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CVE-2026-34990-cups-lpe — Python proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-34990, reproducing the OpenPrinting CUPS local root file-write race with automatic verification and cleanup. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/trx-0/cve-2026-34990-cups-lpe
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GitHubtrx-0/cve-2026-34990-cups-lpe

CVE-2026-34990-cups-lpe

Python proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-34990, reproducing the OpenPrinting CUPS local root file-write race with automatic verification and cleanup.

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1 month agoNot yet reviewed

CVE-2026-34990 — CUPS local privilege escalation

An authorized reproducer for an OpenPrinting CUPS local root file-write vulnerability. An unprivileged local user can leak cupsd's root Local authentication token, exploit a race involving a temporary local printer, and make root cupsd write controlled bytes to an arbitrary path.

The default run is deliberately non-destructive: it writes and verifies a marker in a new private temporary directory, then removes the file and all queues it created.

Affected versions

  • OpenPrinting CUPS 2.4.16 is affected.
  • CUPS 2.4.17 contains the fix.

Consult the vendor advisory for downstream package/backport status rather than relying only on a distribution's displayed version.

Vulnerability chain

  1. CUPS-Create-Local-Printer is pointed at an attacker-controlled loopback IPP listener. A Local trc="y" authentication challenge makes cupsd disclose its root Local token.
  2. A normal authenticated CUPS-Add-Modify-Printer request containing a file:// destination is rejected with the default FileDevice No configuration.
  3. The vulnerable create-local operation can nevertheless instantiate a temporary file-backed queue. The PoC races authenticated add/modify requests against CUPS's temporary-printer handling to persist that queue as a shared raw printer. Crucially, those persistence requests do not resend the blocked device-uri.
  4. A gzip-compressed raw print job causes cupsd to write the decompressed bytes to the file destination as root.

This timing window is why the PoC retries. A failed attempt is expected and is not reported as exploitation; success requires an independent file-content or command check. CUPS commonly creates the target as root with mode 0600; for a new path, the PoC therefore accepts either exact readable content or root ownership plus the expected file size. Existing custom targets still require content or command verification.

Requirements

  • A local shell on an authorized test machine.
  • A vulnerable cupsd reachable through its local socket or loopback TCP port.
  • Python 3; no third-party modules.

FileDevice Yes is not required. If it is enabled, a simpler direct administrative file-printer path exists, but that is not the default-configuration CVE chain reproduced here.

The local CUPS socket is auto-detected. Use --tcp to reproduce the vendor's loopback TCP transport explicitly, or --socket /path/to/cups.sock to select a socket.

Usage

Harmless proof, automatic verification, and automatic cleanup:

python3 cupsploit.py

Explicit privilege-escalation proof using a randomized sudoers fragment:

python3 cupsploit.py --escalate

That mode first confirms the sudo check does not already succeed, verifies uid 0 after the race, and removes the sudoers fragment by default. Add --keep-artifacts only when you intentionally want to retain the successful queue and target.

Arbitrary file-write testing is opt-in and refuses to overwrite an existing path unless the second acknowledgement is supplied:

python3 cupsploit.py \
  --target /absolute/test/path \
  --allow-arbitrary-write \
  --content 'authorized test marker'

python3 cupsploit.py \
  --target /absolute/existing/path \
  --allow-arbitrary-write \
  --force-overwrite \
  --payload-file ./payload.bin \
  --verify-command 'your independent verification command'

If the target cannot be read by the invoking user, provide --verify-command. It must fail before exploitation and succeed afterward, preventing an unrelated pre-existing condition from being reported as success. Race tuning is available through --attempts and --iterations.

Cleanup

Unless --keep-artifacts is used, the script deletes the leak and candidate queues. It also removes its harmless proof file or sudoers proof. A custom target is never deleted automatically because it may be user-supplied data.

If a run is interrupted, use the CUPS administration interface to remove printers whose names begin with cve34990, and manually inspect the selected target.

Tests

Run the standard-library protocol tests with python3 -m unittest -v.

References

  • OpenPrinting advisory GHSA-c54j-2vqw-wpwp
  • CUPS 2.4 branch fix
  • CUPS main-branch fix

Disclaimer

For authorized security testing and research only. Use it only on systems you own or have explicit permission to test.

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