
Proof-of-concept and lab harness for CVE-2026-125753, a path traversal in ABP Framework blob storage enabling unauthenticated file read via blogging file endpoints.
A blob name can leave its container in Volo.Abp.BlobStoring.FileSystem, the file system
provider behind ABP's blob storing abstraction. DefaultBlobFilePathCalculator joins the
name onto the container path with Path.Combine and nothing checks that the result stayed
inside. One shipped module turns that into an unauthenticated file read over HTTP on
Windows hosts: GET /api/blogging/files/..%5C..%5C..%5C<name> returns a file from outside
the container to a caller with no cookie, no token and no header.
| CVE | CVE-2026-125753, assigned by VulnCheck, published 2026-11-10 |
| Advisory | GHSA-4x2h-f4f8-xjr6, 2026-10-08, plus the VulnCheck advisory |
| Project | ABP Framework |
| Affected | Volo.Abp.BlobStoring.FileSystem 2.9.0 before 10.6.2 and 10.7.0-rc.1 before 10.7.0 · Volo.Blogging.Application 0.14.0 before 10.6.2, same pre-release range |
| Fixed | 10.7.0, backported to 10.6.2 |
| CWE | CWE-22, improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory |
| CVSS | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N 8.2 High, and CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 5.9 Medium, both from VulnCheck |
| Tested on | released packages 10.6.1 from nuget.org · Linux leg on .NET SDK 10.0.401 · Windows leg on Windows Server 2022 10.0.20348.0, PowerShell 7.6.9, SDK 10.0.403 |
| Credit | Nguyen Le Thanh Nam (yuwkaa), finder. Fixed by the ABP team in PR #26232, commit a25442ec |
The vendor fixed the code and published the GHSA without requesting an identifier, and
scored that advisory CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N, which is 0.0, on a
page whose own impact text says files outside the container can be read, written and
deleted. VulnCheck assigned the CVE afterwards and scored it 8.2.
framework/src/Volo.Abp.BlobStoring.FileSystem/Volo/Abp/BlobStoring/FileSystem/DefaultBlobFilePathCalculator.cs:
public virtual string Calculate(BlobProviderArgs args)
{
var fileSystemConfiguration = args.Configuration.GetFileSystemConfiguration();
var blobPath = fileSystemConfiguration.BasePath;
if (CurrentTenant.Id == null)
{
blobPath = Path.Combine(blobPath, "host");
}
else
{
blobPath = Path.Combine(blobPath, "tenants", CurrentTenant.Id.Value.ToString("D"));
}
if (fileSystemConfiguration.AppendContainerNameToBasePath)
{
blobPath = Path.Combine(blobPath, args.ContainerName);
}
blobPath = Path.Combine(blobPath, args.BlobName);
return blobPath;
}
Path.Combine matters twice. It does not resolve .., and when its second argument is
rooted it throws away everything before it.
The normalizer that runs ahead of this does not add a containment check either.
FileSystemBlobNamingNormalizer strips the characters Windows forbids in a filename, only
when the current OS is Windows, and keeps / and \ on purpose. Its own comment says
"In order to support the directory included in the blob name, remove / and ". On Linux it
returns the name untouched. Neither branch looks at a .. segment or at whether the name
is rooted.
minimal-repro/ is two files that pin the released package, so the result
does not depend on a lab. run-both-legs.sh runs it
against the vulnerable and the fixed package one after the other and prints the resolved
checksum next to each leg. The run below is from 2026-11-11, SDK 10.0.401, against
volo.abp.blobstoring.filesystem.10.6.1.nupkg
(sha256 fdc15f5c02903a84f32671d3b6d681da138e613825f9ebc177decce1937335e1), full output in
transcripts/minimal-repro.txt:
blob name ok.txt -> Calculate: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/ok.txt FullPath: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/ok.txt
blob name sub/dir/ok.txt -> Calculate: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/sub/dir/ok.txt FullPath: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/sub/dir/ok.txt
blob name ../../../etc/evil -> Calculate: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/../../../etc/evil FullPath: /var/etc/evil
blob name /tmp/absolute-evil -> Calculate: /tmp/absolute-evil FullPath: /tmp/absolute-evil
The first two rows are the control: an ordinary name and the documented subdirectory form
both stay under the container. The third leaves it, and the fourth discards BasePath
entirely. Change the one version to 10.7.0 and the same program keeps the two controls
and throws on the traversal, on package sha256
fccb5077758ed0ee45f1a05515dc47a956ffa0561b7350d7f9ca4dba1565c53b:
blob name ok.txt -> Calculate: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/ok.txt FullPath: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/ok.txt
blob name sub/dir/ok.txt -> Calculate: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/sub/dir/ok.txt FullPath: /var/blobs/host/mycontainer/sub/dir/ok.txt
Unhandled exception. System.ArgumentException: The BlobName must not contain '.' or '..' segments. (Parameter 'BlobName')
Through IBlobContainer those paths become files written, read and deleted on disk. The
full run is in transcripts/blob-traversal.txt: a write
outside the container, a read of a file planted by hand that never went through the blob
API, a delete of a file outside the container, and a cross-tenant overwrite where tenant B
asked for its own blob by an ordinary name and got content tenant A had written. Those
steps behave the same on 8.0.0, 9.0.0 and 10.7.0-rc.5, one transcript each in
transcripts/.
Volo.Blogging exposes BlogFilesController at api/blogging/files/{name} and
api/blogging/files/www/{name}, and FileAppService.GetAsync passes the route value to
BlobContainer.GetAllBytesAsync with only a null-or-whitespace check. There is no
authorization attribute on the controller, on either action, on FileAppService, or on
BloggingAppServiceBase.
Because [Route("{name}")] is a single segment, the question is what survives routing.
A minimal ASP.NET Core application with the same route shape was asked what the handler
received (transcripts/route-encoding.txt):