Research and detection of the Outlook zero-day CVE-2026-124194 (NTLM hash leak): attack chain, detection searches in Splunk, tested on a simulated scenario.
Research into how the Outlook zero-day CVE-2026-124194 leaks NTLM credentials, how a SOC can detect it in logs, and what stops it. The detections are tested on a simulated attack scenario.
| Vulnerability | CVE-2026-124194, Microsoft Outlook |
| Impact | Leak of the user's NTLMv2 hash to an attacker-controlled server |
| Patched | 10 Nov 2026 (November Patch Tuesday) |
| Exploited in the wild | Yes. Added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 10 Nov 2026 |
| Trigger | The victim opens a crafted Outlook message file. The Preview Pane alone is not an attack vector |
When the crafted message is opened, Outlook connects to an attacker-controlled network location over SMB (TCP 445) without the usual external-content warning. Windows then sends the user's NTLMv2 authentication data to that server.
Phishing email with crafted .msg attached
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User opens the .msg in Outlook
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outlook.exe connects to the attacker's SMB server (TCP 445)
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Windows sends the user's NTLMv2 hash
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Attacker cracks the hash offline (weak password) or relays it
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Attacker logs in as the user (e.g. to the mail server)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment · T1187 Forced Authentication · T1110.002 Password Cracking · T1078 Valid Accounts
Each stage of the attack leaves a trace. These are the signals a SOC can alert on:
| Stage | Signal | Log source | Event |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delivery | Email from a newly registered or look-alike domain, SPF fail/softfail, .msg attachment | Email gateway | – |
| Execution | User opens the .msg file in Outlook | Windows / EDR | 4688 |
| Hash leak | outlook.exe making an SMB connection to a public IP | Windows Filtering Platform, firewall | 5156 |
| Credential use | NTLM logon for the user from an unknown workstation or external IP | Domain controller, target server | 4776, 4624 (type 3) |
The strongest signal is the hash leak: outlook.exe should never talk SMB to the internet. A search for this catches the attack before the attacker uses the credentials.
index=windows EventCode=5156 process="outlook.exe" dest_port=445 NOT dest_ip=10.*
| table _time host user dest_ip dest_port result
All searches are in queries.spl.
To test the searches, I built a simulated scenario for a fictional company (Nordwell) with email, Windows and firewall logs (logs/), then investigated it as an L1 SOC analyst would.
| Time | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 07:10 | Email "Q4 invoice - please review" from [email protected] delivered to 6 users, SPF softfail | email logs |
| 07:22:00 | marie.pokorna opens Q4_Invoice_Nov.msg on WS-12 in Outlook | Windows 4688 |
| 07:22:05 | outlook.exe on WS-12 (10.0.4.32) connects to 198.51.100.23:445. The firewall allowed it, so the hash leaked | Windows 5156, firewall |
| 07:31:00 | NTLM authentication for marie.pokorna from workstation WIN-ATTK01 | Windows 4776 (DC01) |
| 07:31:03 | Successful network logon (type 3, NTLM) to MAIL01 as marie.pokorna from 198.51.100.23 | Windows 4624 |
The attacker used the credentials 9 minutes after the file was opened. An alert on the hash-leak signal (07:22:05) would have given the SOC that time to block the IP and reset the password.
Who received the email?
index=email sender="[email protected]"
| table _time sender recipient subject attachment spf
6 recipients. The domain uses the number 1 instead of the letter l ("supp1ier"), and SPF is softfail.
Who opened it?
index=windows EventCode=4688 command_line="*Q4_Invoice*"
| table _time host user parent_process process command_line
Only marie.pokorna on WS-12.
Did the computer connect out over SMB?
index=windows host=WS-12 EventCode=5156 dest_port=445
| table _time process src_ip dest_ip dest_port result
outlook.exe connected to the public IP 198.51.100.23 on port 445, and the firewall log confirms it was allowed.
Were the credentials used?
index=windows user=marie.pokorna (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4776) auth_package=NTLM
| table _time host EventCode src_ip workstation logon_type auth_package result
Yes. A successful NTLM logon to MAIL01 from the attacker's IP and workstation WIN-ATTK01, not from her own PC.
| Indicator | Type | Note |
|---|---|---|
198.51.100.23 | IP | Attacker SMB server |
supp1ier-portal.com | Domain | Look-alike, registered 2 days before the email |
[email protected] | Sender | Phishing sender |
Q4_Invoice_Nov.msg | File | Crafted message file |
WIN-ATTK01 | Hostname | Attacker workstation |
198.51.100.23 and supp1ier-portal.comoutlook.exe (and other Office processes) making SMB connections to public IPs198.51.100.0/24 is a documentation IP range.