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CVE-2026-48907 — PoC and detection notes for CVE-2026-48907: unauthenticated file upload in Joomla JCE profiles.import via double-extension bypass, with patch analysis and verification steps. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/theendofabbys/cve-2026-48907
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GitHubtheendofabbys/cve-2026-48907

CVE-2026-48907

PoC and detection notes for CVE-2026-48907: unauthenticated file upload in Joomla JCE profiles.import via double-extension bypass, with patch analysis and verification steps.

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11 month agoNot yet reviewed

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JCE — unauthenticated file upload via profiles.import

Overview

Joomla Content Editor (JCE) exposes a profile import task at /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import that accepts an uploaded file and writes it to disk without validating the filename extension against the profile format allowlist, and without requiring an authenticated session on affected versions.

The uploaded file lands in the path returned by $config->get('tmp_path') — the Joomla webroot's tmp/ directory on a default install. The write happens before the profile XML is parsed, so the content of the uploaded file is irrelevant to landing it on disk.

The chain

  1. GET /administrator/index.php?option=com_jce&view=profiles — the response HTML carries a 32-hex CSRF token. JCE renders this token into the page in several places; it is not gated behind an authenticated session on affected versions.

  2. POST /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import — multipart body with two fields:

    • profile_file carrying the file content and the filename parameter
    • a form field whose name is the CSRF token and whose value is 1
  3. JCE writes the file to tmp_path using the filename supplied in the multipart filename parameter. No extension check, no content check, no path sanitization beyond what Joomla's JFile::upload applies.

  4. GET /tmp/<filename> — if the response body contains the file content, the write is confirmed.

Why double extension

The uploaded filename uses <name>.xml.php. JCE accepts the file because its validation looks at .xml; Apache executes it because its handler mapping resolves the final extension .php. Each layer reads a different extension and neither rejects.

A .txt extension lands on disk and is readable, but does not execute. A .php extension is rejected by JCE's profile format check on versions where the check is present. .xml.php satisfies both layers.

The sink

The upload target path is built by concatenating tmp_path with the raw filename from the multipart request. JCE does not normalize the path and does not strip traversal segments before the write on affected versions, but the default tmp/ location is already web-accessible on stock Joomla installs — traversal is not required for the chain to work.

tmp/ is served by the web server. On a default Apache + mod_php install, any .php file under tmp/ is executed when requested. The extension allowlist that would normally prevent this is bypassed by the double extension described above.

Affected versions

RangeStatus
JCE < 2.9.99.5affected

Versions outside this range may still be affected depending on the site's tmp_path configuration and whether the web server executes PHP from that directory. The version range is a starting filter, not a guarantee.

The fix

Upstream patched the import task to:

  1. Require an authenticated session with the core.manage capability on com_jce before processing the upload.
  2. Reject filenames whose extension is not in an allowlist of profile formats (.xml only, with no trailing .php).
  3. Move the write to a non-web-accessible directory outside the document root.

If GET /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import returns 403 for an unauthenticated request, or if the response body does not contain a CSRF token, the target is patched.

Detection

A target is vulnerable if all three hold:

  1. /plugins/editors/jce/jce.xml or /plugins/editors/jce/jce.php returns 200 and contains jce.
  2. A CSRF token matching [a-f0-9]{32} is present in the response to /administrator/index.php?option=com_jce&view=profiles (or the frontend equivalent).
  3. A POST to /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import with a profile_file field returns 200/301/302 and the uploaded filename is subsequently readable at /tmp/<filename>.

The third condition is the active check — the first two are preconditions. A target can pass the first two and still be patched if the import task enforces authentication server-side.

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