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CVE-2026-118570 — Proof-of-concept and analysis for CVE-2026-118570, a CSRF flaw in Drupal's fasttoggle toggle route, with a browser PoC page, test transcript, and fix diff. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/yuwkaaa/cve-2026-118570
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb Security
GitHubyuwkaaa/cve-2026-118570

CVE-2026-118570

Proof-of-concept and analysis for CVE-2026-118570, a CSRF flaw in Drupal's fasttoggle toggle route, with a browser PoC page, test transcript, and fix diff.

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14 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-118570 — CSRF on the Drupal fasttoggle toggle route

CVE Drupal risk CWE Vector

/fasttoggle/{entity_type}/{entity_id}/{action} carried no _csrf_token, and the toggle is a GET. Get somebody who holds use fasttoggle onto a page you control, and their browser performs the write for you.

CVECVE-2026-118570, assigned by Drupal.org, published 2026-10-30
AdvisorySA-CONTRIB-2026-283, 2026-10-28
Projectfasttoggle
Affected< 4.1.1
Fixed4.1.1
CWECWE-352, Cross-Site Request Forgery
Drupal riskModerately critical 13/25, AC:Basic/A:None/CI:None/II:Some/E:Theoretical/TD:All
Tested onDrupal 11.4.6, PHP 8.4.24, fasttoggle 4.1.0, Chromium 150.0.7871.181
CreditReported by Nam Nguyen Le Thanh (yuwkaa). Fixed by Andrei Ivnitskii (ivnish)

The same report produced a second advisory, SA-CONTRIB-2026-282 / CVE-2026-118569: the same route also skipped the entity access check, so the permission holder could reach content they had no rights over. This repo covers only the missing token.

The route

fasttoggle.routing.yml in 4.1.0:

fasttoggle.toggle:
  path: '/fasttoggle/{entity_type}/{entity_id}/{action}'
  defaults:
    _controller: '\Drupal\fasttoggle\Controller\FasttoggleController::toggle'
  requirements:
    _permission: 'use fasttoggle'

One _permission line, nothing else. No _csrf_token, no method restriction, so the state change happens on a plain GET.

Which cross-site vector actually works

Worth measuring rather than assuming, because the obvious one fails. A script drives Chromium against the released 4.1.0 on a local lab. The victim origin is http://127.0.0.1:8087, the attacker origin is http://localhost:9099, and a third port is an instrument that records whether a request arrived with the session cookie.

    session cookie: name=SESS12ca17b49af2289436f303e0166030a2 sameSite=Lax httpOnly=True
    instrument saw /probe-same-site-subresource             Cookie carries SESS: True
    instrument saw /probe-cross-site-subresource            Cookie carries SESS: False
    instrument saw /probe-cross-site-toplevel               Cookie carries SESS: True

The first line is the control: a same-site subresource does carry the cookie, so the instrument works. The second kills the textbook vector. Drupal's session cookie defaults to SameSite=Lax, so an `` on the attacker's page never carries it:

    nid 53 owner=4  status=0 promote=0 sticky=0  "Carol's own draft"
    instrument saw /probe-cross-site-subresource            Cookie carries SESS: False
    nid 53 owner=4  status=0 promote=0 sticky=0  "Carol's own draft"

Unchanged before and after.

Lax does allow top-level navigation, which is all this needs, because the toggle is a GET. A link on the attacker's page, or a window.location:

    nid 53 owner=4  status=0 promote=0 sticky=0  "Carol's own draft"
        carol  entity update=YES   core field edit access: status=DENIED promote=DENIED sticky=DENIED
    browser ended up at: http://127.0.0.1:8087/fasttoggle/node/53/status
    nid 53 owner=4  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "Carol's own draft"
        carol  entity update=YES   core field edit access: status=DENIED promote=DENIED sticky=DENIED

The draft is published. Read the second column too: core says carol may not edit the status field, and the toggle changed it regardless, which is the other CVE showing through on the same request.

Full browser run in poc-transcript.txt.

Running it

attacker.html is the page to serve from an origin that is not the Drupal site. It carries both vectors side by side, the `` that does nothing and the link that fires, so a single page shows the difference. Point it at a site you own and edit the host and node id at the top.

python3 -m http.server 9099     # from the directory holding attacker.html

Then open http://localhost:9099/attacker.html in a browser already logged in to the target as a user holding use fasttoggle.

Limits

  • It needs a victim who already holds use fasttoggle and who ends up on the attacker's page. Drupal scored it AC:Basic for that reason.
  • The click is visible. Top-level navigation lands the victim on the toggle URL, so they see the address change. Nothing here hides it.
  • Each request flips one flag on one entity. There is no batching inside a single navigation.
  • Not tested on a browser that defaults to SameSite=None, or on a deployment that sets the session cookie's SameSite explicitly. The measurement above is Chromium 150 against a stock Drupal 11.4.6.

Not remote code execution, not an authentication bypass, and not reachable against a visitor who does not hold the permission.

The fix

4.1.1 put a token on the route and constrained the parameters:

  requirements:
    _permission: 'use fasttoggle'
    _csrf_token: 'TRUE'
    entity_type: 'node|comment'
    entity_id: '\d+'
    action: 'status|promote|sticky'

With _csrf_token: 'TRUE', Drupal expects a token query parameter tied to the session, which an attacker's page cannot produce. The same release added the entity access checks that CVE-2026-118569 was about. Full diff between the released artefacts in fix-4.1.0-to-4.1.1.diff. That patch was read only; the browser run was not repeated against 4.1.1.

References

  • SA-CONTRIB-2026-283
  • CVE-2026-118570
  • CVE-2026-118569, the access bypass on the same route
  • fasttoggle on drupal.org

Reported privately to the Drupal Security Team, who coordinated the fix and both advisories.

For testing systems you own or are authorised to test.

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