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cve-2026-99999-audit — Read-only Bash audit script that triages CVE-2026-99999 (PwnEscape) Linux kernel IPv4 checksum OOB write, checking patch status, module reachability, and risk score. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/quaerendir/cve-2026-99999-audit
Defensive ToolsPrivilege EscalationContainer SecurityVulnerability AnalysisScripting & AutomationConfiguration AuditingSecurity VirtualizationMisconfigurationIncident Response
GitHubquaerendir/cve-2026-99999-audit

cve-2026-99999-audit

319vor 2 TagenNoch nicht geprüft

Read-only Bash audit script that triages CVE-2026-99999 (PwnEscape) Linux kernel IPv4 checksum OOB write, checking patch status, module reachability, and risk score.

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cve-2026-99999-audit

CVE Name CVSS Disclosed Shell License Version CI

Read-only audit script for CVE-2026-99999 (a.k.a. PwnEscape). The bug is in the Linux kernel's IPv4 stack: it trusts the checksum metadata a packet arrives with. An untrusted VM guest can use it to escape to the host, and a local user or container can use it for privilege escalation.

   ___               ___
  | _ \__ __ ___ _  | __|___ __ __ _ _ __  ___
  |  _/\ V  V / ' \ | _|(_-</ _/ _` | '_ \/ -_)
  |_|   \_/\_/|_||_||___/__/\__\__,_| .__/\___|
                                    |_|
     CVE-2026-99999    ipv4 skb_checksum_help() csum_start OOB write

TL;DR

A CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packet carries csum_start/csum_offset taken from a virtio_net_hdr. The packet source controls those values. When the IPv4 stack later completes the checksum in skb_checksum_help(), nothing has checked the offsets against the IPv4 header it has already validated. The checksum write then lands on the network header or past it (CWE-787). Red Hat lists the outcomes as code execution on the host, a crash, or a leak of kernel memory.

The upstream fix has two Fixes: tags, one for each way bad metadata gets in. The script checks both:

EntryIntroduced byWho can reach it
tun/tap (also macvtap, ipvtap) with virtio_net_hdrf43798c27684 "tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr" (2.6.27)Guests of QEMU/KVM, vhost-net, Firecracker, Cloud Hypervisor; any user who owns a persistent tap; CAP_NET_ADMIN via userns
AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDRbfd5f4a3d605 "packet: Add GSO/csum offload support."Anyone with CAP_NET_RAW: unprivileged userns, Docker/Podman containers by default

It is the host kernel that has to be patched. Updating guest kernels does nothing.

CVECVE-2026-99999
ComponentLinux kernel net/ipv4 / skb_checksum_help()
ClassOut-of-bounds write → VM escape / LPE
ReporterPaulos Yibelo (pwn.ai), Vercel Sandbox challenge
Upstream fix6785011f8b16 "ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum", in 7.3-rc7
Stable fixes5.10.272, 5.15.223, 6.1.190, 6.6.159, 6.12.113, 6.18.57, 7.2.11
Red HatImportant, CVSS 8.8 (AV:L/PR:L/S:C); no runtime mitigation. Fixed: RHEL 6 ELS 2.6.32-754.66.1.el6, RHEL 7 ELS 3.10.0-1160.167.2.el7, RHEL 8 4.18.0-553.178.1.el8_10, RHEL 9 5.14.0-687.59.1.el9_8, RHEL 10 6.12.0-211.67.1.el10_2; EUS/AUS streams carry other builds
UbuntuCVSS 9.3 (AV:L/PR:N/S:C); source package linux: 26.10 7.3.0-10.10, 26.04 7.0.0-43.43, 24.04 6.8.0-149.149, 22.04 5.15.0-203.213; 20.04/18.04/16.04 pending, 14.04 gets no fix; flavours and HWE kernels are fixed in their own builds
Debianbookworm fixed in 6.1.190-1 (DLA-4841-1), trixie in 6.12.113-1 (DSA-6568-1), unstable in 7.2.11-1

The stable versions were checked against the kernel.org ChangeLog-* files on 2026-10-17. In each branch, the listed release is the first to carry the fix and the release before it lacks it. Distro states were re-read on 2026-11-16 (Debian security tracker, ubuntu.com/security, Red Hat security data API). The report prints the age of this snapshot and warns once it passes 14 days (matrix_date, matrix_age_days, matrix_stale in JSON; a second NOTE: line with --quiet).

The upstream commit calls itself defence in depth: "a more complete validation at input is forthcoming". A follow-up virtio-net hardening series may get its own CVE.

What this script does

It only triages and changes nothing. It never loads a module, never touches sysctl, and never runs a PoC, so it is safe to run in production.

  • Inventories the running kernel, the distro, and the package of the running kernel.
  • Fix detection from the package itself: it searches the running kernel package's changelog (changelog.Debian.gz or rpm -q --changelog) for the CVE ID or the upstream commit subject. A fix found there always wins. On Ubuntu the kernel changelog is read from linux-modules-$(uname -r); the signed linux-image-* package only carries a signing wrapper. Ubuntu keeps the last 10 uploads there, so for the linux source package a version threshold decides as well.
  • Uses a distro fix matrix (Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL family, Oracle UEK) and the verified upstream stable thresholds for kernels that track upstream (Arch family, Fedora, vanilla).
  • Probes each entry module (tun, macvtap, ipvtap, af_packet) for being:
    • loaded (lsmod)
    • built in (/boot/config-$(uname -r), /proc/config.gz, modules.builtin), or compiled out
    • shipped at all (modules.dep; trusted only when the module tree exists, so a container isn't mistaken for a safe host)
    • blocked by an install <mod> /bin/true|false override, by a blacklist that the kernel's autoload alias honours, or by kernel.modules_disabled=1
  • Looks for hosting signals: /dev/kvm, hypervisor and vhost processes, tun/tap interfaces, user-owned persistent tap devices (no capability needed), container runtimes.
  • Reads the userns/netns gates and the Ubuntu AppArmor userns restriction.
  • Optionally hunts the kernel journal for skb_checksum_help / bad-offload warnings (--since / --until).
  • Produces a risk score from 0 to 100 and a verdict: PATCHED / NOT_APPLICABLE / MITIGATED / VULNERABLE / UNKNOWN.

Verdict rules

  • PATCHED: the changelog lists the fix, the package is at or above a concrete vendor threshold, or the kernel is an upstream-tracking one at or above the stable/mainline fix.

  • VULNERABLE: the kernel is unfixed and at least one entry path is reachable.

  • MITIGATED: the kernel is unfixed, but both paths are closed:

    • Guest path: no tap backend (tun, macvtap, ipvtap) is loaded, built in, or loadable.
    • Local path: no user-owned tap device, no container runtime, and unprivileged userns or netns disabled. Alternatively, no entry module can load at all.

    A module that is already loaded still counts, because a modprobe rule doesn't unload it.

  • UNKNOWN: the vendor has no fixed build yet and the changelog could not be read. Also used inside a container, where the package data describes the image, not the host kernel.

The AppArmor userns restriction lowers the score but is not counted as a block.

Usage

sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh                       # full text report
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --json                # machine-readable JSON, no banner
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --quiet --no-hunt     # one-line verdict for mass scans
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --since 2026-09-01    # widen IoC hunt window
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --since 2026-09-22 --until 2026-10-17  # bounded IoC window
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --no-banner           # text report without the ASCII banner
./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --version                  # print script version and exit

The script also runs without root. It then can't read every changelog or sysfs entry, and gives UNKNOWN more often.

Exit codes

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