
PoC and detection notes for CVE-2026-48907: unauthenticated file upload in Joomla JCE profiles.import via double-extension bypass, with patch analysis and verification steps.
profiles.importJoomla Content Editor (JCE) exposes a profile import task at
/index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import that accepts an uploaded
file and writes it to disk without validating the filename extension
against the profile format allowlist, and without requiring an authenticated
session on affected versions.
The uploaded file lands in the path returned by $config->get('tmp_path') —
the Joomla webroot's tmp/ directory on a default install. The write happens
before the profile XML is parsed, so the content of the uploaded file is
irrelevant to landing it on disk.
GET /administrator/index.php?option=com_jce&view=profiles — the response
HTML carries a 32-hex CSRF token. JCE renders this token into the page in
several places; it is not gated behind an authenticated session on
affected versions.
POST /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import — multipart body
with two fields:
profile_file carrying the file content and the filename parameter1JCE writes the file to tmp_path using the filename supplied in the
multipart filename parameter. No extension check, no content check, no
path sanitization beyond what Joomla's JFile::upload applies.
GET /tmp/<filename> — if the response body contains the file content,
the write is confirmed.
The uploaded filename uses <name>.xml.php. JCE accepts the file because its
validation looks at .xml; Apache executes it because its handler mapping
resolves the final extension .php. Each layer reads a different extension
and neither rejects.
A .txt extension lands on disk and is readable, but does not execute. A
.php extension is rejected by JCE's profile format check on versions where
the check is present. .xml.php satisfies both layers.
The upload target path is built by concatenating tmp_path with the raw
filename from the multipart request. JCE does not normalize the path and
does not strip traversal segments before the write on affected versions, but
the default tmp/ location is already web-accessible on stock Joomla
installs — traversal is not required for the chain to work.
tmp/ is served by the web server. On a default Apache + mod_php install,
any .php file under tmp/ is executed when requested. The extension
allowlist that would normally prevent this is bypassed by the double
extension described above.
| Range | Status |
|---|---|
| JCE < 2.9.99.5 | affected |
Versions outside this range may still be affected depending on the site's
tmp_path configuration and whether the web server executes PHP from that
directory. The version range is a starting filter, not a guarantee.
Upstream patched the import task to:
core.manage capability on
com_jce before processing the upload..xml only, with no trailing .php).If GET /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import returns 403 for an
unauthenticated request, or if the response body does not contain a CSRF
token, the target is patched.
A target is vulnerable if all three hold:
/plugins/editors/jce/jce.xml or /plugins/editors/jce/jce.php returns
200 and contains jce.[a-f0-9]{32} is present in the response to
/administrator/index.php?option=com_jce&view=profiles (or the frontend
equivalent).POST to /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import with a
profile_file field returns 200/301/302 and the uploaded filename is
subsequently readable at /tmp/<filename>.The third condition is the active check — the first two are preconditions. A target can pass the first two and still be patched if the import task enforces authentication server-side.