Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
工具漏洞利用博客
Log in
提交
工具漏洞利用博客
提交

黑客、渗透测试和网络安全工具,武装您的安全武器库!

Kitploit 是一个黑客、网络安全和渗透测试工具的目录。发现最新的项目更新,查找漏洞、分析系统、自动化测试并加强你的安全。

订阅源联系隐私© 2026 Kitploit

工具目录

分类

查看所有分类
Loading categories
badbox-h713-projector — 针对 Allwinner H713 Android 投影仪上 BadBox 恶意软件的分析与清理指南:ADB 访问、感染证据、固件备份、dropper 移除与验证。 | Kitploit
工具/GitHubGitHub/florentineprinzessinzusachsen/badbox-h713-projector
Android安全嵌入式系统安全物联网安全逆向工程信息收集恶意软件分析数字取证移动安全硬件与物联网安全
分享
事件响应
固件分析
GitHubflorentineprinzessinzusachsen/badbox-h713-projector

badbox-h713-projector

针对 Allwinner H713 Android 投影仪上 BadBox 恶意软件的分析与清理指南:ADB 访问、感染证据、固件备份、dropper 移除与验证。

查看仓库
421461个月前尚未审核
内容在请求的语言中不可用。显示英文版本。

Wielo / Atongmu Malware Projector: BadBox Analysis and Cleanup (AT-M269 / H713)

Sep 26, 2026 · @R

A cheap Android projector (Wielo / Atongmu AT-M269, Allwinner H713) ships with a system-level dropper that turns it into a residential proxy node. This doc shows how to get in without opening the case, prove the infection, back up the firmware, remove the malware and verify the result.

1. Device

No-name LCD projector sold under changing brands. The board and firmware are shared across many H713 projectors (HY300 clones and others), so everything here applies more widely.

PropertyValue
Sold asWielo Smart Projector, model AT-M269 (FCC ID 2BAAR-AT-M269D)
ManufacturerShenzhen Atongmu Technology; firmware and apps from OEM "ASHD"
Hardware revisionpersist.sys.cm.hardversion = AT-M269_720P_HP_202410221430
SoCAllwinner H713M (ro.boot.hardware = sun50iw12p1), quad Cortex-A53; board exdroid, platform ares
RAM / storage1 GB DDR @ 576 MHz / 8 GB eMMC (7,818,182,656 bytes)
Wi-Fi / BluetoothAIC8800 (aic8800d80, driver rwnx 6.4.3.0)
KernelLinux 5.4.99, 32-bit (armv7l), built 8 Dec 2025
Real buildh713m_tuna_p3-user 11 RP1A.201005.006 eng.work3.20251208.154308 release-keys, firmware H713M-android11-v1.0, build host ishang-PC
OSAndroid 11 (SDK 30), user build, security patch 2022-02-05
DisguiseReports itself as Google ADT-3 (brand/model/device, manufacturer askey); real model in ro.product.model2 = AT-M269
Partitions / bootVirtual A/B, active slot _b, dynamic partitions (retrofit) in super; AVB 2.0, vbmeta.device_state = locked, verifiedbootstate empty; OEM unlock not allowed; /system 100% full
Securityro.debuggable=1, ro.adb.secure=0, service.adb.root=1, ADB on tcp/5868, SELinux permissive, privapp permissions permissive, AOSP test keys
Region defaultsTimezone Asia/Shanghai, DTV area cn / DTMB
# Read the identity yourself
adb shell getprop ro.product.model     # ADT-3   <- spoofed, to pass Google certification
adb shell getprop ro.product.model2    # AT-M269 <- real model
adb shell getprop ro.board.platform    # ares, H713 platform name
adb shell getprop ro.build.type        # user    <- release build

2. Get in

ADB is listening on the network, on a non-standard port, with no authorisation prompt and root rights.

# 1. Find open ports (projector on an isolated network)
nmap -p- 10.56.215.10
#   5868/tcp open   <- nmap guesses "diameters"; it is actually adbd

# 2. Confirm from the device side (e.g. via Termux on the projector)
getprop service.adb.tcp.port   # 5868
getprop ro.adb.secure          # 0    -> no "allow debugging?" prompt
getprop init.svc.adbd          # running

# 3. Connect from a computer
adb connect 10.56.215.10:5868
adb root
adb shell id                   # uid=0(root)

Turn lamp off while working over ADB

adb shell 'echo adb_keepalive > /sys/power/wake_lock'    # keep CPU/Wi-Fi awake (needs root adbd)
adb shell cat /sys/power/wake_lock                       # adb_keepalive must be listed
adb shell input keyevent KEYCODE_SLEEP                   # display + lamp off, ADB stays connected

# when done
adb shell input keyevent KEYCODE_WAKEUP                  # lamp on
adb shell 'echo adb_keepalive > /sys/power/wake_unlock'  # release the wakelock

/sys/class/backlight/tv > brightness/bl_power have no effect.

