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CVE-2026-116105 — Advisory and technical analysis of CVE-2026-116105: cleartext transmission of sensitive data in the HeyCyan Android app, with static APK findings and remediation guidance. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/ohackercego/cve-2026-116105
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GitHubohackercego/cve-2026-116105

CVE-2026-116105

Advisory and technical analysis of CVE-2026-116105: cleartext transmission of sensitive data in the HeyCyan Android app, with static APK findings and remediation guidance.

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26 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-116105 — HeyCyan App 1.0.103: cleartext transmission of sensitive data

Official vulnerability registered in VulDB (accepted on 10/25/2026, submitter ohackercego). English version below.

FieldValue
CVECVE-2026-116105
VulDBVDB-426173 · CTI · Submit #1002850
GCVEGCVE-0-2026-116105 · GCVE-100-426173
ProductHeyCyan App (companion app for the Glass Studio smart glasses)
Version1.0.103 (Android) — package com.glasssutdio.wear
ClassCleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
CWECWE-319 / CWE-310
ATT&CKT1040 — Network Sniffing
CVSS (VulDB)Base Score 3.7 · Temp Score 3.7 · rating problematic (the CVSS vector is restricted in VulDB and is not reproduced here)
VectorRemote (Yes) · Local: No · Physical: No · does not require authentication
Vendor statusContacted prior to disclosure — did not respond
ExploitNo published exploit (exploitation considered difficult)
Timeline10/25/2026 — advisory disclosure · 10/25/2026 — creation and last update of the VulDB entry
RelatedCVE-2026-116106 (VDB-426174) — incorrect access control in the FileProvider

Summary

HeyCyan App 1.0.103 for Android transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext, due to its network security configuration (AndroidManifest.xml / Network Security Configuration). Any unauthorized actor able to observe the traffic — same Wi‑Fi network, ISP, corporate proxy, or anyone who can install their own CA on the device — can intercept and manipulate the communication. The impact falls on confidentiality; the attack can be initiated remotely and does not require authentication.

Technical details

  • The application allows cleartext traffic and uses a permissive network security config, so calls to the product's backends can occur over plain HTTP instead of HTTPS.
  • The configuration also accepts user-installed CA certificates, which means an interception proxy (mitmproxy, Burp Suite, Charles) is accepted without warning by the app.
  • In the full report of this research, this flaw is item V1 and is the first stage of the remote exploitation chain: MITM enables JavaScript injection into the app's WebView (V3), which in turn achieves code execution on the device. VulDB records the MITRE ATT&CK technique as T1040 (Network Sniffing).
  • Identified by static analysis of APK 1.0.103 (build 20260411): decoding of the binary AndroidManifest.xml (AXML) and of the network security configuration.

Recommended fix

  1. Remove android:usesCleartextTraffic="true" from the manifest and set cleartextTrafficPermitted="false" in the network security config, making an exception only for domains that genuinely do not offer HTTPS — example in remediation/network_security_config.exemplo.xml.
  2. Stop trusting user-installed CAs in production builds (<certificates src="system" /> only).
  3. Implement certificate pinning on connections to the product's servers — example in remediation/CertificatePinning.exemplo.java.

Files in this repository

  • advisory.json — the structured record (CVE 5.1 format) with the entry's public data.
  • vuldb-entry.txt — the official VulDB entry captured in full.
  • remediation/ — example fix files (not the app's original files).

References

  • VulDB: https://vuldb.com/vuln/426173 · https://vuldb.com/vuln/426173/cti
  • GCVE: https://db.gcve.eu/ (GCVE-0-2026-116105 / GCVE-100-426173)
  • Full advisory for this research: https://github.com/ohackercego/heycyan-vulnerabilitys
  • Related: CVE-2026-116106 (VDB-426174) — FileProvider with incorrect access control
  • scip Labs (VulDB classification methodology): https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20130704

Credits

Discovery, analysis and responsible disclosure by Juan Mathews Rebello Santos (@ohackercego).

Disclosure: the analysis was static (reverse engineering of the HeyCyan App 1.0.103). The vendor was contacted in advance and did not respond. Fields marked as restricted in VulDB are not reproduced here.


English

CVE-2026-116105 — HeyCyan App 1.0.103 (Android) cleartext transmission of sensitive information.

The HeyCyan companion app for the Glass Studio smart glasses transmits sensitive data over cleartext because of its permissive network security configuration (AndroidManifest.xml). An attacker able to observe the traffic — same Wi‑Fi network, ISP, corporate proxy, or anyone able to install a custom CA on the device — can intercept and manipulate the communication. Class: Cleartext Transmission; CWE-319 / CWE-310; ATT&CK T1040; VulDB Base/Temp Score 3.7, classified as problematic (the CVSS vector is restricted on VulDB). The attack is remote and requires no authentication; the impact is on confidentiality. This is item V1 of the full research report and the first step of a remote WebView exploitation chain. Vendor was contacted early and did not respond. No public exploit.

Recommended fix: drop usesCleartextTraffic, enforce HTTPS-only through the network security config, stop trusting user-installed CAs in production, and add certificate pinning.

Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Juan Mathews Rebello Santos (@ohackercego).

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