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broadcom-wps — Tools to fingerprint WiFi Access Points running the Broadcom SDK and a list of known affected devices. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/qkaiser/broadcom-wps
Embedded Systems SecurityStatic AnalysisVulnerability ScannersWi-Fi AuditingIoT SecurityNetwork MappingInformation GatheringWireless SecurityHardware & IoT SecurityFirmware Analysis
GitHubqkaiser/broadcom-wps
326477714 days agoReviewed by Kitploit
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broadcom-wps

Tools to fingerprint WiFi Access Points running the Broadcom SDK and a list of known affected devices.

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Broadcom 802.11 SDK Detection Toolkit

This repository contains two ways to detect the presence of Broadcom's 802.11 implementation on a target router:

  1. Statically using YARA rules on extracted firmware
  2. Dynamically by running a fingerprinting script against a live access point

The list of affected devices is available at the end of this page. This list is not exhaustive. We expect the complete list to contain thousands of different devices, make and models.

Broadcom WPS Monitor YARA rules

broadcom_wps_monitor.yar contains three candidate detectors for ELF32 ARM and MIPS binaries:

  • BRCM_WPS_Monitor_Generic_ELF identifies a generic Broadcom WPS Monitor binary from independent vendor and protocol strings.
  • BRCM_WPS_Monitor_HAL_Config_ELF identifies the narrower HAL configuration event variant.
  • VULN_BRCM_WPS_EAP_Fragment_Reassembly_ELF requires the generic component evidence plus an ARM or MIPS opcode shape associated with the vulnerable fragment-reassembly path.

These rules are triage aids. Compiler changes can evade opcode patterns, and a patched binary can retain strings or code bytes used by a candidate detector. Confirm findings against the integrated source or by manual review of the fragment-length validation and copy sink.

You can find binaries with this command:

yara -w -r broadcom_wps_monitor.yar extracted_firmware_dir

Broadcom SDK Fingerprinter

Make sure your interface supports monitor mode and enable monitor mode.

[!TIP] Prevent NetworkManager interference: Before switching to monitor mode, prevent NetworkManager from managing or resetting the interface:

sudo nmcli device set <interface> managed no

Enable monitor mode using the otherbss control flags (important: without otherbss, drivers such as MediaTek mt76 / mt7921 will drop frames from other BSSIDs):

sudo ip link set dev wlp0s12u1 down
sudo iw dev wlp0s12u1 set monitor otherbss control
sudo ip link set dev wlp0s12u1 up

Quick Verification

Verify that your card is receiving frames in monitor mode with tcpdump (set to a channel with known traffic, e.g., channel 1, 3, or 6):

sudo iw dev wlp0s12u1 set channel 6
sudo tcpdump -i wlp0s12u1 -e -n -c 5 "type mgt subtype beacon"

If beacons appear, your adapter is successfully receiving 802.11 frames.

Note on hardware: monitor mode / frame injection is very driver-dependent. In testing, the built-in Intel Dual Band Wireless-AC 7265 (iwlwifi) accepted type monitor but captured zero frames (no beacons even with a strong signal), so the fingerprinter never locked onto a target. MediaTek chipsets — such as MT7921AU (USB id 0e8d:7961, driver mt7921u) or MT7922 (mt7921e) — work properly when configured with set monitor otherbss control. If the script keeps sweeping without finding your SSID, check that otherbss is enabled and test with tcpdump. Known-good chipsets for this kind of work include MediaTek mt76, Atheros ath9k_htc, and Realtek rtl8812au.

Running the Fingerprinter

[!TIP] If uv is installed in your user directory (e.g., ~/.local/bin/uv) and sudo reports uv: command not found, either run with sudo env "PATH=$PATH" or directly invoke the virtual environment's Python:

sudo .venv/bin/python broadcom_fingerprint.py --interface <interface> --ssid "<SSID>"

(Always wrap the SSID in quotes if it contains spaces or special characters).

If the script reports that it could not authenticate or associate, add --debug-assoc to log the 802.11 authentication/association status codes to stderr. That tells you whether the AP never answered (filtered, off-channel) or answered with a status code.

