
The authorization layer CVE-2026-93328 was missing: scoped grants, path confinement, and signed receipts in front of MCP storage tools. CVE reproduction + gated proof, 10/10 tests.
CVE-2026-93328 / GHSA-2gc9-c85v-5vwr — Path Traversal and Missing Authorization in the cloud-storage source of Google Cloud MCP Toolbox for Databases (googleapis/mcp-toolbox), versions 1.2.0 through 1.4.0. CVSS 9.3 (Critical). CWE-22 (path traversal) + CWE-862 (missing authorization). Published 2026-10-26. Per the advisory, an unauthenticated remote attacker can exfiltrate host files to external Google Cloud Storage buckets and overwrite arbitrary local files via crafted tool invocation parameters.
This repository is the authorization layer that was missing — built, tested, and published so anyone can run it and prove or disprove the claim.
The cloud-storage tools take bucket, object, and the local path entirely from caller-supplied tool parameters:
cloudstorageuploadobject's invoke path passes the caller's localPath through ValidateLocalPath, then the source opens that file (os.Open) and uploads it to the caller-chosen bucket.cloudstoragedownloadobject mirrors it: the source creates the caller-chosen destination (os.OpenFile, mode 0644) and writes the bucket object's bytes there.ValidateLocalPath (in internal/tools/cloudstorage/cloudstoragecommon/paths.go) enforces a shape contract only — non-empty, absolute after cleaning, no .. segments. Its own comment says the quiet part out loud: OS permissions are the real boundary; the check just prevents "obvious traversal mistakes." It confines the path to nothing. Every absolute path on the host — /etc/passwd, a user's SSH keys, application secrets — passes it. And there is no caller authorization in front of the tools at all: the request executes with the server process's ambient filesystem authority. That combination is the CVE: a validation function mistaken for an authorization boundary, in tooling whose inputs are chosen by AI agents — callers that are supposed to be untrusted.
Google's remediation (PR googleapis/mcp-toolbox#3454, merged 2026-06-18, reported by HE WEI) added allowedBuckets and allowedLocalRoot options to the cloud-storage source. The PR description states the default plainly: "Defaults to allow all."
If you run mcp-toolbox: upgrade past the affected range and set the allowlists — the default preserves the vulnerable posture.
That default is the pattern this repository argues against. Protection that ships turned off, in the exact component whose job is standing between an agent and the host filesystem, is not a gate. It is a setting — and settings get left unset.
mcp-authz-gate puts the same two operations (upload_object, download_object, over buckets modeled as local directories so the proof needs no cloud account) behind four mechanisms:
cargo test
The suite (13 tests) runs both shapes against the same sandbox:
/etc/passwd and ~/.ssh/id_rsa — shape, not confinement... traversal, symlink escape, revoked grant — receipts each denial, lets legitimate in-scope work through, and the receipt chain verifies end to end (and fails under the wrong key).Receipts for this build: 13 passed, 0 failed on 2026-10-26, from a clean checkout of this repository's own tree.
Revision note (v0.1.1, 2026-10-26). The first published version of this crate was reviewed and found wanting in three places — the same class of gap it exists to criticize, so they are recorded here rather than quietly patched. (1) The bucket/object join in the local simulation was unchecked, letting a crafted object name escape the simulated bucket; object names are now confined (in real GCS they are keys, not paths — the escape was an artifact of the stand-in, and artifacts count). (2) The path resolver treated a dangling symlink destination as a nonexistent filename and returned a path whose write would have followed the link outside the grant root; unresolvable symlink components are now rejected, matching the treatment upstream later adopted. (3) Several post-authorization I/O failures returned before a receipt was appended; every invocation now appends exactly one receipt — allowed, denied, or failed. Each defect has a regression test in the suite. The broader lesson is the repository's own thesis: passing tests establish only the guarantees they exercise.
This is a demonstration layer, not a patch for Google's binary: mcp-toolbox is a Go server, this crate is Rust, and buckets here are local directories standing in for GCS. What transfers is the architecture — scoped grants, resolution-based confinement, fail-closed defaults, and signed witness receipts in front of agent-invoked tools. What does not transfer is any claim about Google's current release: read their code and their advisory, not this README, for that.
By the PlaneKey project — where keys are scoped, custody is hashed, revocation is immediate and journaled, and no tool call happens without a receipt.