Access control for AI agents. Set what Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor and any MCP server are allowed to do, review risky actions before they run, and keep every action on the record.
Access control for AI agents
Your AI agents can reach Slack, GitHub, email, and your database.
node9 decides what they may do with each one.
Credential jail · secrets and PII · destructive git, SQL and shell held for review · MCP tool pinning · network egress allowlist · loop breaker · one record across twelve agents
Works with Claude Code · Codex CLI · Antigravity (agy) · GitHub Copilot CLI · Gemini CLI · Cursor · Windsurf · VSCode · Claude Desktop · Opencode · Pi · Hermes Agent · any MCP server.
| See | Scan a repository on every pull request, or check this machine. Nothing to install. | Scan every pull request |
| Guard | Put node9 in front of every tool call your agents make: allowed, blocked, or held for you. | Guard your agents |
| Prove | One OWASP Agentic Top 10 report across every agent and every machine your team runs. | Prove it to your team |
This repository is also the GitHub Action node9 Agent Security. It reads the agent configuration committed to a repository (workflows, agent settings, MCP servers, instruction files) and reports what a pull request could turn against you. Nothing runs, no agent is installed, and it needs no account and no secret: the job token is enough.
Add one file, .github/workflows/agent-security.yml:
name: node9 agent-security
on: pull_request
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
checks: write
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: node9-ai/node9-proxy@v2
with:
fail-on: high # never | medium | high | critical
fail-on-scope: introduced # judge only what this PR added or made worse
Every pull request then gets:
| Workflows a stranger can steer | a workflow that hands the text of an issue or a pull request to an agent that holds secrets or can run commands, or that runs the agent inside a fork's code |
| Agent settings | allow rules that cover credentials or any command, hooks that fetch remote code, local settings committed by mistake |
| MCP servers and plugins | a server installed at whatever version is newest, a credential written into the config |
| Secrets in reach | secrets an agent in a workflow can read, and the ways it could leak them |
| Instruction files and skills | hidden characters, text that tells the agent to drop its instructions, to fetch and obey a page, or to send data out |
The comment, on a repository where anyone can open an issue that an agent reads:
🛡️ node9 agent-security · 🔴 High: action needed
Anyone can make this repository's AI agent act with its permissions
A stranger opens an issue with instructions for the agent. The agent follows them with this repository's permissions.
What we saw in
.github/workflows/triage.yml:13:
- Anyone can start the agent (
allowed_non_write_users: "*").- It reads the text of the pull request or issue.
- It can run any command (
Bash).✅ How to fix:
- Let only people with write access start it: remove
allowed_non_write_users: "*".- Give the agent only the tools the job needs.
Also found:
- 🟡 MCP server
filesinstalls whatever version is newest, every time (.mcp.json)