
Technical writeup and Docker lab for CVE-2026-116214, an unauthenticated MacCMS v10 account takeover via an unbound password-recovery code, with root-cause analysis and patch diff.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-116214 |
| Title | MacCMS v10 before 2026.1000.4054 Account Takeover via Unbound Password Recovery Code |
| CNA / Assigner | VulnCheck (VulnCheck Endgame) |
| Published | 2026-10-26T13:08:47Z |
| State | PUBLISHED |
| CWE | CWE-640 — Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password |
| CVSS v3.1 | 9.1 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| CVSS v4.0 | 9.3 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| Affected (fork) | maccmspro/maccms10 — all versions ≤ 2021.1000.2000 (repo @ 7f388ee, 2023-03-21) |
| Affected (upstream) | magicblack/maccms10 — versions < 2026.1000.4054 |
| Fixed | magicblack/maccms10 2026.1000.4054 — commit 27bb1b004b9931c93f46b65e9c0e531466e7e02a (2026-07-16) |
| Credit | Abu Raihan Biswas |
| VulnCheck advisory | https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/maccms-v10-before-2026.1000.4054-account-takeover-via-unbound-password-recovery-code |
| Tracking issue | https://github.com/maccmspro/maccms10/issues/30 |
| Vulnerable code | application/common/model/User.php L607–630 (check_msg), L777–837 (findpass_reset) |
MacCMS v10's code-based password recovery verifies a 6-digit code without binding it to the account being reset. The verifier check_msg() searches mac_msg by (user_id, msg_time, msg_code, msg_type), where user_id is always 0 for anonymous flows; the recipient column msg_to is never compared. findpass_reset() then resolves the victim from the attacker's own request (user_email / user_phone) and overwrites the password.
An attacker requests a reset code for their own mailbox via user/findpass_msg, reads it, then submits it to user/findpass_reset together with the victim's email/phone. No session, no token, no password — full member account takeover.
Because vulnerable versions never consume codes (msg_status stays 0), one code can reset multiple accounts within its validity window (default 5 minutes; extendable via app.email.time). The patch adds msg_to/msg_status verification and an atomic code consume.
Password reset styles in MacCMS:
user/findpass) — requires the user's question/answer;user/findpass_msg sends a code, user/findpass_reset accepts it.Reset endpoints are session-free by design (application/index/controller/User.php:19 lists findpass, findpass_msg, findpass_reset among the no-session actions). The only proof of ownership is therefore the code.
mac_msg schema (application/install/sql/install.sql:405–418):
CREATE TABLE `mac_msg` (
`msg_id` int(10) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
`user_id` int(10) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0',
`msg_type` tinyint(1) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0', -- 1=bind 2=findpass 3=register
`msg_status` tinyint(1) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0', -- 0=unused 1=used (post-patch)
`msg_to` varchar(30) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
`msg_code` varchar(10) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
`msg_content` varchar(255) NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
`msg_time` int(10) unsigned NOT NULL DEFAULT '0',
PRIMARY KEY (`msg_id`), KEY `msg_code`, KEY `msg_time`, KEY `user_id`
) ENGINE=MyISAM;
application/common/model/User.php:607–630, fork 7f388ee)public function check_msg($param)
{
$param['to'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['to'])));
$param['code'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['code'])));
if (!in_array($param['ac'], ['email','phone']) || empty($param['to'])
|| empty($param['code']) || empty($param['type'])) {
return ['code'=>9001,'msg'=>lang('param_err')];
}
// msg_type: 1=bind 2=findpass 3=register
$stime = strtotime('-5 min');
if ($param['ac']=='email' && intval($GLOBALS['config']['email']['time']) > 0) {
$stime = strtotime('-'.$GLOBALS['config']['email']['time'].' min');
}
$where = [];
$where['user_id'] = intval($GLOBALS['user']['user_id']); // 0 when anonymous
$where['msg_time'] = ['gt', $stime]; // freshness
$where['msg_code'] = ['eq', $param['code']]; // code
$where['msg_type'] = ['eq', $param['type']]; // 2 = findpass
// msg_to is MISSING: any recipient's code satisfies this query
$res = model('msg')->infoData($where);
if ($res['code'] > 1) {
return ['code'=>9002,'msg'=>lang('model/user/msg_not_found')];
}
return ['code'=>1,'msg'=>'ok'];
}
Three defects:
msg_to absent — code is not bound to the destination being reset;msg_status absent — used codes stay 0, enabling replay;$param['to'] is caller-controlled, not cross-checked with the reset identity.User.php:777–837)public function findpass_reset($param)
{
$to = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['user_email'])));
if (empty($to)) {
$to = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['to'])));
}
$param['code'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['code'])));
$param['user_pwd'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['user_pwd'])));
$param['user_pwd2'] = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(trim($param['user_pwd2'])));
if (strlen($param['user_pwd']) < 6) { /* length error */ }
if ($param['user_pwd'] != $param['user_pwd2']) { /* mismatch error */ }
$param['type'] = 2;
$res = $this->check_msg($param); // validates only code/time/type
if ($res['code'] > 1) { return $res; }
if ($param['ac'] == 'email') {
$where['user_email'] = $to; // VICTIM lookup
$user = $this->where($where)->find();
} else {
$where['user_phone'] = $to; // or phone
$user = $this->where($where)->find();
}
$update['user_pwd'] = md5($param['user_pwd']); // fork; newer builds use mac_hash_password()
$res = $this->where($where)->update($update); // victim password overwritten
return ['code'=>1,'msg'=>lang('model/user/pass_reset_ok')];
}
Asymmetry making this an authentication bypass:
| Value | Verified by check_msg()? | Selects victim? |
|---|---|---|
| code | yes | — |
| msg_type=2 | yes | — |
| msg_time | yes | — |
| to (attacker mailbox) | only non-empty | no |
| user_email / user_phone | never | yes |
user_id=0 namespacesend_msg() (User.php:632–704) stores codes under the current user id — 0 for anonymous flows:
$data['user_id'] = intval($GLOBALS['user']['user_id']); // 0
$data['msg_type'] = $param['type']; // 2
$data['msg_status'] = 0;
$data['msg_to'] = $to; // attacker mailbox
$data['msg_code'] = $code; // 6-digit
$data['msg_time'] = time();
model('msg')->saveData($data);
Only msg_to distinguishes rows, and the verifier ignores it.
Nothing sets msg_status=1 in vulnerable reset flows, and check_msg() does not filter it. One code can reset an arbitrary number of accounts within the validity window.
maccmspro/maccms10 all commits (frozen at 2021.1000.2000 / 7f388ee) and magicblack/maccms10 < 2026.1000.4054.Lab: MacCMS 2021.1000.2000, mail configured, victim [email protected].
curl -sS "http://TARGET/index.php/user/findpass_msg"