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Outils/GitHubGitHub/techdevfun/alpinegate
Defensive ToolsVulnerability ScannersWeb Vulnerability ScannersContainer SecurityVulnerability AnalysisConfiguration AuditingDevSecOpsMisconfigurationIncident Response
GitHubtechdevfun/alpinegate

alpinegate

Find which images and containers run a vulnerable Alpine + OpenSSH combination (CVE-2026-123158) — five-condition check, zero network, first-hour playbook.

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alpinegate

Check whether your Alpine images and containers are actually exposed to the OpenSSH musl password bypass (CVE-2026-123158) — five live conditions, one verdict, zero network.

On 5 November 2026, OpenSSH shipped emergency release 10.6p2 for a bypass nicknamed "sshole": on Linux systems where sshd links against musl libc and runs without PAM, a 257–1024 byte password logs in to any account whose password field is a single * — an account that was supposed to never accept any password. Alpine Linux is the common case. A CVE list cannot tell you which of your images is actually exposed. This tool can, in one command.

demo

The five conditions

A target is EXPOSED only when all five hold at the same time (Alpine security advisory, 2026-11-05):

  1. Alpine / musl — an /etc/alpine-release exists.
  2. Vulnerable openssh — the installed version is below the fixed version for its branch (backported per branch; see the table below).
  3. No PAM — openssh-server built without PAM, or openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no.
  4. PasswordAuthentication yes — the OpenSSH default.
  5. A * account plus a salt donor — at least one account with password field exactly * (for example root:*, shipped since Alpine 3.16), and at least one other account with a $5$ or $6$ hash that can supply a salt.

Why it works: musl's crypt() returns "*" on failure for passwords over 256 bytes, and "*" is exactly what the stored field contains for an account with no password — so the comparison succeeds. OpenSSH 10.6p2 refuses stored fields shorter than four characters.

Install (from source)

npm publishing is pending an owner decision on the registry token. Until then, install from source — three steps:

git clone https://github.com/techdevfun/alpinegate.git
cd alpinegate
npm install && npm run build

Then run it with node dist/cli.js ... (or link it: npm link).

Worked example

The repo ships two fixtures built from the real Alpine 3.18.9 minirootfs plus real openssh APKs — one pre-fix, one patched (see fixtures/PROVENANCE.md for URLs, digests, and what is synthetic):

node dist/cli.js scan fixtures/exposed fixtures/patched
TARGET            ALPINE  OPENSSH    PAM  PASSAUTH  `*` ACCOUNTS  DONOR  VERDICT
----------------  ------  ---------  ---  --------  ------------  -----  -------
fixtures/exposed  3.18.9  9.3_p2-r3  no   yes       root          $6$    EXPOSED
fixtures/patched  3.18.9  9.3_p2-r4  no   yes       root          $6$    SAFE

fixtures/exposed: all five conditions hold: Alpine 3.18, openssh 9.3_p2-r3 < fixed 9.3_p2-r4, no PAM, password auth on, * accounts (root) + $6$ salt donor
fixtures/patched: openssh 9.3_p2-r4 is at or above the fixed version 9.3_p2-r4 for Alpine 3.18

Exit code is 1 when any target is EXPOSED, 0 otherwise. Then print the first-hour stopgap for the exposed target:

node dist/cli.js playbook fixtures/exposed

Usage

alpinegate scan [targets...] [--format table|json] [--fail-on exposed|at-risk]
alpinegate check <target> [--format table|json]
alpinegate playbook <target>

Targets, all read-only and offline:

TargetWhat it scans
A rootfs directory (or / for the live host)The directory tree as-is
An image tarball (.tar, .tar.gz, docker save output)Layers merged in order, whiteouts applied
A local Docker image name (alpine:3.18)Exported read-only via /var/run/docker.sock; no registry pull

Flags: --format table|json (default table), --fail-on exposed|at-risk (default exposed; at-risk also fails the run on AT-RISK targets, for CI gates).

Exit codes: 0 = no EXPOSED target; 1 = at least one EXPOSED target (or AT-RISK with --fail-on at-risk); 2 = usage or config error (unknown flag, no target, unresolvable image, missing Docker socket). An unresolvable target is never reported as SAFE.

Verdicts

VerdictMeaning
EXPOSEDAll five conditions hold. Fix it in the first hour (see playbook).
AT-RISKA vulnerable openssh version is present, but at least one condition is missing (for example password auth already off). Still patch it — one config change away from exposed.
SAFEPatched openssh version, or PAM in use, or no sshd at all.
UNKNOWNNot enough data to decide — for example /etc/shadow not readable, or not an Alpine rootfs. UNKNOWN is not SAFE.

Fixed openssh versions per branch

Checked 2026-11-06 against the Alpine advisory (https://alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-05-openssh-password-authentication-bypass/) and the OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes. Alpine did not move stable branches to 10.6p2 — each branch got the fix backported onto the version it already shipped. Looking for "10.6p2" on a stable branch is wrong:

BranchFixed openssh version
edge10.6_p2-r0
3.2410.3_p1-r2
3.2310.2_p1-r1
3.2210.0_p1-r11
3.219.9_p2-r1
3.209.7_p1-r6
3.199.6_p1-r3
3.189.3_p2-r4
3.179.1_p1-r7
3.169.0_p1-r6

CVE-2026-123158, CVSS 3.1 score 8.1 (High). Researcher: Özgün Kültekin (Wakefield); write-up at sshhole.com. No confirmed exploitation in the wild was reported at disclosure (per the Alpine advisory and OpenSSH notes); watchTowr reported active exploitation attempts on 2026-11-06, driven by automated botnets and cryptominers — treat exposure as urgent.

The first-hour playbook

alpinegate playbook <target> prints the stopgap; it never applies it. In short, from the Alpine advisory:

  1. Close the hole now — set PasswordAuthentication no (drop-in file /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf; Alpine reads that directory from 3.19 on, older releases need the main file edited too), then sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart. Make sure key login works first and keep your current session open.
  2. Upgrade and restart — apk upgrade -U -a, then rc-service sshd restart. The upgrade alone does not replace the running daemon.
  3. Check whether you were attacked — grep 'Accepted password for' /var/log/messages. Any accepted password login for an account with no password means the machine was compromised.

Where rivals beat us

  • Trivy and Grype cover thousands of CVEs across every package in an image; alpinegate covers exactly one exposure shape. Trivy also scans IaC, Kubernetes, secrets, and licenses; alpinegate does none of that. If you want a full CVE list, use Trivy or Grype.
  • Trivy and Grype are database-driven, so a same-day CVE may not be in their database yet. On the day this CVE landed, a condition checker was not blind in the same way — that is the whole wedge: alpinegate checks the five live conditions from the image itself, with zero network and no database wait, and adds an image inventory plus a first-hour playbook that a CVE list does not give you.
  • ssh-audit audits SSH configuration and policy, but does not detect Alpine/musl, does not check /etc/shadow, and does not inventory a fleet.
  • Lynis / OpenSCAP do broad host hardening audits, but no sshole-specific condition check and no container inventory.

Sources and check dates for the rival claims are in the blueprint's competitor scan (2026-11-06): Trivy 0.76.1 reported zero PHP2Shell findings on php:8.4.26-fpm while Grype flagged both (LiveWyer drill, 29 Oct 2026), and reported "Clean" for end-of-life alpine:3.18 (revisit.tech drill, 20 Oct 2026).

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