
Proof-of-concept and write-up for CVE-2026-123618: ABP Framework's external login provider path in the OpenIddict password grant bypasses 2FA, lockout and account deactivation.
When a password login succeeds through a registered IExternalLoginProvider, the
/connect/token password grant hands back an access token without running any of the
checks the local password branch runs. A deactivated account gets a token. A locked-out
account gets a token. An account with two-factor enabled gets a token with no second
factor. A provider whose own IsEnabledAsync() returns false still authenticates.
| CVE | CVE-2026-123618, assigned by VulnCheck, published 2026-11-06 |
| Advisory | VulnCheck. The vendor shipped the fix without one |
| Project | ABP Framework |
| Affected | Volo.Abp.OpenIddict.AspNetCore before 10.7.1, and Volo.Abp.Identity.AspNetCore on the web sign-in path |
| Fixed | 10.7.1, released 2026-11-03 |
| CWE | CWE-288, authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel, with CWE-304, missing critical step in authentication |
| CVSS | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N 7.6 High, and CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 6.8 Medium, both from VulnCheck |
| Tested on | tag 10.7.0 (c68e856d), .NET SDK 10.0.401, inside ABP's own integration test harnesses |
| Credit | Nguyen Le Thanh Nam (yuwkaa), finder. Fixed by maliming in PR #26305, commit b2fd3cf0 |
Reported to [email protected] on 2026-10-10, with a follow-up on 2026-10-20. The behaviour
was fixed in 10.7.1 with no advisory, no identifier and no release note naming it, so a
reader who diffs 10.7.0 against 10.7.1 can see the issue and a reader who only reads the
changelog cannot. VulnCheck assigned the CVE afterwards.
modules/openiddict/src/Volo.Abp.OpenIddict.AspNetCore/Volo/Abp/OpenIddict/Controllers/TokenController.Password.cs,
lines 51 to 77:
if (AbpIdentityOptions.Value.ExternalLoginProviders.Any())
{
foreach (var externalLoginProviderInfo in AbpIdentityOptions.Value.ExternalLoginProviders.Values)
{
var externalLoginProvider = (IExternalLoginProvider)scope.ServiceProvider
.GetRequiredService(externalLoginProviderInfo.Type);
if (await externalLoginProvider.TryAuthenticateAsync(request.Username, request.Password))
{
user = await UserManager.FindSharedUserByNameAsync(request.Username);
...
using (CurrentTenant.Change(user.TenantId))
{
return await SetSuccessResultAsync(request, user);
}
}
}
}
The local branch of the same method reaches SetSuccessResultAsync only through
SignInManager.CheckPasswordSignInAsync, which runs AbpSignInManager.PreSignInCheck, and
then through IsTfaEnabledAsync. The external branch reaches it directly.
The gate it walks past is in AbpOpenIdDictControllerBase.cs:
protected virtual async Task<bool> PreSignInCheckAsync(IdentityUser user)
{
if (!user.IsActive)
{
return false;
}
if (!await SignInManager.CanSignInAsync(user))
{
return false;
}
if (await UserManager.IsLockedOutAsync(user))
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
At 10.7.0 that method is called from TokenController.AuthorizationCode.cs:50,
TokenController.DeviceCode.cs:50, TokenController.RefreshToken.cs:50 and
TokenController.TokenExchange.cs:47, and from nowhere in the password grant.
IExternalLoginProvider.cs:36 declares Task<bool> IsEnabledAsync() with the comment
"Return a value indicating whether this source is enabled." A grep for it across
framework/src and modules at that tag finds the declaration, the abstract override in
ExternalLoginProviderBase.cs:35, a test implementation, and no production caller.
Two call sites, both run against the released 10.7.0 tree inside ABP's own integration test harnesses. Every row has a paired control in the same run, same user, same endpoint.
/connect/token, password grantSeeded user two-factor-user, two-factor enabled, lockout enabled. Rows in
transcripts/token-endpoint-rows.txt.
| request | result |
|---|---|
| CONTROL local password, two-factor enabled | HTTP 400 invalid_grant / RequiresTwoFactor plus a twoFactorToken |
| MEASURED external provider password, no two-factor code sent | HTTP 200 and an access_token |
CONTROL local password, IsActive = false | HTTP 400 account_inactive |
MEASURED external provider password, IsActive = false | HTTP 200 and an access_token |
| CONTROL local password, locked out one hour | HTTP 400 account_locked |
| MEASURED external provider password, locked out one hour | HTTP 200 and an access_token |
CONTROL local password, ShouldChangePasswordOnNextLogin = true | HTTP 400 ShouldChangePasswordOnNextLogin plus a changePasswordToken |
| MEASURED external provider password, same flag | HTTP 200 and an access_token |
MEASURED provider whose IsEnabledAsync() returns false | HTTP 200 and an access_token |
| CONTROL password matching neither source | HTTP 400, no token |
The two-factor pair, as the harness printed it:
CONTROL local password, two-factor enabled
HTTP 400 BadRequest
{
"error": "invalid_grant",
"error_description": "RequiresTwoFactor",
"error_uri": "https://documentation.openiddict.com/errors/ID2024",
MEASURED external login provider, no two-factor code sent
HTTP 200 OK
{
"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IllEVzJWQlRZNDYtLVY5RzNHTUhJVDJXV1dPUzZRSzlBX0lGQkNPQlUiLCJ0eXAiOiJhdCtqd3QifQ...
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600
}
And the lockout pair:
CONTROL local password, locked out for an hour
HTTP 400 BadRequest
{
"error": "account_locked",
"error_description": "The user account has been locked out due to invalid login attempts. Please wait a while and try again.",
MEASURED external login provider, locked out for an hour
HTTP 200 OK
The token belongs to the same user the control refused. Every control response that carries
a userId returns the same identifier the issued JWT carries as sub, and every issued
token has "preferred_username": "two-factor-user". The seeded user gets a fresh Guid
per test instance, so no GUID is quoted here.
AbpSignInManager.PasswordSignInAsync, the web sign-in pathSeeded user bob, created with SetIsActive(false) and the manager role by ABP's own
test data builder. Rows in transcripts/web-signin-rows.txt:
CONTROL bob (IsActive = false), local password -> NotAllowed
CONTROL bob, password matching neither source -> NotAllowed
MEASURED bob (IsActive = false), external provider password -> Succeeded
CONTROL bob.IsActive read back after that sign-in -> False
The last row rules out the other explanation for that Succeeded: the provider's
UpdateUserAsync did not quietly reactivate the account.