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New releaseSep 5, 2026

node9-proxy v2.8.3

The Execution Security Layer for the Agentic Era. Providing deterministic "Sudo" governance and audit logs for autonomous AI agents.

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🛡️ node9

Access control for AI agents

Your AI agents can reach Slack, GitHub, email, and your database.
node9 decides what they may do with each one.

npm version monthly downloads License: Apache 2.0 Documentation OpenSSF Best Practices OpenSSF Scorecard node9 self-scanned Mentioned in Awesome Claude Code

Credential jail · secrets and PII · destructive git, SQL and shell held for review · MCP tool pinning · network egress allowlist · loop breaker · one record across twelve agents

Works with Claude Code · Codex CLI · Antigravity (agy) · GitHub Copilot CLI · Gemini CLI · Cursor · Windsurf · VSCode · Claude Desktop · Opencode · Pi · Hermes Agent · any MCP server.

Three ways in

SeeScan a repository on every pull request, or check this machine. Nothing to install.Scan every pull request
GuardPut node9 in front of every tool call your agents make: allowed, blocked, or held for you.Guard your agents
ProveOne OWASP Agentic Top 10 report across every agent and every machine your team runs.Prove it to your team

Scan every pull request

This repository is also the GitHub Action node9 Agent Security. It reads the agent configuration committed to a repository (workflows, agent settings, MCP servers, instruction files) and reports what a pull request could turn against you. Nothing runs, no agent is installed, and it needs no account and no secret: the job token is enough.

Add one file, .github/workflows/agent-security.yml:

name: node9 agent-security
on: pull_request
permissions:
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write
  checks: write
jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: node9-ai/node9-proxy@v2
        with:
          fail-on: high # never | medium | high | critical
          fail-on-scope: introduced # judge only what this PR added or made worse

Every pull request then gets:

  • A check that passes or fails at the severity you choose.
  • One comment that leads with the worst finding in plain words and how to fix it, updated in place on every push.
  • Annotations on the lines that caused them.

What it looks for

Workflows a stranger can steera workflow that hands the text of an issue or a pull request to an agent that holds secrets or can run commands, or that runs the agent inside a fork's code
Agent settingsallow rules that cover credentials or any command, hooks that fetch remote code, local settings committed by mistake
MCP servers and pluginsa server installed at whatever version is newest, a credential written into the config
Secrets in reachsecrets an agent in a workflow can read, and the ways it could leak them
Instruction files and skillshidden characters, text that tells the agent to drop its instructions, to fetch and obey a page, or to send data out

The comment, on a repository where anyone can open an issue that an agent reads:

🛡️ node9 agent-security · 🔴 High: action needed

Anyone can make this repository's AI agent act with its permissions

A stranger opens an issue with instructions for the agent. The agent follows them with this repository's permissions.

What we saw in .github/workflows/triage.yml:13:

  • Anyone can start the agent (allowed_non_write_users: "*").
  • It reads the text of the pull request or issue.
  • It can run any command (Bash).

✅ How to fix:

  1. Let only people with write access start it: remove allowed_non_write_users: "*".
  2. Give the agent only the tools the job needs.

Also found:

  • 🟡 MCP server files installs whatever version is newest, every time (.mcp.json)

Inputs

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