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php-cve-2026-115560-kit — Local-only PoC lab for CVE-2026-115560 (PHP session upload-progress serialize-handler confusion) — two-request PoC on the PHP CLI built-in server (no Docker) + fleet audit implementing the advisory's decision tree. | Kitploit
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slabbdev/php-cve-2026-115560-kit

php-cve-2026-115560-kit

Local-only PoC lab for CVE-2026-115560 (PHP session upload-progress serialize-handler confusion) — two-request PoC on the PHP CLI built-in server (no Docker) + fleet audit implementing the advisory's decision tree.

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cve-115560-kit — local lab for the PHP session serialize-handler confusion

Companion lab for the black box article on CVE-2026-115560 (PHP session.upload_progress, informational advisory, 2026-10-23). Part 2 of the php2shell story (part 1: CVE-2026-109618/109619).

Local target only (127.0.0.1). Never aimed at third-party systems.

The combo (all three legs required, per php.net)

  1. session.serialize_handler = php_binary or php_serialize in configuration;
  2. application code switches it back to php at runtime with ini_set() before session_start();
  3. session.upload_progress.enabled still on.

PHP calls this setup "unlikely in practice" — the advisory is informational, the fix ships in the regular cycle. The mitigation is the same as GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp (CVE-2026-109619): session.upload_progress.enabled=0.

The lab

No Docker needed — the PHP CLI's built-in server is the whole stack, and the serializer grammar is not version-specific. Requires php and python3 on $PATH.

$ ./run.sh          # starts 127.0.0.1:8899 (or ./run.sh PORT) and runs the PoC

What the two requests do:

  1. POST a small multipart upload whose PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS value is the attacker-chosen key p|O:8:"DemoVuln":1:{...}. The progress hook stores the entry with the configured handler (php_binary: length-prefixed key, no | semantics). session.upload_progress.cleanup=0 keeps the entry after the upload completes — no race.
  2. GET /?a=read: the target does ini_set('session.serialize_handler','php') then session_start(). The php grammar splits entries at the first | — which the attacker planted — and unserializes attacker bytes. DemoVuln::__wakeup fires.

Expected output (PHP 8.5.10):

[1] upload POST — writes the progress entry under the crafted key…
     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[2] read GET — ini_set to `php`, session_start()…
     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    > [CVE-2026-115560] DemoVuln::__wakeup — attacker-controlled unserialize executed, note=pwned-1
    > read OK — session keys: []
RESULT: INJECTION CONFIRMED

Two details in that output are the lab's teaching points:

  • read OK — session keys: [] — the decoder fails on the trailing progress-array bytes that follow the injected object, and destroys the session. The gadget still ran.
  • the server logs PHP Warning: session_start(): Failed to decode session object — that warning is your detection artifact: a session store written under one grammar and read under another shows up exactly there.

Audit your own fleet instead

$ ./audit-cve-2026-115560.sh -s /path/to/src -c /path/to/config

Implements the advisory's decision tree: scans ini files for non-default session.serialize_handler (leg 1), greps sources for the runtime ini_set switch (leg 2, tests/vendor excluded), reads the effective config for each SAPI (CLI vs FPM — the "fixed the wrong ini" trap; php -i in CLI proves nothing for php-fpm), and checks the branch version against the 2026-10-21 patched releases (8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35). Exit codes: 0 nothing to do · 1 mitigate now · 2 patches missing · 64 usage. --json for CI. Read-only.

On this very kit's target it reports ACTION — as it should: the demo ships all three legs.

Mitigation

  • Applied the Tuesday mitigation (session.upload_progress.enabled=0)? Keep it. No further action.
  • Never call ini_set() on session.serialize_handler? You can keep upload progress enabled.
  • You do switch handlers at runtime? Set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 now, watch for the full advisory with the next regular release.
  • One ini file per SAPI — verify the FPM pool's effective config, not the CLI's.

Files

filerole
run.shbinds 127.0.0.1, launches the vulnerable target + the PoC
target/index.phpthe combo: php_binary in config, ini_set() to php on the read path
target/DemoVuln.phpthe gadget (__wakeup) standing in for a real POP chain
exploit.pythe two-request PoC (raw sockets, no dependencies)
audit-cve-2026-115560.shfleet audit implementing the advisory's decision tree

Sources

  • php.net informational advisory (2026-10-23): https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php
  • GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp (CVE-2026-109619, the shared mitigation): https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp
  • Article (black box series): The "BREAKING" unpatched PHP RCE that wasn't
  • Part 1 lab: https://github.com/slabbdev/php2shell-cve-2026-109618-109619
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