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CVE-2026-111943-Emudhra-Ca-Compromise-POC

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-111943: recovers weak eMudhra intermediate CA private keys, forges TLS/code-signing certificates, and runs a SNI-based MITM server plus trust-store scanner.

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CVE-2026-111943-Emudhra-Ca-Compromise-POC

eMudhra/emSign Intermediate CA Compromise — Forged Certificate MITM Exploit for Live Environments


1. Incident Overview

CVE: CVE-2026-111943 (Go), GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (certifi) Date: Disclosed October 17-22, 2026 Severity: Critical — allows forging valid TLS and code-signing certificates for any hostname

What Happened

Eight eMudhra/emSign intermediate CA certificates were created in April 2025 with P-384 ECC keys where the private scalar d was a tiny integer:

d in {4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237}

Anyone can recover the private key from the public certificate in milliseconds by trying each candidate scalar. Six of the eight intermediates could mint TLS certificates for any hostname; two were code-signing CAs.

Impact

  • MITM Attacks: Forge valid TLS certificates for any hostname — intercept HTTPS traffic from clients with unpatched trust stores
  • C2 Channels: Establish command-and-control with "valid" TLS certificates
  • Phishing Sites: Deploy trusted HTTPS phishing sites for any domain
  • Code Signing: Sign malware with valid code-signing certificates (two CAs affected)
  • Memory Disclosure: Leaked process memory via MITM

Timeline

DateEvent
Apr 30, 2025Eight intermediates created with weak keys
May 2025All eight cross-signed by Sectigo's AAA Certificate Services root
Oct 17, 2026Researcher "Wayne" reports the weakness; Chrome/Firefox block within hours
Oct 19, 2026Apple blocks via macOS/iOS update
Oct 20, 2026Microsoft blocks via Windows Update; Go 1.27.3 released
Oct 22, 2026Apple protections reach full rollout

2. Affected Versions

SoftwarePatched VersionStatus
Python certifi2026.10.19Update required
pip26.2.2Update required (bundles own certifi)
Go1.27.3 / 1.26.10CVE-2026-111943
Node.js 26.x26.12.1SPKI blocklist
Node.js 24.x24.22.1SPKI blocklist
Node.js 22.x22.23.4SPKI blocklist
Electron 4444.9.1Update required
Electron 4343.8.1Update required
Electron 4242.11.16Update required
Rust rustls-webpki0.103.16Update required
Rust webpki-roots1.0.10Update required
Bun1.4.4Update required
sigstore4.5.1Update required
Debian ca-certificates20250419~deb12u2Update required
Ubuntu ca-certificates20260816ubuntu0.*Update required
Alpine ca-certificates20261020-r0Update required
NSS3.131.1Root removal
curl CA bundle2026-10-20Update required
Java cacertsAdd 16 SHA-256 hashes to blocked.certsManual fix

Protected (browsers)

  • Chrome (CRLSet), Firefox (OneCRL + CT), Safari (Apple update)
  • Windows Schannel (disallowed-certificate CTL)
  • Node.js 24.22.1+ (compiled SPKI blocklist)
  • Go 1.27.3+ (compiled SPKI blocklist)

Vulnerable (non-browser software)

  • Python with certifi < 2026.10.19
  • pip < 26.2.2 (bundles own certifi)
  • Go < 1.27.3 / 1.26.10
  • Node.js < 22.23.4 / 24.22.1 / 26.12.1
  • PHP with old CA bundles
  • Java with default cacerts (no revocation checking)
  • Debian/Ubuntu with unpatched ca-certificates
  • Any software with bundled trust stores containing emSign roots
  • Any software that trusts AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)

