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Tools/GitHubGitHub/sita-technologies/cve-2025-39247
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GitHubsita-technologies/cve-2025-39247

CVE-2025-39247

HikCentral Professional - Pre-Auth License ActiveCode Leak

556 months agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2025-39247

  • Target: HikCentral Professional (HCMP, central VMS server)
  • CVE: CVE-2025-39247 — Access Control Vulnerability
  • CVSS 3.1: 8.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)
  • Affected: V2.3.1 – V2.6.2 and V3.0.0
  • Fixed: V2.6.3 / V3.0.1 / Fix-Pack CVE-2025-39247
  • Disclosed: 2025-08-28
  • Analysis date: 2026-05-21

1. Open-source intelligence pass

Before downloading anything, what's already public:

SourceWhat it tells us
Hikvision security advisory"Missing authentication checks on API endpoints", advice to upgrade to V2.6.3 / V3.0.1
NVD CVE-2025-39247CVSS metrics; vector is network, no auth, scope-changed, confidentiality-high
Wiz, ZeroPath, SentinelOne, OffSeq, gbhackers, cybersecuritynews summariesAll restate the advisory; no technical detail, no PoC, no affected endpoint named
GitHub PoC aggregators (poc-in-github, 0xMarcio/cve, etc.)No PoC indexed
Forums (ipcamtalk, cctvforum, reddit), torrent indexersNo PoC, no leaked installers; ipcamtalk has a HikCentral usage thread but nothing exploit-related

So as of analysis date, no public technical write-up exposes the bug. Any reproduction starts from binary diffing.


2. Acquisition

2.1 Vulnerable installer (V2.6.2 Full Pack)

After CVE-2025-39247 was published the V2.6.2 download page was delisted, but the file on the CDN was never purged. The filename can be recovered from a third-party mirror that indexed the page before delisting (FileHorse — published filename and MD5). With that filename, a plain GET to Hikvision's CDN — using only a normal browser User-Agent and a matching Referer header — still serves it.

curl -A "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0" \
     -H "Referer: https://www.hikvision.com/en/support/download/software/hikcentral-professional-v2-6-2/" \
     -O \
     "https://www.hikvision.com/content/dam/hikvision/en/support/download/vms/hcp-2-6-2/HikCentral-Professional_Full-Pack_V2.6.2.202501211507_Win_x64_Installer.exe"

Result:

  • Size: 1,314,043,792 bytes (1.22 GB)
  • MD5: 76d42e7cb16dc0e177b9a35d0fed7ced — matches the FileHorse-published value, confirming the genuine Hikvision-signed installer (not a third-party rebundle)
  • CDN response headers: HTTP/2 200, content-type: application/x-msdownload, eo-cache-status: HIT, age: 2520395 (≈ 29 days in the Tencent EdgeOne edge cache without eviction)

Side observation worth reporting to Hikvision PSIRT: the "delisting" of the V2.6.2 page is cosmetic. The orphaned file is reachable on the CDN with no auth and no signed-URL gate. V2.5.1 and V2.6.0 Full Packs respond the same way.

2.2 Patched installer (V2.6.3 Base Pack)

Currently linked from the V2.6.3 download page; same retrieval method:

https://www.hikvision.com/content/dam/hikvision/en/support/download/vms/hcp-2-6-3/HikCentral-Professional_Base-Pack_V2.6.3.202508280142_Win_x64_Installer.exe
  • Size: 932,813,264 bytes (890 MB)
  • Last-Modified: 2025-08-28 (CVE disclosure date)

2.3 Fix-Pack

Still linked from the V2.6.2 download page (Hikvision want users to apply it):

https://www.hikvision.com/content/dam/hikvision/en/support/download/vms/cve-2025-39247-security-vulnerability-patch/HikCentral-Professional_CVE-2025-39247_FixPack_V2.3.1-V2.6.2V3.0.0_20250904.exe
  • Size: 32,599,504 bytes (31 MB)

3. Static extraction

All three are InstallShield-style PE wrappers. 7z peels them in two passes:

# pass 1 — extract PE resources
7z x -o./extracted/v262/pe downloads/<v2.6.2 installer>
7z x -o./extracted/v263/pe downloads/<v2.6.3 installer>

