verified. We mark a row verified only when two or more independent publishers report it.
  • There is more in the report than we copy. Read it for the full description of how the group worked (link in CREDITS.md).

Using iocs.csv

ColumnMeaning
idStable row ID (VC-nnnn)
waveAlways vcenter in this release
typeip, filename, file-path, string, account or behaviour
valueThe indicator. Addresses are written as normal text, not defanged. Never open them in a browser
matchexact, substring, prefix or wildcard
evidenceWhere it would show: network, file, process, access-log or event-log
fragileyes if the attacker can change it trivially
verifiedyes only when two or more independent primary sources report it. no means a single source
source_url, source_dateWhere we took it from and the date of that source
fetched, review_byWhen we read it, and when it should be re-checked (30 days for every row here)
notesContext and caveats. Sentences starting "Our note" are ours, not the source's

Search your own systems with the steps in the hunt guide. This package does not ship anything that runs on your systems or collects data from them.

Licence

The text we wrote is licensed under CC BY 4.0 (LICENSE). The indicator values and facts belong to the research and documents that reported them: they are credited in CREDITS.md, and we do not relicense them. Details and how to credit us are in NOTICE.md.

Where to go for the full, current picture

Broadcom's advisory is the authority on which versions are affected and fixed. Google's report is the authority on what the group did. Both may be updated: follow the links in CREDITS.md.

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