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CVE-2026-116106 — Advisory and remediation notes for CVE-2026-116106, an improper access control flaw in the HeyCyan Android app's exported FileProvider allowing filesystem traversal. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/ohackercego/cve-2026-116106
Android SecurityPrivilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisMobile App PentestingMobile SecurityPapers & Research
GitHubohackercego/cve-2026-116106

CVE-2026-116106

Advisory and remediation notes for CVE-2026-116106, an improper access control flaw in the HeyCyan Android app's exported FileProvider allowing filesystem traversal.

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26 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-116106 — HeyCyan App 1.0.103: incorrect access control in FileProvider

Official vulnerability registered in VulDB (accepted on 10/25/2026, submitter ohackercego) — classified as critical. English version below.

FieldValue
CVECVE-2026-116106
VulDBVDB-426174 · CTI · Submit #1002851
GCVEGCVE-0-2026-116106 · GCVE-100-426174
ProductHeyCyan App (companion app for Glass Studio smart glasses)
Version1.0.103 (Android) — package com.glasssutdio.wear
ClassAccess control — exposure of access control files to unauthorized actor
CWECWE-284 / CWE-266
ATT&CKT1068 — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
CVSS (VulDB)Critical (VulDB textual severity; restricted vector)
VectorRemote (Yes) · Local: No · Physical: No · does not require authentication · exploitation considered easy
Vendor statusContacted prior to disclosure — did not respond
ExploitNo published exploit (technical details known)
Timeline10/25/2026 — advisory disclosure · 10/25/2026 — creation and last update of the VulDB entry
RelatedCVE-2026-116105 (VDB-426173) — cleartext transmission

Summary

The FileProvider of HeyCyan App 1.0.103 is exported with incorrect access control: the app declares a FileProvider whose provider_paths.xml includes the filesystem root (root-path with path="."). As a result, any other application installed on the same device that requests access to the provider can read the application's directories and traverse the filesystem from the root. The impact affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability; exploitation is remote, does not require authentication, and VulDB considers it easy.

Technical details

With access to FileProvider, a malicious application on the same device can:

  1. Read the entire SQLite database (/data/data/com.glasssutdio.wear/databases/glass_w_database.db) — AI conversation history, photo albums, and recorded meetings;
  2. Access the application's SharedPreferences;
  3. Traverse the filesystem from the root;
  4. Extract TFLite models, Lua scripts, and other application assets.

Aggravating factor: the LicenseContentProvider (PairIP) extends this vulnerable FileProvider and is also exported, expanding the exposed surface.

In the full report of this research, this flaw is item V2 (critical, CVSS 8.4 / AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N within the scope of that analysis) and is part of the remote exploitation chain together with V1 and V3.

Recommended fix

  1. Remove the root-path from provider_paths.xml, exposing only the directories strictly necessary for sharing — example in remediation/provider_paths.exemplo.xml.
  2. Mark the provider as android:exported="false" when there is no need for sharing with third parties, or require its own permission (android:readPermission/writePermission, at the signature level) with android:grantUriPermissions="true" — explanation in remediation/FileProvider-seguro.md.
  3. Review the LicenseContentProvider (PairIP) so that it does not inherit the exposure of FileProvider.

Files in this repository

  • advisory.json — the structured record (CVE 5.1 format) with the entry's public data.
  • vuldb-entry.txt — the official VulDB entry captured in full.
  • remediation/ — example fix files (not the app's original files).

References

  • VulDB: https://vuldb.com/vuln/426174 · https://vuldb.com/vuln/426174/cti
  • GCVE: https://db.gcve.eu/ (GCVE-0-2026-116106 / GCVE-100-426174)
  • Full advisory for this research: https://github.com/ohackercego/heycyan-vulnerabilitys
  • Related: CVE-2026-116105 (VDB-426173) — plaintext transmission
  • scip Labs (VulDB classification methodology): https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20130704

Credits

Discovery, analysis and responsible disclosure by Juan Mathews Rebello Santos (@ohackercego).

Disclosure: the analysis was static (reverse engineering of the HeyCyan App 1.0.103). The vendor was contacted in advance and did not respond. Fields marked as restricted in VulDB are not reproduced here.


English

CVE-2026-116106 — HeyCyan App 1.0.103 (Android) improper access control in FileProvider.

The app ships an exported FileProvider whose provider_paths.xml includes a root-path (path="."), so any app on the device that requests access to the provider can read the application's directories and traverse the filesystem from the root — including the SQLite database with AI chat history, photos and recordings (glass_w_database.db), SharedPreferences, and the app's TFLite/Lua assets. The inherited PairIP LicenseContentProvider is exported as well. Severity: critical; CWE-284 / CWE-266; ATT&CK T1068; remote, no authentication, exploitation considered easy; impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability. This is item V2 of the full research report. Vendor was contacted early and did not respond. No public exploit.

Recommended fix: remove the root-path, set android:exported="false" (or require a signature-level permission with grantUriPermissions), and review the PairIP LicenseContentProvider.

Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Juan Mathews Rebello Santos (@ohackercego).

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