
node9-proxy v2.8.3
The Execution Security Layer for the Agentic Era. Providing deterministic "Sudo" governance and audit logs for autonomous AI agents.
🛡️ node9
Access control for AI agents
Your AI agents can reach Slack, GitHub, email, and your database.
node9 decides what they may do with each one.
Credential jail · secrets and PII · destructive git, SQL and shell held for review · MCP tool pinning · network egress allowlist · loop breaker · one record across twelve agents
Works with Claude Code · Codex CLI · Antigravity (agy) · GitHub Copilot CLI · Gemini CLI · Cursor · Windsurf · VSCode · Claude Desktop · Opencode · Pi · Hermes Agent · any MCP server.
Three ways in
| See | Scan a repository on every pull request, or check this machine. Nothing to install. | Scan every pull request |
| Guard | Put node9 in front of every tool call your agents make: allowed, blocked, or held for you. | Guard your agents |
| Prove | One OWASP Agentic Top 10 report across every agent and every machine your team runs. | Prove it to your team |
Scan every pull request
This repository is also the GitHub Action node9 Agent Security. It reads the agent configuration committed to a repository (workflows, agent settings, MCP servers, instruction files) and reports what a pull request could turn against you. Nothing runs, no agent is installed, and it needs no account and no secret: the job token is enough.
Add one file, .github/workflows/agent-security.yml:
name: node9 agent-security
on: pull_request
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
checks: write
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: node9-ai/node9-proxy@v2
with:
fail-on: high # never | medium | high | critical
fail-on-scope: introduced # judge only what this PR added or made worse
Every pull request then gets:
- A check that passes or fails at the severity you choose.
- One comment that leads with the worst finding in plain words and how to fix it, updated in place on every push.
- Annotations on the lines that caused them.
What it looks for
| Workflows a stranger can steer | a workflow that hands the text of an issue or a pull request to an agent that holds secrets or can run commands, or that runs the agent inside a fork's code |
| Agent settings | allow rules that cover credentials or any command, hooks that fetch remote code, local settings committed by mistake |
| MCP servers and plugins | a server installed at whatever version is newest, a credential written into the config |
| Secrets in reach | secrets an agent in a workflow can read, and the ways it could leak them |
| Instruction files and skills | hidden characters, text that tells the agent to drop its instructions, to fetch and obey a page, or to send data out |
The comment, on a repository where anyone can open an issue that an agent reads:
🛡️ node9 agent-security · 🔴 High: action needed
Anyone can make this repository's AI agent act with its permissions
A stranger opens an issue with instructions for the agent. The agent follows them with this repository's permissions.
What we saw in
.github/workflows/triage.yml:13:
- Anyone can start the agent (
allowed_non_write_users: "*").- It reads the text of the pull request or issue.
- It can run any command (
Bash).✅ How to fix:
- Let only people with write access start it: remove
allowed_non_write_users: "*".- Give the agent only the tools the job needs.
Also found:
- 🟡 MCP server
filesinstalls whatever version is newest, every time (.mcp.json)