3. Attack Path

[ Attacker ]
    |
    |-- (1) Recover compromised CA private key
    |       - Extract public key from intermediate certificate
    |       - Try each weak scalar d in {4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237}
    |       - Derive private key with ec.derive_private_key(d, SECP384R1)
    |       - Takes milliseconds
    |
    |-- (2) Forge a leaf certificate
    |       - Generate a new leaf key pair
    |       - Build a certificate for the target hostname (CN + SAN)
    |       - Sign with the recovered CA private key
    |       - The forged cert chains to the real intermediate and root
    |
    |-- (3) Deploy MITM TLS server
    |       - Set up a TLS server with the forged certificate
    |       - Listen for incoming connections from vulnerable clients
    |       - Auto-forge certificates based on SNI (hostname)
    |
    |-- (4) Intercept TLS traffic
    |       - Client connects to MITM server (via DNS poisoning, ARP spoofing, etc.)
    |       - MITM presents forged certificate chain
    |       - Vulnerable client accepts (unpatched trust store)
    |       - MITM decrypts and reads all traffic
    |
    `-- (5) Post-exploitation
            - Inject payloads, steal credentials, session tokens
            - Establish reverse shell through the MITM channel
            - Pivot to internal networks

4. How the POC Works

Key Recovery

The eight compromised intermediate CA certificates use P-384 ECC keys with trivially small private scalars. The key_recovery.py module:

  1. Loads the public certificate (or uses known SPKI hashes)
  2. Tries each candidate scalar d in {4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237}
  3. For each candidate, derives the private key with ec.derive_private_key(d, SECP384R1())
  4. Compares the derived public key with the certificate's public key
  5. When they match, the private key is recovered

This takes milliseconds because there are only 8 candidates to try.

Certificate Forgery

The cert_forger.py module:

  1. Recovers the compromised CA private key
  2. Generates a new leaf key pair (ECDSA P-256 or RSA 2048)
  3. Builds a certificate with:
    • Subject CN = target hostname
    • SAN = target hostname
    • EKU = serverAuth (and optionally codeSigning)
    • Basic constraints: CA=False (leaf cert)
  4. Signs the certificate with the recovered CA key using SHA-384 (ECDSA)
  5. Checks the recovered key against the published intermediate before signing
  6. Writes a chain file: the leaf, then the real intermediate (AAA cross-sign by default, or the emSign-issued copy with --chain emsign)

MITM Server

The mitm_server.py module:

  1. Listens for incoming TLS connections
  2. Extracts the SNI (Server Name Indication) from the ClientHello
  3. Auto-forges a certificate for the requested hostname
  4. Presents the leaf plus the real intermediate during the TLS handshake
  5. If the client accepts (unpatched trust store), the MITM is established
  6. All traffic is decrypted and logged

Scanner

The scanner.py module checks:

  • Python certifi version
  • pip version
  • Go version (CVE-2026-111943)
  • Node.js version
  • System CA bundles (Debian/Ubuntu/Alpine/RHEL)
  • Java cacerts
  • Network services presenting compromised certificates

5. POC Components

CVE-2026-111943-Emudhra-Ca-Compromise-POC/
  key_recovery.py     Recover private keys from compromised CA certs
  cert_forger.py      Forge TLS/code-signing certificates
  scanner.py          Scan for vulnerable clients (unpatched trust stores)
  mitm_server.py      MITM TLS server with auto-forging on SNI
  exploit.py          Full exploit chain orchestrator
  listener.py         Reverse shell listener (post-exploitation)
  emudhra_ca.sh       Shell wrapper (scan/keys/forge/mitm/full)
  README.md           This file

6. Usage

Prerequisites

  • Python 3.8+
  • cryptography library: pip install cryptography

List Compromised Keys

python3 key_recovery.py --list

Scan for Vulnerable Clients

python3 scanner.py --scan-all

Recover a CA Private Key

python3 key_recovery.py --cn "EM DV TLS CA - G3B" --export recovered_key.pem

Forge a Certificate

python3 cert_forger.py --hostname api.victim.com --ca "EM DV TLS CA - G3B" --output-dir ./certs

Start MITM TLS Server

python3 mitm_server.py --port 8443 --ca "EM DV TLS CA - G3B" --cert-dir ./certs

Full Exploit Chain

python3 exploit.py --target-hostname api.victim.com --port 8443

One-Shot via Shell Wrapper

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