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Packet-Sniffer — Raw socket-based network packet sniffer that captures and disassembles TCP/IP packets from network interfaces for security analysis and educational use. | Kitploit
도구/GitHubGitHub/eonraider/packet-sniffer
Packet Sniffing & AnalysisInformation GatheringNetwork SecurityLearning & Education
GitHubeonraider/packet-sniffer

Packet-Sniffer

Raw socket-based network packet sniffer that captures and disassembles TCP/IP packets from network interfaces for security analysis and educational use.

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RootWire

CodeFactor CI PyPI Python Version OS License

A network traffic monitor for GNU/Linux — formerly known as Packet-Sniffer. Frames are captured from one or more network interfaces with a raw socket, timestamped by the kernel itself, decoded layer by layer with the NETProtocols library, and rendered live, written to nanosecond-precision pcap, or streamed as JSON:

[>] Frame #4 at 15:42:07 (wlan0, 74 bytes)
    [+] Ethernet 3c:7c:3f:1a:be:22 -> 9c:1e:95:aa:01:5f
        EtherType: IPv4
    [+] IPv4 192.168.1.96 -> 142.250.79.78
        TTL: 64 | Flags: Don't fragment (DF) | Total Length: 60 | ID: 39754
        Protocol: TCP | Checksum: 0x2b51
    [+] TCP 51888 -> 443
        Flags: 0x002 (SYN) | Seq: 3598801521 | Ack: 0
        Window: 64240 | Checksum: 0x2008
        Options: Maximum Segment Size (1460), SACK Permitted, Timestamps (3644437524, 0), No-Operation, Window Scale (7)

Every protocol NETProtocols decodes on its own has a renderer of its own, from Ethernet to BGP, STUN and VXLAN (see the table below), and HTTP joins them when you ask for it with --decode-as. Checksums are verified against a recomputation and flagged inline when they disagree. Malformed, truncated or hostile frames are diagnosed, never fatal: the capture survives whatever the network delivers.

What it decodes

LayerProtocolWhat the screen shows
LinkEthernet, 802.1Q VLAN (nested QinQ too)addresses, EtherType; each tag's VID, PCP and DEI
LinkIEEE 802.2 LLC, SNAPDSAP/SSAP by name, control format; OUI and PID (as an EtherType where the OUI makes it one); Novell raw 802.3
LinkLLDP, CDPthe neighbor's chassis/device ID, port, TTL, system name and description, platform, software, capabilities and addresses
LinkSTP, RSTProot and bridge IDs, path cost, port, flags (an RST BPDU's role and proposal/agreement handshake) and timers
LinkMPLSthe label stack, top first: label (special-purpose ones by name), traffic class, TTL, bottom of stack
NetworkARPthe who-has / is-at summary, sender and target
NetworkIPv4TTL, flags, length, ID, decoded options, fragments
NetworkIPv6 and its extension headersHop-by-Hop, Destination Options, Routing, Fragment (an MLD report renders its whole chain)
NetworkICMPv4, ICMPv6the enclosing addresses, type and code, and Neighbor Discovery targets and link-layer options
NetworkIGMPmessage type, group, every v3 group record
TunnelsGRE, IP-in-IPencapsulated protocol and optional fields; the inner packet renders as its own layers
TunnelsVXLANVNI and flags (set reserved bits noted); the inner Ethernet frame renders in full
TunnelsIPsec ESP, AH (IPv4 and IPv6)SPI and sequence number; the protected size (ESP), or what AH protects, tunnel mode named, and the ICV's size
TransportTCP, UDPports, flags, sequence numbers, window, decoded TCP options
TransportSCTPverification tag and the chunk types in wire order with their flags
RoutingOSPFv2Hello timers and DR/BDR election, Database Description, LSA requests, updates and acknowledgments, authentication
RoutingRIP v1/v2routes with metrics and next hops, whole-table requests, authentication entries
RoutingBGPOPEN, UPDATE (withdrawals, path attributes, NLRI), NOTIFICATION, one section per message
RoutingPIM v2Hello options, Register, Register-Stop, Join/Prune groups and sources, Assert
RedundancyVRRP v2/v3, HSRPvirtual router or group, priority (resignation and address owner named), virtual addresses, timers, clear-text authentication
ApplicationDNS (UDP and TCP), DHCPevery question and answer with decoded RDATA; DHCP message type, client MAC, addresses, options
ApplicationTLSone line per record; a ClientHello's version, SNI, cipher-suite count and extensions — or, for a ClientHello split across segments (never reassembled), the SNI alone, when its first segment holds it
ApplicationNTPmode, stratum, Reference ID or kiss code, timestamps, extension fields, MAC
ApplicationTFTPthe request's filename, mode and options; DATA/ACK blocks; ERROR code and message; OACK options
ApplicationRADIUScode, identifier, Authenticator, User-Name and the other text attributes, addresses and numbers (passwords by size only)
ApplicationSTUNmethod and class, mapped addresses, ERROR-CODE, SOFTWARE, unknown attributes, MESSAGE-INTEGRITY's presence
ApplicationHTTP/1.x (with --decode-as)start line, Host, User-Agent and the other triage fields, body framing and size, and the framing anomalies request smuggling rests on

Checksums verified: IPv4, ICMPv4, ICMPv6, IGMP, GRE (when present), TCP, UDP, SCTP (CRC32c), VRRP, PIM, OSPF and every OSPF LSA's LS checksum, CDP, and the STUN FINGERPRINT. A mismatch shows inline as Checksum: 0x0000 [!] mismatch (expected 0x1a2b) — a real signal for corrupted or spoofed traffic. Inside a tunnel the inner IP header is used, behind an IPv6 Routing header the route's final destination, and Ethernet padding never reaches the sum; a non-reassembled fragment is not checked, since its checksum covers a datagram RootWire never rebuilds. Authenticators that need a key (AH's ICV, RADIUS's Authenticator, STUN's MESSAGE-INTEGRITY, an OSPF digest) are shown, never verified.

Installation

pipx install rootwire        # or: uv tool install rootwire

Or run from a clone with uv:

git clone https://github.com/EONRaider/RootWire.git
cd RootWire
uv sync

Usage

usage: rootwire [-h] [-i INTERFACE] [-r FILE] [-w FILE]
                [--filter NAME_OR_EXPR] [--decode-as TABLE=KEY:CLASS] [--json]
                [-d] [--version]

Monitor network traffic: capture Ethernet frames from an interface (or replay
them from a pcap file), decode their protocol stack and render each frame.
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