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samsung_tizen_tv_root — Research toolkit that roots a Samsung Tizen 9 TV via a Chromium WasmGC RCE and V4L2 physmap arbitrary physical memory access, with persistent on-boot payload and root shell channel. | Kitploit
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GitHubcommit-regrets/samsung_tizen_tv_root

samsung_tizen_tv_root

Research toolkit that roots a Samsung Tizen 9 TV via a Chromium WasmGC RCE and V4L2 physmap arbitrary physical memory access, with persistent on-boot payload and root shell channel.

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296955 days agoReviewed by Kitploit

Samsung Tizen 9 TV Root — Research Toolkit

Unofficial security research on a 2024 Samsung Neo QLED running Tizen 9. The exploit chain needs no sdb, no developer mode, no firmware flashing: the TV is rooted from its own browser, and the root is made persistent through a stock on-boot service app.

Test unit2024 Neo QLED, QNX1D series (QTV T09 platform)
FirmwareT-PTMxxxx (01400)
KernelLinux 5.4.249, ARM32 (VMSPLIT_3G + HIGHMEM, no LPAE), PAGE_OFFSET 0xC0000000, PHYS_OFFSET 0x20000000
BrowserChromium 120.0.6099.5 (SamsungBrowser/7.0)
Rootuid=0, CapEff=0x3fffffffff
Persistent payloadrepo v47 (current md5/size in the AGENTS.md state row); payload_backup.dll keeps the previous build
Root channelTCP 31337 on the TV, line protocol, replies end with __END__

Quick start

pwsh -File .\root.ps1 -TvIp <tv-ip>        # root the TV
pwsh -File .\uninstall.ps1 -TvIp <tv-ip>   # restore stock

root.ps1 runs on the PC and drives everything: it starts the port-80 server, roots the browser stub, installs the boot payload, and waits for the root channel after the reboot. Two steps stay on the TV remote, and it prompts for both:

  1. open the printed http://<pc-ip>/index.html and wait for RUNNING;
  2. power-cycle the TV once the deploy is verified.

Then:

python tools\root_shell.py "id" <tv-ip>   # talk to the TV's root channel

Every option, the exact prompts, expected output, the host-IP caveat and the manual fallback: docs/USAGE.md.

How it works

  1. Browser RCE — CVE-2024-2887 (WasmGC type confusion) in Chromium 120 gives arbitrary read/write and ARM shellcode execution inside the renderer.
  2. Physmap — the V4L2 codec nodes (/dev/video40/30/60) accept an attacker-chosen vm_pgoff in mmap() and pass it to remap_pfn_range() unvalidated: arbitrary physical memory read/write from an unprivileged process (uid 5001, group video). Exclusivity is per instance: the payload retries video40 on EBUSY and falls back to video30/video60 only on ENOENT/ENODEV — never cycle nodes on busy.
  3. Root — find the kernel Image and init_task in physical memory, locate our own task through a forked child's real_parent, and zero the credentials.
  4. Persistence — replace the IL assembly of a stock app_onboot service with a .NET payload that repeats the physmap/cred patch at every boot, closes its node and serves a root command channel on TCP 31337.

No GPU CVE, no kernel exploit, no signed module. The physmap is the interesting part; the stage-by-stage writeup with the measured constants is docs/EXPLOIT.md.

Kernel analysis — firmware file first, TV dump when rooted

The kernel you analyse comes from two sources, in order: the OTA package downloadable before rooting (strip the u-boot header off its uImage), and after rooting the TV itself — flash partition or live RAM — via tools/dump_kernel_chunked.py and tools/dump_kernel_ram.py. Key rule: trust RAM, not the firmware file, for any offset that goes into shellcode — the two are usually different builds (the TV may run a newer build than the package you downloaded, and each build links its sections at slightly different addresses; it is not a runtime relocation). Full procedure, measured examples and the flash-vs-RAM build differences: docs/KERNEL-DUMPS.md.

After rooting — debloat

The package-inventory / disable-list work (QNX1D classification, apply and restore tooling, measured resource budget) lives in this repository under debloat/. It consumes this toolkit's root channel as its only dependency. The payload re-asserts the durable service masks at every boot on its own, and root.ps1 runs a debloat health check (tools/tv_health.py) against debloat/registry.tsv after a deploy.

Rooting and debloating are separate steps. The deploy installs only the policy — deploy.sh fetches services-units.txt (29 units), services-bind.txt (23 kill binaries), debloat-apps.txt (the registry's 73 applied ids) and debloat-sentinels.txt into /opt/usr/data/, and the payload re-applies the service masks at every boot. The app disables — the 73 package_app_info.app_disable rows and the canalysis/pisa sentinels — are written by debloat/tools/apply.sh, a one-time per-TV run that also records an undo log and arms /opt/usr/data/debloat-enforce; with that marker present the v49 payload repairs any row an update reset (and re-plants the sentinels) at every boot. On a TV where the apply has never run, the payload beacons apps skip (not armed) and tv_health reports drift (applied/count/ sentinels); root.ps1 then exits 4 (deploy succeeded, acceptance did not) — use -SkipHealth or run the apply first.

After rooting — TV behaviour

Two TV-side behaviours are commonly worth changing once rooted. Neither is part of the payload — both are ordinary settings stored on the TV (/opt/dbspace), so a fresh root (or a stock set) keeps stock behaviour until you set them.

  • Samsung TV Plus opens at power-on. Two independent switches are involved (the TV Plus autorun key and the Start Screen Option target); the "Autorun Last App" setting is a third, unrelated one. Explanation, exact keys, verify and revert: docs/TVPLUS-AUTOSTART.md.
  • Samsung updates. Firmware OTA, store apps and built-in (preload) apps are three separate paths. A preload update resets the debloat rows and drops the vendor sentinels — that is how the disabled ad services came back on 2026-11-12. How to switch each path off, how the boot payload does (and does not) re-assert, and how to detect/restore a reset: docs/SAMSUNG-UPDATES.md.

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