AI amended PoC for CVE-2026-10795 - for educational purposes only - use at your own risk on labs you own ;)
A single-file proof of concept for the unauthenticated udrpc authentication
bypass in UpdraftPlus that leads to administrator-level command execution.
[!WARNING] Authorized testing only. Use this against systems you own or have explicit written permission to test. Running it against a third-party site is unlawful in most jurisdictions and is not what this project is for. The author accepts no liability for misuse or damage.
| CVE | CVE-2026-10795 |
| Component | UpdraftPlus (WordPress backup/restore plugin) |
| Vulnerable | <= 1.26.4 (Premium <= 2.26.4) |
| Fixed | 1.26.5 and later (current release at time of writing: 1.26.14) |
| Class | Authentication bypass → remote code execution |
| CVSS 3.1 | 9.8 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Authentication | None |
| User interaction | None |
| Preconditions | An active UpdraftCentral or Migrator key on the target |
The plugin exposes a remote-control listener (udrpc) used by UpdraftCentral and the
Migrator. On vulnerable versions that listener accepts the legacy format 1 message
format, which carries no signature, and decrypts the per-message AES key with an RSA
operation whose failure is never checked. An attacker who supplies an undecryptable key
obtains a known all-zero AES key, encrypts their own command, and the site executes it
as the user bound to the key — normally an administrator.
This PoC:
ping command and proves the bypass without side effects;git clone https://github.com/<your-org>/CVE-2026-10795.git
cd CVE-2026-10795
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
# Read-only check: no writes, no posts, no files.
python3 cve-2026-10795.py -u https://target.example -k --max-keys 2 --verbose
A vulnerable target returns an encrypted udrpc reply and the tool prints:
0.central.updraftplus.com: HTTP 200, 976 bytes -> vulnerable
[+] VULNERABLE: authentication bypass succeeded (CVE-2026-10795).
A patched target rejects the message instead:
0.central.updraftplus.com: HTTP 200, 0 bytes -> blocked
[-] Key name is valid, but the forged message was rejected.
This normally means the plugin is patched (>= 1.26.5).
decrypt_message() splits the attacker-supplied blob into an RSA-wrapped symmetric key
and an AES ciphertext, then decrypts the key and immediately uses the result:
// class-udrpc2.php (1.25.9), decrypt_message()
$rsa->loadKey($this->key_local);
$sym_key = base64_decode($sym_key);
$sym_key = $rsa->decrypt($sym_key); // returns false on malformed input
$rij->setKey($sym_key); // false -> zero-length / all-zero key
return $rij->decrypt($ciphertext);
phpseclib returns false when the RSA operation fails. Passing false into
Crypt_Rijndael::setKey() produces an all-zero AES-128 key rather than an error. The
attacker therefore knows the key that will be used to decrypt their own payload.
The vendor fix adds a type and length check before the key is used:
$sym_key = $rsa->decrypt($sym_key);
if (false === $sym_key || !is_string($sym_key) || strlen($sym_key) < 16) {
return false;
}
Format 2 signs every message with the site's public key. Format 1 predates that and is processed without any signature verification, so no key material is required:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
format=1&key_name=0.central.updraftplus.com&udrpc_message=<encrypted command>
The fix in 1.26.5 restricts format 1 to the four Migrator commands that still need it, and only for key names matching the Migrator pattern:
// Restrict use of format 1
if ($format < 2 && (!in_array($command, array('ping', 'get_file_status', 'send_chunk', 'upload_complete'))
|| !preg_match('/^([a-f0-9]+)\.migrator\.updraftplus\.com$/', $this->key_name_indicator))) {
$this->log("Obsolete format used - dropping (command: $command)", 'error');
die;
}
The bypass alone is an authentication bypass. It becomes code execution because the UpdraftCentral command modules expose two primitives:
| Primitive | File | What it allows |
|---|---|---|
comments.update_settings | central/modules/comments.php | Calls update_option() on any supplied key — including upload_path and stylesheet. |
posts.save → attach_remote_image() | central/modules/posts.php | Writes attacker-supplied bytes to wp_upload_dir()['path'] . '/' . basename($url) before any file-type check. |
Neither primitive validates its input in 1.26.14, and the vendor fix for this CVE does not change that. They are documented as defence-in-depth gaps in the accompanying assessment report, because any future authentication bypass — or any stolen UpdraftCentral key — re-enables the same chain.
[!NOTE] A non-writable webroot does not stop this. The write is redirected to
/tmp,/var/tmp,/dev/shm, orwp-content/uploads, and the include is redirected with the unvalidatedstylesheetoption.open_basediris often the only control that breaks it.