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CVE-2026-123618 — Proof-of-concept and write-up for CVE-2026-123618: ABP Framework's external login provider path in the OpenIddict password grant bypasses 2FA, lockout and account deactivation. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/yuwkaaa/cve-2026-123618
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingIdentity & Access Management (IAM)Authentication
GitHubyuwkaaa/cve-2026-123618

CVE-2026-123618

Proof-of-concept and write-up for CVE-2026-123618: ABP Framework's external login provider path in the OpenIddict password grant bypasses 2FA, lockout and account deactivation.

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CVE-2026-123618 — the external login path in ABP skips the pre-sign-in gate and the second factor

CVE CVSS 4.0 CWE Bypassed

When a password login succeeds through a registered IExternalLoginProvider, the /connect/token password grant hands back an access token without running any of the checks the local password branch runs. A deactivated account gets a token. A locked-out account gets a token. An account with two-factor enabled gets a token with no second factor. A provider whose own IsEnabledAsync() returns false still authenticates.

CVECVE-2026-123618, assigned by VulnCheck, published 2026-11-06
AdvisoryVulnCheck. The vendor shipped the fix without one
ProjectABP Framework
AffectedVolo.Abp.OpenIddict.AspNetCore before 10.7.1, and Volo.Abp.Identity.AspNetCore on the web sign-in path
Fixed10.7.1, released 2026-11-03
CWECWE-288, authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel, with CWE-304, missing critical step in authentication
CVSSCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N 7.6 High, and CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 6.8 Medium, both from VulnCheck
Tested ontag 10.7.0 (c68e856d), .NET SDK 10.0.401, inside ABP's own integration test harnesses
CreditNguyen Le Thanh Nam (yuwkaa), finder. Fixed by maliming in PR #26305, commit b2fd3cf0

Reported to [email protected] on 2026-10-10, with a follow-up on 2026-10-20. The behaviour was fixed in 10.7.1 with no advisory, no identifier and no release note naming it, so a reader who diffs 10.7.0 against 10.7.1 can see the issue and a reader who only reads the changelog cannot. VulnCheck assigned the CVE afterwards.

The code, at 10.7.0

modules/openiddict/src/Volo.Abp.OpenIddict.AspNetCore/Volo/Abp/OpenIddict/Controllers/TokenController.Password.cs, lines 51 to 77:

if (AbpIdentityOptions.Value.ExternalLoginProviders.Any())
{
    foreach (var externalLoginProviderInfo in AbpIdentityOptions.Value.ExternalLoginProviders.Values)
    {
        var externalLoginProvider = (IExternalLoginProvider)scope.ServiceProvider
            .GetRequiredService(externalLoginProviderInfo.Type);

        if (await externalLoginProvider.TryAuthenticateAsync(request.Username, request.Password))
        {
            user = await UserManager.FindSharedUserByNameAsync(request.Username);
            ...
            using (CurrentTenant.Change(user.TenantId))
            {
                return await SetSuccessResultAsync(request, user);
            }
        }
    }
}

The local branch of the same method reaches SetSuccessResultAsync only through SignInManager.CheckPasswordSignInAsync, which runs AbpSignInManager.PreSignInCheck, and then through IsTfaEnabledAsync. The external branch reaches it directly.

The gate it walks past is in AbpOpenIdDictControllerBase.cs:

protected virtual async Task<bool> PreSignInCheckAsync(IdentityUser user)
{
    if (!user.IsActive)
    {
        return false;
    }

    if (!await SignInManager.CanSignInAsync(user))
    {
        return false;
    }

    if (await UserManager.IsLockedOutAsync(user))
    {
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

At 10.7.0 that method is called from TokenController.AuthorizationCode.cs:50, TokenController.DeviceCode.cs:50, TokenController.RefreshToken.cs:50 and TokenController.TokenExchange.cs:47, and from nowhere in the password grant.

IExternalLoginProvider.cs:36 declares Task<bool> IsEnabledAsync() with the comment "Return a value indicating whether this source is enabled." A grep for it across framework/src and modules at that tag finds the declaration, the abstract override in ExternalLoginProviderBase.cs:35, a test implementation, and no production caller.

What was measured

Two call sites, both run against the released 10.7.0 tree inside ABP's own integration test harnesses. Every row has a paired control in the same run, same user, same endpoint.

/connect/token, password grant

Seeded user two-factor-user, two-factor enabled, lockout enabled. Rows in transcripts/token-endpoint-rows.txt.

requestresult
CONTROL local password, two-factor enabledHTTP 400 invalid_grant / RequiresTwoFactor plus a twoFactorToken
MEASURED external provider password, no two-factor code sentHTTP 200 and an access_token
CONTROL local password, IsActive = falseHTTP 400 account_inactive
MEASURED external provider password, IsActive = falseHTTP 200 and an access_token
CONTROL local password, locked out one hourHTTP 400 account_locked
MEASURED external provider password, locked out one hourHTTP 200 and an access_token
CONTROL local password, ShouldChangePasswordOnNextLogin = trueHTTP 400 ShouldChangePasswordOnNextLogin plus a changePasswordToken
MEASURED external provider password, same flagHTTP 200 and an access_token
MEASURED provider whose IsEnabledAsync() returns falseHTTP 200 and an access_token
CONTROL password matching neither sourceHTTP 400, no token

The two-factor pair, as the harness printed it:

 CONTROL  local password, two-factor enabled
   HTTP 400 BadRequest
   {
   "error": "invalid_grant",
   "error_description": "RequiresTwoFactor",
   "error_uri": "https://documentation.openiddict.com/errors/ID2024",
 MEASURED external login provider, no two-factor code sent
   HTTP 200 OK
   {
   "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IllEVzJWQlRZNDYtLVY5RzNHTUhJVDJXV1dPUzZRSzlBX0lGQkNPQlUiLCJ0eXAiOiJhdCtqd3QifQ...
   "token_type": "Bearer",
   "expires_in": 3600
 }

And the lockout pair:

 CONTROL  local password, locked out for an hour
   HTTP 400 BadRequest
   {
   "error": "account_locked",
   "error_description": "The user account has been locked out due to invalid login attempts. Please wait a while and try again.",
 MEASURED external login provider, locked out for an hour
   HTTP 200 OK

The token belongs to the same user the control refused. Every control response that carries a userId returns the same identifier the issued JWT carries as sub, and every issued token has "preferred_username": "two-factor-user". The seeded user gets a fresh Guid per test instance, so no GUID is quoted here.

AbpSignInManager.PasswordSignInAsync, the web sign-in path

Seeded user bob, created with SetIsActive(false) and the manager role by ABP's own test data builder. Rows in transcripts/web-signin-rows.txt:

 CONTROL  bob (IsActive = false), local password  -> NotAllowed
 CONTROL  bob, password matching neither source -> NotAllowed
 MEASURED bob (IsActive = false), external provider password -> Succeeded
 CONTROL  bob.IsActive read back after that sign-in -> False

The last row rules out the other explanation for that Succeeded: the provider's UpdateUserAsync did not quietly reactivate the account.

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