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GitHubzapstiko/cve-2026-116214

CVE-2026-116214

Technical writeup and Docker lab for CVE-2026-116214, an unauthenticated MacCMS v10 account takeover via an unbound password-recovery code, with root-cause analysis and patch diff.

114 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-116214

1. CVE metadata

FieldValue
CVE IDCVE-2026-116214
TitleMacCMS v10 before 2026.1000.4054 Account Takeover via Unbound Password Recovery Code
CNA / AssignerVulnCheck (VulnCheck Endgame)
Published2026-10-26T13:08:47Z
StatePUBLISHED
CWECWE-640 — Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password
CVSS v3.19.1 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS v4.09.3 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected (fork)maccmspro/maccms10 — all versions ≤ 2021.1000.2000 (repo @ 7f388ee, 2023-03-21)
Affected (upstream)magicblack/maccms10 — versions < 2026.1000.4054
Fixedmagicblack/maccms10 2026.1000.4054 — commit 27bb1b004b9931c93f46b65e9c0e531466e7e02a (2026-07-16)
CreditAbu Raihan Biswas
VulnCheck advisoryhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/maccms-v10-before-2026.1000.4054-account-takeover-via-unbound-password-recovery-code
Tracking issuehttps://github.com/maccmspro/maccms10/issues/30
Vulnerable codeapplication/common/model/User.php L607–630 (check_msg), L777–837 (findpass_reset)

2. Executive summary

MacCMS v10's code-based password recovery verifies a 6-digit code without binding it to the account being reset. The verifier check_msg() searches mac_msg by (user_id, msg_time, msg_code, msg_type), where user_id is always 0 for anonymous flows; the recipient column msg_to is never compared. findpass_reset() then resolves the victim from the attacker's own request (user_email / user_phone) and overwrites the password.

An attacker requests a reset code for their own mailbox via user/findpass_msg, reads it, then submits it to user/findpass_reset together with the victim's email/phone. No session, no token, no password — full member account takeover.

Because vulnerable versions never consume codes (msg_status stays 0), one code can reset multiple accounts within its validity window (default 5 minutes; extendable via app.email.time). The patch adds msg_to/msg_status verification and an atomic code consume.


3. Background

Password reset styles in MacCMS:

  1. Security-question reset (user/findpass) — requires the user's question/answer;
  2. Email/SMS code reset — user/findpass_msg sends a code, user/findpass_reset accepts it.

Reset endpoints are session-free by design (application/index/controller/User.php:19 lists findpass, findpass_msg, findpass_reset among the no-session actions). The only proof of ownership is therefore the code.

mac_msg schema (application/install/sql/install.sql:405–418):

CREATE TABLE `mac_msg` (
  `msg_id`     int(10) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
  `user_id`    int(10) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0',
  `msg_type`   tinyint(1) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0',   -- 1=bind 2=findpass 3=register
  `msg_status` tinyint(1) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0',   -- 0=unused 1=used (post-patch)
  `msg_to`     varchar(30) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
  `msg_code`   varchar(10) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
  `msg_content` varchar(255) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
  `msg_time`   int(10) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0',
  PRIMARY KEY (`msg_id`), KEY `msg_code`, KEY `msg_time`, KEY `user_id`
) ENGINE=MyISAM;

4. Root cause

4.1 Vulnerable verifier (application/common/model/User.php:607–630, fork 7f388ee)

public function check_msg($param)
{
    $param['to']   = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['to'])));
    $param['code'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['code'])));
    if (!in_array($param['ac'], ['email','phone']) || empty($param['to'])
        || empty($param['code']) || empty($param['type'])) {
        return ['code'=>9001,'msg'=>lang('param_err')];
    }
    // msg_type: 1=bind 2=findpass 3=register
    $stime = strtotime('-5 min');
    if ($param['ac']=='email' && intval($GLOBALS['config']['email']['time']) > 0) {
        $stime = strtotime('-'.$GLOBALS['config']['email']['time'].' min');
    }

    $where = [];
    $where['user_id']  = intval($GLOBALS['user']['user_id']);   // 0 when anonymous
    $where['msg_time'] = ['gt', $stime];                        // freshness
    $where['msg_code'] = ['eq', $param['code']];                // code
    $where['msg_type'] = ['eq', $param['type']];                // 2 = findpass
    // msg_to is MISSING: any recipient's code satisfies this query
    $res = model('msg')->infoData($where);
    if ($res['code'] > 1) {
        return ['code'=>9002,'msg'=>lang('model/user/msg_not_found')];
    }
    return ['code'=>1,'msg'=>'ok'];
}

Three defects:

  1. msg_to absent — code is not bound to the destination being reset;
  2. msg_status absent — used codes stay 0, enabling replay;
  3. $param['to'] is caller-controlled, not cross-checked with the reset identity.

4.2 Victim resolved from attacker input (User.php:777–837)

public function findpass_reset($param)
{
    $to = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['user_email'])));
    if (empty($to)) {
        $to = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['to'])));
    }
    $param['code']    = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['code'])));
    $param['user_pwd']  = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['user_pwd'])));
    $param['user_pwd2'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['user_pwd2'])));

    if (strlen($param['user_pwd']) < 6)          { /* length error */ }
    if ($param['user_pwd'] != $param['user_pwd2']) { /* mismatch error */ }

    $param['type'] = 2;
    $res = $this->check_msg($param);             // validates only code/time/type
    if ($res['code'] > 1) { return $res; }

    if ($param['ac'] == 'email') {
        $where['user_email'] = $to;              // VICTIM lookup
        $user = $this->where($where)->find();
    } else {
        $where['user_phone'] = $to;              // or phone
        $user = $this->where($where)->find();
    }

    $update['user_pwd'] = md5($param['user_pwd']);   // fork; newer builds use mac_hash_password()
    $res = $this->where($where)->update($update);    // victim password overwritten
    return ['code'=>1,'msg'=>lang('model/user/pass_reset_ok')];
}

Asymmetry making this an authentication bypass:

ValueVerified by check_msg()?Selects victim?
codeyes—
msg_type=2yes—
msg_timeyes—
to (attacker mailbox)only non-emptyno
user_email / user_phoneneveryes

4.3 How attacker codes land in the user_id=0 namespace

send_msg() (User.php:632–704) stores codes under the current user id — 0 for anonymous flows:

$data['user_id']    = intval($GLOBALS['user']['user_id']);  // 0
$data['msg_type']   = $param['type'];                       // 2
$data['msg_status'] = 0;
$data['msg_to']     = $to;                                  // attacker mailbox
$data['msg_code']   = $code;                                // 6-digit
$data['msg_time']   = time();
model('msg')->saveData($data);

Only msg_to distinguishes rows, and the verifier ignores it.

4.4 Replay and scale

Nothing sets msg_status=1 in vulnerable reset flows, and check_msg() does not filter it. One code can reset an arbitrary number of accounts within the validity window.


5. Affected deployments and preconditions

  • Affected: maccmspro/maccms10 all commits (frozen at 2021.1000.2000 / 7f388ee) and magicblack/maccms10 < 2026.1000.4054.
  • Preconditions: email or SMS recovery enabled; attacker-controlled mailbox/phone; victim email/phone known; code within freshness window; no privileged role needed.

6. Step-by-step reproduction (authorized lab)

Lab: MacCMS 2021.1000.2000, mail configured, victim [email protected].

Step 0 — Confirm flow enabled

curl -sS "http://TARGET/index.php/user/findpass_msg"

Step 1 — Request code to attacker mailbox

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