
Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-122675, a CSRF in the Wp Social WordPress plugin (<=3.2.3) that lets an attacker overwrite OAuth provider credentials via a forged admin request.
| CVE | CVE-2026-122675 |
| Plugin | Wp Social (wp-social) |
| Affected | <= 3.2.3 |
| Fixed in | 3.2.4 |
| Severity | CVSS 5.4 Medium |
| Attacker needs | No account. A logged in administrator has to open an attacker page |
| Advisory | Patchstack |
| Writeup | mor-golan.github.io/research/cve-2026-122675-wp-social |
The Wp Social plugin by Wpmet saves its social login provider settings in Admin_Settings::content_xs_providers() (inc/admin-settings.php) on the presence of the xs_provider_submit_form POST key alone. There is no nonce check and no referer check on that path, while every sibling save branch in the same class verifies a nonce.
An attacker with no account hosts a page that posts to the providers screen. When a logged in administrator opens it, the browser sends the administrator's cookies and the plugin overwrites the xs_provider_data option, which holds the OAuth client ID and client secret for every social login provider the site uses. I tested on 3.2.1. The official affected range is every version up to and including 3.2.3.
Precondition: the plugin's one time onboarding wizard has been finished, which is the normal state of a site that uses the plugin.
Lab setup: WordPress at http://localhost:8080 with Wp Social 3.2.1 installed, the onboarding wizard finished, and an administrator account.
Check the starting values:
wp option get xs_provider_data --format=json
Serve the attacker page from a different origin than the target. 127.0.0.1 and localhost are different sites to the browser, so this makes the delivery cross site:
python3 -m http.server 9098 --bind 127.0.0.1
Log in to http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/ as the administrator in a browser, then open in the same browser:
http://127.0.0.1:9098/csrf-poc.html?target=http://localhost:8080
The page submits itself. The administrator lands on the plugin's providers screen with "Providers data have been updated." Read the option again:
wp option get xs_provider_data --format=json
# {"facebook":{"id":"ATTACKER-CLIENT-ID","secret":"ATTACKER-CLIENT-SECRET","enable":"on"}}
Sends the same request without a browser, to show the handler accepts it with no nonce. It needs a cookie jar with an administrator session:
curl -s -c jar.txt -d 'log=ADMIN&pwd=PASSWORD&wp-submit=Log+In&testcookie=1' \
http://localhost:8080/wp-login.php -o /dev/null
./csrf-poc.sh http://localhost:8080
# or: TARGET=http://localhost:8080 ./csrf-poc.sh
wp option get xs_provider_data --format=json
csrf-poc.html: attacker page that posts the forged providers form as soon as it loads. Target from ?target=, default http://localhost:8080.csrf-poc.sh: the same request with curl and an administrator cookie jar. Target from the first argument or TARGET, default http://localhost:8080.For authorized security testing and education only. Run it only against systems you own or are permitted to test.
Found and reported by Mor Golan, Israeli CVE hunter and bug bounty hunter.