
Advisory and remediation notes for CVE-2026-116106, an improper access control flaw in the HeyCyan Android app's exported FileProvider allowing filesystem traversal.
Official vulnerability registered in VulDB (accepted on 10/25/2026, submitter
ohackercego) — classified as critical. English version below.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-116106 |
| VulDB | VDB-426174 · CTI · Submit #1002851 |
| GCVE | GCVE-0-2026-116106 · GCVE-100-426174 |
| Product | HeyCyan App (companion app for Glass Studio smart glasses) |
| Version | 1.0.103 (Android) — package com.glasssutdio.wear |
| Class | Access control — exposure of access control files to unauthorized actor |
| CWE | CWE-284 / CWE-266 |
| ATT&CK | T1068 — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
| CVSS (VulDB) | Critical (VulDB textual severity; restricted vector) |
| Vector | Remote (Yes) · Local: No · Physical: No · does not require authentication · exploitation considered easy |
| Vendor status | Contacted prior to disclosure — did not respond |
| Exploit | No published exploit (technical details known) |
| Timeline | 10/25/2026 — advisory disclosure · 10/25/2026 — creation and last update of the VulDB entry |
| Related | CVE-2026-116105 (VDB-426173) — cleartext transmission |
The FileProvider of HeyCyan App 1.0.103 is exported with incorrect access control: the app declares a FileProvider whose provider_paths.xml includes the filesystem root (root-path with path="."). As a result, any other application installed on the same device that requests access to the provider can read the application's directories and traverse the filesystem from the root. The impact affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability; exploitation is remote, does not require authentication, and VulDB considers it easy.
With access to FileProvider, a malicious application on the same device can:
/data/data/com.glasssutdio.wear/databases/glass_w_database.db) — AI conversation history, photo albums, and recorded meetings;SharedPreferences;Aggravating factor: the LicenseContentProvider (PairIP) extends this vulnerable FileProvider and is also exported, expanding the exposed surface.
In the full report of this research, this flaw is item V2 (critical, CVSS 8.4 / AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N within the scope of that analysis) and is part of the remote exploitation chain together with V1 and V3.
root-path from provider_paths.xml, exposing only the directories strictly necessary for sharing — example in remediation/provider_paths.exemplo.xml.android:exported="false" when there is no need for sharing with third parties, or require its own permission (android:readPermission/writePermission, at the signature level) with android:grantUriPermissions="true" — explanation in remediation/FileProvider-seguro.md.LicenseContentProvider (PairIP) so that it does not inherit the exposure of FileProvider.advisory.json — the structured record (CVE 5.1 format) with the entry's public data.vuldb-entry.txt — the official VulDB entry captured in full.remediation/ — example fix files (not the app's original files).GCVE-0-2026-116106 / GCVE-100-426174)CVE-2026-116105 (VDB-426173) — plaintext transmissionDiscovery, analysis and responsible disclosure by Juan Mathews Rebello Santos (@ohackercego).
Disclosure: the analysis was static (reverse engineering of the HeyCyan App 1.0.103). The vendor was contacted in advance and did not respond. Fields marked as restricted in VulDB are not reproduced here.
CVE-2026-116106 — HeyCyan App 1.0.103 (Android) improper access control in FileProvider.
The app ships an exported FileProvider whose provider_paths.xml includes a root-path (path="."), so any app on the device that requests access to the provider can read the application's directories and traverse the filesystem from the root — including the SQLite database with AI chat history, photos and recordings (glass_w_database.db), SharedPreferences, and the app's TFLite/Lua assets. The inherited PairIP LicenseContentProvider is exported as well. Severity: critical; CWE-284 / CWE-266; ATT&CK T1068; remote, no authentication, exploitation considered easy; impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability. This is item V2 of the full research report. Vendor was contacted early and did not respond. No public exploit.
Recommended fix: remove the root-path, set android:exported="false" (or require a signature-level permission with grantUriPermissions), and review the PairIP LicenseContentProvider.
Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Juan Mathews Rebello Santos (@ohackercego).