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s5e8835-sboot-probe — Static S-Boot/LK probe for Samsung Exynos 1380 (s5e8835): SVE-2026-3546 / CVE-2026-21155 resolver patch, four-device coverage, and safety notes. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/yuki493/s5e8835-sboot-probe
Embedded Systems SecurityStatic AnalysisVulnerability AnalysisExploitationReverse EngineeringMobile SecurityHardware SecurityBinary AnalysisFirmware Analysis
GitHubyuki493/s5e8835-sboot-probe

s5e8835-sboot-probe

116 days agoNot yet reviewed
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Static S-Boot/LK probe for Samsung Exynos 1380 (s5e8835): SVE-2026-3546 / CVE-2026-21155 resolver patch, four-device coverage, and safety notes.

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s5e8835 S-Boot Probe

Static resolver probe for Samsung Exynos 1380 (s5e8835) S-Boot/LK — SVE-2026-3546 / CVE-2026-21155.

STATIC ONLY. This repository contains no USB code, no flashing code, no fuse code, and no device-write path. Nothing here talks to a phone. The tools read a local sboot.bin and print addresses. That is the whole attack surface.


Why this exists

The public SVE-2026-3546 proof of concept targets s5e8825 only. It resolves the s5e8825 LK image, builds a loader for its memory layout, and ends in a one-way Secure Boot KEY2 fuse. Owners of the newer Exynos 1380 / s5e8835 devices — Galaxy Tab S9 FE, Galaxy A26 5G, Galaxy A35 5G, Galaxy A54 5G — had no documented answer to the first question: does the resolver even understand this LK?

This repository answers that question statically. It documents the s5e8835 LK layout, the two resolver changes needed to make parallel() and input_map() recognize it, and the exact heuristics that still fail. The result was validated against four independent sboot.bin images spanning 2025-08 to 2026-10.

No hardware was used. No device was unlocked. No fuse was burned.


What it does

  • Locates the LK sub-image inside a raw sboot.bin by scanning for the BSS descriptor triple, then validates the candidate with resolve.image_map().
  • Derives the LK load base, end address, and BSS range from the image, rather than hardcoding them per build.
  • Runs the nine upstream resolver heuristics and prints a PASS/FAIL table.
  • Dumps the compressed_download_init instruction window and the MOVZ/MOVK constants that input_map() sees, so a failing build can be diagnosed without a disassembler.
  • Ships the exact resolve.py patch needed for the s5e8835 slot-register layout while preserving the s5e8825 behavior.

What it explicitly does not do

  • It does not connect to a device, enumerate USB, or open a serial port.
  • It does not flash, erase, unlock, or write anything.
  • It does not burn, plan, or simulate a fuse. There is no dry run.
  • It does not build or run a loader payload.
  • It does not redistribute Samsung firmware or the upstream resolve.py.
  • It does not claim that the exploit chain is portable end-to-end. Only the static resolver stage is covered here.

Device coverage

All four images are sboot.bin extracted from official BL packages. The table is the complete dataset behind the findings.

DeviceModelBuildSPLsboot.bin sha256LK sliceBaseBSS
Galaxy Tab S9 FE (Wi-Fi)SM-X510X510XXSGEZI32026-09-05a8abc835e5b7337fd6ed6009abe74bde18882d8807841ae6d48e62eebf44f2670xf10000xf48000000xf4c3d000..0xf507a908
Galaxy A26 5GSM-A266BA266BXXS4AYGA2025-08-0179f169c9ecc03f604add536c5d3eb3c1a097ecabb7d4c3986ad20387bcd481c40xf10000xf48000000xf4c3c000..0xf5105df8
Galaxy A35 5GSM-A356EA356EXXSBDZH1Oct 2026797fcba92b90e6ceadd55ffa6adaea64793c4a378c0dca26efc8ce9f89e374840xf10000xf48000000xf4c3c000..0xf5079908
Galaxy A54 5GSM-A546EA546EXXUNGZJ5Oct 2026cb386232b2b32fc55fb3af7c676e54fb4fb43080e4d2adb1391edd8fdf5d9dc90xf10000xf48000000xf4c44000..0xf5087270

All four: end = 0xf6000000.

