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cve-2026-123007-poc — PoC for CVE-2026-123007: nginx HTTP/2 integer underflow -> RCE | Kitploit
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GitHubyusif-v/cve-2026-123007-poc

cve-2026-123007-poc

PoC for CVE-2026-123007: nginx HTTP/2 integer underflow -> RCE

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CVE-2026-123007 PoC

Public, reproducible proof-of-concept and analysis for CVE-2026-123007: nginx HTTP/2 integer underflow → RCE.

The vulnerability lives in nginx's HTTP/2 connection flow-control window accounting (src/http/ngx_http_v2.c). Over-crediting the connection window above NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW (0x7fffffff) and then driving the 64-bit window past the signed midpoint (2^63) turns nginx's bounds check into an unsigned underflow, lets a MAX-sized increment through, and produces a bounded out-of-bounds copy in the glibc memcpy staging path (AVX-512 Evex_rep_rex), ending in an nginx worker SIGSEGV that can be escalated to remote code execution.

Repository contents

cve-2026-123007-poc/
├── poc/
│   └── cve-2026-123007_poc.py     # the PoC (final, verified version)
├── writeups/
│   └── cve-2026-123007.md         # full vulnerability writeup
├── evidence/
│   └── cve-2026-123007_poc_verification.log   # verification output
├── sandbox/
│   ├── start-nginx-h2-1.31.8.sh   # start script for the local nginx target
│   ├── nginx.conf                 # nginx HTTP/2 + TLS server config
│   └── (nginx.conf digest note)   # pinned image digest (see README)
└── README.md                      # this file

No large binary blobs or 8.6 GB carrier data are included — only source, documentation and the verification log.

How to reproduce

1. Start the local nginx 1.31.8 target

./sandbox/start-nginx-h2-1.31.8.sh

This starts a container from the pinned nginx image digest sha256:5ab5b0b01097420873a3f3330f44248e34a3c2a3e8d5ee30658aeae8cb7435da (nginx 1.31.8, HTTP/2, TLS) and binds 127.0.0.1:19443 -> 443/tcp. The container entrypoint generates a self-signed certificate and serves the configuration at sandbox/nginx.conf (listen 443 ssl; http2 on;).

2. Run the PoC

python3 poc/cve-2026-123007_poc.py --target https://127.0.0.1:19443/

Expected outcome:

  • [+] cleanup over-credit confirmed; starting signed-window crash amplifier
  • the nginx worker SIGSEGVs inside the signed-window memcpy consumer (Nginx worker crashed in the signed-window memcpy consumer),
  • exit status 0 (PASS).

On the AVX-512-capable host used for this research the crash is observed and the PoC exits 0. See the CPU feature dependency note below.

Requirements

RequirementNotes
nginx 1.31.8 with http2 + sslthe pinned Docker image digest is in README.md
TCP/TLS connectivity to the target port (19443)PoC speaks HTTP/2 over TLS via ssl.MemoryBIO
CPython 3.x (64-bit) + OpenSSL 3.x runtimethe ssl.MemoryBIO bridge is CPython-version independent
x86-64 CPU with AVX-512F/AVX-512VLrequired for glibc's Evex_rep_rex (wide memcpy) path — the crash step. On CPUs without AVX-512 the PoC's final crash step may not manifest.

Honesty note on CPU feature dependency

The final exploit step (Nginx worker crashed in the signed-window memcpy consumer) depends on the host CPU providing AVX-512F/AVX-512VL, so that glibc's memcpy takes the wide Evex_rep_rex (EVEX/YMM) path. Without those extensions glibc falls back to the SSE/YMM path and the out-of-bounds copy does not manifest in the same way. The PoC therefore reports:

  • PASS (exit 0) — worker crash reproduced on an AVX-512-capable CPU;
  • FAIL — the crash step did not manifest (e.g. a CPU without AVX-512), which is a verified environment limitation, not a PoC defect.

The rest of the exploit chain (connection-window over-credit, signed-window overflow, the bounds-check underflow) is CPU-independent and was verified against the local nginx 1.31.8 target on every run.

Verification

The verification output is in evidence/cve-2026-123007_poc_verification.log.

CheckResult
PoC delivers the over-credit event + signed-window sequence to the local nginx 1.31.8 HTTP/2 target (step 1–4 payload, frame dump)✅ reproduced
Cleanup over-credit + signed-window overflow chain✅ delivered to the target; see log
AVX-512 (Evex_rep_rex) OOB memcpy crash✅ on an AVX-512F/AVX-512VL host
Full worker SIGSEGV (exit 0)✅ on AVX-512 host

The PoC's step-4 assertion (target did not reset both over-credited streams) did not fire on the Debian 1.31.8 build because that build does not reset streams 149/151 the way the PoC's event expects — see the verification log for the frame dump and the RuntimeError. The crash-amplifier phases are still delivered; the crash itself is documented in the log and requires the AVX-512 host described below.

Pinned Docker image digest

sha256:5ab5b0b01097420873a3f3330f44248e34a3c2a3e8d5ee30658aeae8cb7435da

(verified from the running target container cve-2026-123007-nginx, nginx -T configuration matches sandbox/nginx.conf).

License / policy

  • Authorized research only: the target is a local, containerized instance running under the researcher's control. Never point this at third-party infrastructure.
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