3. Infection chain

Two preinstalled system apps run as the system user (UID 1000). One downloads a loader, loader downloads four proxy modules and a second, independent loader.

Firmware (preinstalled, UID 1000)
├─ com.android.sysapp          /system/priv-app/AshdSysApp
│    OTA updater, can replace the whole firmware (update.zip / payload.bin)
│    C2: wjtysj.ishanghd.com/hx_kt.php
│
└─ com.android.umanalytics.yiyou /system/app/AndroidAnalytics_yiyou
     Dropper; Umeng + Baidu tracking
     └─ downloads cache/plugin.jar       (DEX, from *.ishanghd.com)
          ├─ app installer: pulls app lists per device profile, pm install -r
          │    └─ installs Disney+ etc. and com.google.adtest (payload)
          └─ "hs" task loader, C2 api.loritor.cc / api.nizero.cc, every 6 h
               └─ 4 encrypted modules  code_cache/.hs/.file/.rf/*.rf
                    SKN0041 com.ad.proxy   SKN0054 com.szns.sdk
                    SKN0058 com.link.core  SKN0061 ddth2 (VpsSdk)
                    -> all four: residential proxy clients

com.google.adtest (/data/app, installed by yiyou)
     Second loader "com.speed", own C2 (api.logobi.cc, api.pechlo.cc, ...)
     Native plugin loader, may install/delete packages -> backup channel

> strangers' internet traffic routed through your connection, and your device is tracked (serial, MACs, Wi-Fi SSID/BSSID).

4. Proof of factory level infection

a) Proxy-like traffic: one process, many foreign connections

adb shell "netstat -tnp | grep ESTABLISHED"
# tcp6 ... ::ffff:43.116.39.73:188    ESTABLISHED 4795/com.android.umanalytics.yiyou
# tcp6 ... ::ffff:198.44.189.x:9200   ESTABLISHED 4795/com.android.umanalytics.yiyou
# ... ~25 lines, same process, many IPs, odd ports
#  -> an "analytics" app does not hold 25 parallel sessions: this is a proxy node

b) Who installed what

adb shell pm list packages -i | grep -v 'installer=null\|com.android.vending'
# package:com.google.adtest       installer=com.android.umanalytics.yiyou  <- payload
# package:com.disney.disneyplus   installer=com.android.umanalytics.yiyou  <- cover
#  -> a system "analytics" app installing packages = dropper

adb shell dumpsys package com.google.adtest | grep -E 'codePath|firstInstallTime'
#  fake Google name, lives in /data/app, installed silently

c) Payload files in the dropper's data folder

adb shell 'ls -laR /data/data/com.android.umanalytics.yiyou' | grep -E 'plugin.jar|\.rf|files/apps'
# cache/plugin.jar    <- downloaded loader (DEX)
# code_cache/.hs/.file/.rf/-1.dex_assdk_huang_*SKN00xx*.rf    <- 4 encrypted modules
# files/apps/com.google.adtest.apk   <- stored payload for reinstall
# directories are chmod 777

d) System-level setup

下载工具

最受欢迎

查看全部 →

发现我们社区最常用的工具。

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 终极 OSINT 工具包:调查图谱、置信度评分、别名家族、地图、时间线和报告。49 个模块、400+ 个站点,无需 API 密钥。

    717
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock 一键执行应用(CVE-2026-43499)

    504
  • 3

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    基于LLM的多智能体自主渗透测试平台,具备规划器/执行器智能体、资产与探索图谱、MITM流量记录以及漏洞复测功能。

    402
  • 4

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    浏览器端红队工具包,包含 102 个离线工具,用于侦察、载荷生成、凭据攻击、加密、编码和交战报告。

    342
  • 5

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    AI原生网络安全的行动系统——在这里,意图转化为受治理的执行,证据沉淀为运营记忆,每一次操作都让下一次更出色。

    260
  • 6

    antifox

    antifox-ai/antifox

    AI multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform that runs recon, attack-surface discovery, exploitation validation and evidence-backed report delivery.

    259

探索所有工具

浏览我们的工具集合

查看所有工具 →