Download-mode buffers are identical across the family:

PAR_BASE = 0xce800000   PAR_SIZE = 0x7e00000   PAR_SLOT = 0x1e00000
IN_BASE  = 0x890010000  IN_SIZE  = 0x8000000  IN_SLOT  = 0x2000000

The BSS range differs on every build. That is expected: it is linker output, not a protocol constant. image_map() recovers it from the descriptor at the head of the LK slice, so it must never be hardcoded.


Findings

1. LK layout is stable across four devices

Every image places the LK sub-image at file offset 0xf1000 and maps it at 0xf4800000, ending at 0xf6000000. The BSS descriptor sits at 0xf1030 (file offset), immediately inside the slice.

The whole sboot.bin is 0x800000 bytes. The first 0xf1000 bytes are EPBL and other pre-LK blobs; the s5e8835 string at file offset 0x5e43 lives there, not in LK. Additional marker copies appear inside LK on some builds:

Devices5e8835 marker file offsets
SM-X5100x5e43
SM-A266B0x5e43, 0x26e42b, 0x4f125f
SM-A356E0x5e43, 0x26ee28, 0x4f125f
SM-A546E0x5e43, 0x276bf0, 0x4f125f

2. The download buffers match s5e8825 exactly

Both parallel_download_init and compressed_download_init materialize the same buffer geometry as the s5e8825 ground truth. On the X510 the functions resolve at:

parallel_download_init   @ 0xf4863d64
compressed_download_init @ 0xf4863fb0

The patch changes only how the slot register is recognized, not the buffer values. After the patch both rows return the exact s5e8825 values on every s5e8835 build tested.

3. The slot register moved from w9 to w10

The upstream resolver was written against s5e8825, where the per-slot size is loaded into w9:

mov  w9, #0x1e00000      ; PAR_SLOT (or #0x2000000 for IN_SLOT)

On s5e8835 LK, the same constant is loaded into w10, while w9 carries the 0x40 stride/count value:

mov  w10, #0x2000000     ; slot size
mov  w9,  #0x40          ; slot count / stride constant

The upstream predicates slot[2:] != (9, 0, 0x52800000) therefore reject the real slot on s5e8835 and the resolvers return an empty candidate list. The patch accepts w9 or w10.

4. The s5e8825 ordering guard

Simply accepting w10 everywhere is not safe. The two SoCs schedule the base, total-size, and slot-size MOVZs in a different order:

  • s5e8825 (w9): the 64-bit base pair is emitted before the size loads. Upstream's base_offset >= min(total[0], slot[0]) rejection is part of the original filter.
  • s5e8835 (w10): the base pair can be emitted after the slot load, so the same rejection discards the valid candidate.

The final patch applies the ordering rejection only when the slot register is w9. That is the whole reason the A53 regression stays green.

5. The A53 regression

An intermediate revision accepted w10 without the conditional. On the s5e8825 A53 image that admitted a spurious candidate and the regression line no longer reproduced. The final slot[2] == 9 guard restores the ground truth:

base=0xf8800000 in=0x890010000 pack=0x894110000 code=0x896010100 out=0xc5000000 write=0xf8f03de8 cb=0xf8f04008 walk=0x33f03de8

Any future resolver change must reproduce that line before it is considered portable.

6. Block wrappers

blk_bread and blk_bwrite resolve by symbol XREF and non-PAC prologue on two builds:

Deviceblk_breadblk_bwrite
SM-X5100xf4846b580xf4846d54
SM-A266B0xf4845fb80xf48461b4

Both wrappers use the classic non-PAC prologue:

fd7b bda9 f657 01a9 f44f 02a9 fd03 0091

A35/A54 wrapper addresses were not captured in the tester report. The rows are expected to pass there as well, but this repository does not claim an address it did not observe.

7. Five heuristics still fail

On the X510 and A26 after the patch, the nine-row probe is 4 PASS / 5 FAIL:

RowFailure signature
compressed output blockRuntimeError: compressed output: []
Odin setter/replyRuntimeError: Odin setter: []
screen printf/cursorIndexError: list index out of range
em_crypto_sha256RuntimeError: SHA-256 XREF not found
blk shiftRuntimeError: block shift

These are heuristic-shape failures, not evidence that the functions are absent:

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