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outlook-ntlm-leak-investigation — Research and detection of the Outlook zero-day CVE-2026-124194 (NTLM hash leak): attack chain, detection searches in Splunk, tested on a simulated scenario. | Kitploit
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GitHubaminaljabre77-collab/outlook-ntlm-leak-investigation

outlook-ntlm-leak-investigation

Research and detection of the Outlook zero-day CVE-2026-124194 (NTLM hash leak): attack chain, detection searches in Splunk, tested on a simulated scenario.

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3 days agoNot yet reviewed

CVE-2026-124194: Detecting the Outlook NTLM Hash Leak

Research into how the Outlook zero-day CVE-2026-124194 leaks NTLM credentials, how a SOC can detect it in logs, and what stops it. The detections are tested on a simulated attack scenario.

Research questions

  1. How does the attack work, step by step?
  2. What does it leave in the logs (email, Windows, firewall)?
  3. Which searches can detect it, and how early?
  4. What weaknesses make it successful, and how can they be fixed?

1. Background

VulnerabilityCVE-2026-124194, Microsoft Outlook
ImpactLeak of the user's NTLMv2 hash to an attacker-controlled server
Patched10 Nov 2026 (November Patch Tuesday)
Exploited in the wildYes. Added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 10 Nov 2026
TriggerThe victim opens a crafted Outlook message file. The Preview Pane alone is not an attack vector

When the crafted message is opened, Outlook connects to an attacker-controlled network location over SMB (TCP 445) without the usual external-content warning. Windows then sends the user's NTLMv2 authentication data to that server.

2. How the attack works

Phishing email with crafted .msg attached
        │
        ▼
User opens the .msg in Outlook
        │
        ▼
outlook.exe connects to the attacker's SMB server (TCP 445)
        │
        ▼
Windows sends the user's NTLMv2 hash
        │
        ▼
Attacker cracks the hash offline (weak password) or relays it
        │
        ▼
Attacker logs in as the user (e.g. to the mail server)

MITRE ATT&CK: T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment · T1187 Forced Authentication · T1110.002 Password Cracking · T1078 Valid Accounts

3. Detection opportunities

Each stage of the attack leaves a trace. These are the signals a SOC can alert on:

StageSignalLog sourceEvent
DeliveryEmail from a newly registered or look-alike domain, SPF fail/softfail, .msg attachmentEmail gateway–
ExecutionUser opens the .msg file in OutlookWindows / EDR4688
Hash leakoutlook.exe making an SMB connection to a public IPWindows Filtering Platform, firewall5156
Credential useNTLM logon for the user from an unknown workstation or external IPDomain controller, target server4776, 4624 (type 3)

The strongest signal is the hash leak: outlook.exe should never talk SMB to the internet. A search for this catches the attack before the attacker uses the credentials.

index=windows EventCode=5156 process="outlook.exe" dest_port=445 NOT dest_ip=10.*
| table _time host user dest_ip dest_port result

All searches are in queries.spl.

4. Testing the detections: simulated case

To test the searches, I built a simulated scenario for a fictional company (Nordwell) with email, Windows and firewall logs (logs/), then investigated it as an L1 SOC analyst would.

Timeline (9 Nov 2026, CET)

TimeEventSource
07:10Email "Q4 invoice - please review" from [email protected] delivered to 6 users, SPF softfailemail logs
07:22:00marie.pokorna opens Q4_Invoice_Nov.msg on WS-12 in OutlookWindows 4688
07:22:05outlook.exe on WS-12 (10.0.4.32) connects to 198.51.100.23:445. The firewall allowed it, so the hash leakedWindows 5156, firewall
07:31:00NTLM authentication for marie.pokorna from workstation WIN-ATTK01Windows 4776 (DC01)
07:31:03Successful network logon (type 3, NTLM) to MAIL01 as marie.pokorna from 198.51.100.23Windows 4624

The attacker used the credentials 9 minutes after the file was opened. An alert on the hash-leak signal (07:22:05) would have given the SOC that time to block the IP and reset the password.

Investigation steps

Who received the email?

index=email sender="[email protected]"
| table _time sender recipient subject attachment spf

6 recipients. The domain uses the number 1 instead of the letter l ("supp1ier"), and SPF is softfail.

Who opened it?

index=windows EventCode=4688 command_line="*Q4_Invoice*"
| table _time host user parent_process process command_line

Only marie.pokorna on WS-12.

Did the computer connect out over SMB?

index=windows host=WS-12 EventCode=5156 dest_port=445
| table _time process src_ip dest_ip dest_port result

outlook.exe connected to the public IP 198.51.100.23 on port 445, and the firewall log confirms it was allowed.

Were the credentials used?

index=windows user=marie.pokorna (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4776) auth_package=NTLM
| table _time host EventCode src_ip workstation logon_type auth_package result

Yes. A successful NTLM logon to MAIL01 from the attacker's IP and workstation WIN-ATTK01, not from her own PC.

Indicators of compromise (simulated)

IndicatorTypeNote
198.51.100.23IPAttacker SMB server
supp1ier-portal.comDomainLook-alike, registered 2 days before the email
[email protected]SenderPhishing sender
Q4_Invoice_Nov.msgFileCrafted message file
WIN-ATTK01HostnameAttacker workstation

Response

  • Purged all 6 emails from user mailboxes
  • Blocked 198.51.100.23 and supp1ier-portal.com
  • Reset the user's password
  • Escalated to L2 to review what was accessed on MAIL01

5. Findings: why the attack worked

  1. Outbound SMB (TCP 445) to the internet was allowed. This let the hash leave the network.
  2. The mail server accepted NTLM logons from an external IP. This let the attacker log in with the stolen credentials.
  3. No MFA on mail access, and a password weak enough to crack quickly.
  4. The email gateway delivered mail with SPF softfail from a 2-day-old domain.
  5. Outlook was unpatched. The fix came one day after the attack (zero-day).

6. Recommendations

  • Block outbound TCP 445 to the internet
  • Install the CVE-2026-124194 Outlook update
  • Restrict NTLM and use Kerberos where possible; do not accept NTLM from outside the network
  • Enable SMB signing and Extended Protection for Authentication against NTLM relay
  • Enforce strong passwords and MFA on email and remote access
  • Quarantine email from newly registered domains and with SPF fail/softfail
  • Alert on outlook.exe (and other Office processes) making SMB connections to public IPs

7. Limitations

  • The logs are simulated, not captured from a real exploit. They model the behaviour described in public reporting.
  • All names, domains and internal IPs are fictional. 198.51.100.0/24 is a documentation IP range.
  • The searches are written in Splunk SPL. Field names will differ in other SIEMs.

References

  • SOC Prime: CVE-2026-124194 Microsoft Outlook Zero-Day Exploited to Steal NTLM Hashes
  • Outlook CVE-2026-124194 in CISA KEV: Fixed Office Builds
  • Microsoft fixes exploited Outlook zero-day CVE-2026-124194
  • MITRE ATT&CK T1187: Forced Authentication
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