You should see something like this on affected devices:

sudo uv run --with scapy broadcom_fingerprint.py --interface wlp0s12u1 --ssid VOO-111317
Scanning channels 1-13 for SSID 'VOO-111317' (sweep 1)...
SSID:       VOO-111317
BSSID:      20:0c:c8:16:76:dc
Channel:    1
Vendor:     Netgear
Model:      Netgear
Assessment: LIKELY_VULNERABLE
JSON:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T203352.732742Z/result.json
PCAP:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T203352.732742Z/traffic.pcap
sudo uv run --with scapy broadcom_fingerprint.py --interface wlp0s12u1 --ssid Orange-180cd
Scanning channels 1-13 for SSID 'Orange-180cd' (sweep 1)...
SSID:       Orange-180cd
BSSID:      08:6a:0a:f1:80:d1
Channel:    1
Vendor:     TCG300
Model:      TCG300
Assessment: LIKELY_VULNERABLE
JSON:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T205813.695480Z/result.json
PCAP:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T205813.695480Z/traffic.pcap
sudo uv run --with scapy broadcom_fingerprint.py --interface wlp0s12u1 --ssid WiFi-2.4-4B3C
Scanning channels 1-13 for SSID 'WiFi-2.4-4B3C' (sweep 1)...
SSID:       WiFi-2.4-4B3C
BSSID:      38:35:fb:13:4b:42
Channel:    1
Vendor:     SagemCom
Model:      SagemcomFast5336v_BBOX3
Assessment: LIKELY_VULNERABLE
JSON:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T205852.234368Z/result.json
PCAP:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T205852.234368Z/traffic.pcap

On patched devices you'll see:

sudo uv run --with scapy broadcom_fingerprint.py --interface wlp0s12u1 --ssid MY-AP
Scanning channels 1-13 for SSID 'MY-AP' (sweep 1)...
SSID:       MY-AP
BSSID:      38:35:fb:13:4b:42
Channel:    1
Vendor:     SagemCom
Model:      SagemcomFast5336v_BBOX3
Assessment: PATCHED_HOSTAPD
JSON:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T205852.234368Z/result.json
PCAP:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261014T205852.234368Z/traffic.pcap

If your device does not advertise WPS it's not affected and you'll see this:

sudo uv run --with scapy broadcom_fingerprint.py --interface wlx00c0ca588c7e --ssid MY-AP
Scanning channels 1-13 for SSID 'MY-AP' (sweep 1)...
SSID:       MY-AP
BSSID:      1c:0b:8b:xx:xx:xx
Channel:    6
Vendor:     Unknown
Model:      Unknown
Assessment: INCONCLUSIVE
JSON:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261019T113912.161025Z/result.json
PCAP:       /tmp/broadcom-fingerprint-20261019T113912.161025Z/traffic.pcap
Warning: selected AP does not advertise WPS

Assessments

The script can return four values in Assessment, not just the three shown above:

AssessmentMeaning
LIKELY_VULNERABLEThe bounded first fragment was rejected the way the legacy Broadcom WPS Monitor rejects it.
PATCHED_HOSTAPDThe fragment was ACKed like hostapd does, and the beacon carried Broadcom evidence (proprietary IE or WPS identity defaults), so the device is Broadcom-based but runs hostapd.
NO_BROADCOM_FINGERPRINTThe fragment was ACKed like hostapd does, but no Broadcom evidence was found. The device does not appear to use the Broadcom WPS stack at all.
INCONCLUSIVENo classifiable response. Check warning in result.json: the target may not advertise WPS, association may have failed, or the response did not match either pattern.

Only LIKELY_VULNERABLE is a positive finding. INCONCLUSIVE is not a clean result, and the three warnings above are different situations that need different fixes.

The fingerprinting script relies on two things:

  1. the presence of Broadcom proprietary information elements
  2. an implementation quirk that can differentiate between Broadcom's wps_monitor and hostapd

The presence of Broadcom proprietary information element is not a sufficiently strong signal since it's sometimes added by Broadcom's Linux kernel module while the user space implementation is not from their SDK. We use that signal to check if it's Broadcom or not.

If it's a Broadcom AP, we send a zero-length fragmented frame to differentiate between Broadcom's wps_monitor and hostapd. hostapd sends an ACK while wps_monitor sends a NACK (in a nutshell).

If we have both signals (Broadcom IE + implementation quirk), we can assess with a rather high confidence level that you're affected.

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