# pass 2 — extract the nested 7-Zip streams hiding in PE resources
# (note: the resource-type label says "ZIP" but the byte signature is 7-Zip)
for ver in v262 v263; do
  for z in extracted/$ver/pe/.rsrc/2052/ZIP/*; do
    sz=$(stat -c %s "$z"); [ "$sz" -lt 1048576 ] && continue
    7z x -o"extracted/$ver/payload/$(basename $z)" "$z"
  done
done

Both installers expand into roughly two dozen named payload archives. The top-level dirs reveal the architecture:

ArchiveContents
246/Nginx + 246/wwwNginx web tier (the front door) and the SPA web UI
244/binNative C++ service binaries + certs
240Bundled PostgreSQL + DB init scripts
238Bee* runtime (BeeAgent, BeeGuard, …)
282Application services and addons (the bulk of the C++ backend code)
281, 283-284, 396, 398-399, 513, 520, 538-541, 573Smaller addons, plugins, upgrade/uninstall stubs

Crucially, there are no Java JARs/WARs anywhere. The backend is C++ on Nginx — important because it tells you up front that any auth flaw will be in compiled binaries, not in WAR/JAR bytecode where decompilation is trivial.


4. File-level diff

# Build inventories
for ver in v262 v263: find . -type f -print0 | xargs -0 md5sum | sort -k2 > inv_$ver.txt

# Sets:  common-path + different MD5  →  the patched files
v262 = {ln[34:]: ln[:32] for ln in open("inv_v262.txt")}
v263 = {ln[34:]: ln[:32] for ln in open("inv_v263.txt")}
common = set(v262) & set(v263)
changed = [p for p in common if v262[p] != v263[p]]

Result: 239 changed files in common paths. Distribution:

BucketCountComment
246/www/*.js (Web UI chunks)~200Mostly version-bumped asset hashes; ignore
246/Nginx/conf/nginx_location.conf1Single-file Nginx config delta — start here
246/Nginx*/install.bat6Install scripts, unrelated
244/bin/*.{exe,dll}6Native binaries (DistributionFilter.dll, FilterChain.dll, media tools)
282/*.{exe,dll}55Application services (the largest cluster — platform.dll, PersonCredential.dll, baseacs.*, …)
240/bin/pg_*6Postgres rebuild, unrelated
284/hplugin/dahua_plugin/*4Vendor SDK refresh (+10.97 MB) — unrelated
284/hplugin/onvif_plugin/*4Vendor SDK refresh (+0.99 MB) — unrelated
upgrade/uninstall stubs, crash reporters~30Same-size PE timestamp rebuilds, ignore

After filtering out vendor-SDK refresh, build-system timestamp drift, and pure cosmetic asset bumps, the actual security-relevant deltas reduce to:

  • One Nginx config file
  • A small number of C++ binaries in 282/ (most prominently platform.dll, the HCMP backend service, +57 KB)

5. The Nginx diff: free-of-charge bug location

diff -u nginx_location.conf between V2.6.2 and V2.6.3 produces exactly one hunk: a brand-new location = block in V2.6.3.

#禁止非127.0.0.1和::1的重置密码                   ← "Forbid non-127.0.0.1/::1 password reset"
location = /ISAPI/Bumblebee/Platform/V0/Permission/ChangeDefaultUserPassword {
    if ($remote_addr ~ ^(127\.0\.0\.1|::1)$) { set $allowed 1; }
    if ($allowed != "1")   { return 403; }
    if ($scheme = "http")  { proxy_pass http://http_backend;  }
    if ($scheme = "https") { proxy_pass http://http2_backend; }
}

That single 21-line addition is the entire CVE-2025-39247 fix at the front-door tier, and it tells you everything:

  • Endpoint: PUT /ISAPI/Bumblebee/Platform/V0/Permission/ChangeDefaultUserPassword
  • Bug class: in V2.6.2 the request falls through the catch-all /ISAPI/Bumblebee/Platform/V0/* proxy directive to the backend with no remote-address restriction and no Nginx-level authentication check.
  • Backend semantics: the handler exists to set the initial default-admin password during install (i.e., trusts the caller is the local installer); the fix makes that trust explicit.

The Chinese comment matters: it translates literally to "Forbid password reset from non-127.0.0.1/::1".


6. Request shape from the Web UI

The Web UI JavaScript (minified, in 246/www/Portal/*.js) calls the endpoint as:

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