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redmi14c-pond-cve-2026-64560 — Porting template and derivation toolkit for adapting the CVE-2026-64560 Android kernel UAF local-privilege-escalation chain to the Redmi 14C (pond, MediaTek). | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/meniben/redmi14c-pond-cve-2026-64560
Android SecurityPrivilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationReverse EngineeringMobile SecurityPayload DevelopmentBinary Exploitation
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meniben/redmi14c-pond-cve-2026-64560

redmi14c-pond-cve-2026-64560

Porting template and derivation toolkit for adapting the CVE-2026-64560 Android kernel UAF local-privilege-escalation chain to the Redmi 14C (pond, MediaTek).

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11 month agoNot yet reviewed

Redmi 14C (pond) — CVE-2026-64560 Porting Kit (China Variant / MediaTek)

This is a "values-to-be-filled" porting skeleton, not an exploit that can run directly. It takes the upstream NebuSec/CyberMeowfia CVE-2026-64560 Android LPE exploit chain, as well as the device adaptations for dada (Xiaomi 15 / SM8750) and miro (K80 Pro / Snapdragon 8 Elite), two Qualcomm flagship devices, and structurally reworks them into a porting template targeting the China-variant Redmi 14C (codename pond, MediaTek Helio G81-Ultra).

All constants that need to be derived from "the real kernel Image of your device" are left blank in this kit (sentinel value POND_TODO = 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef), and are guarded by compile-time _Static_assert gates to ensure: as long as even one constant is unfilled, it will not compile. This is the upstream miro-profile.h's own safety design, inherited as-is by this kit.


0. One-sentence conclusion

CVE-2026-64560 (posix-cpu-timers non-leader exec() race UAF) on the China-variant Redmi 14C (codename pond, model 2409BRN2CC): "the vulnerability very likely exists, the exploit chain is in principle portable, but none of dada/miro's address constants can be reused", because this is a Qualcomm → MediaTek cross-vendor port, where the physical memory layout, CPU topology, and resource limits are all different. This kit provides everything needed to safely port the exploit chain to pond: the structures, difference analysis, and step-by-step derivation procedures; a truly runnable binary can only be produced after you fill the derived values back into src/redmi14c-pond-profile.h on your own device.**

⭐ Empirical verdict (2026-10-02, based on the pond-probe.txt you provided): GO

CriterionMeasuredConclusion
Kernel6.6.89-android15-8 (GKI, same android15-8 KMI line as dada/miro)< upstream fixed version 6.6.147 → affected
PatchSPL 2026-07-01, CVE 2026-07-29 disclosureunpatched
Fatal configINIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON not configured, RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES not configured✓ no fatal items
ComponentsUHID/ASHMEM/CONFIGFS/SELINUX all =y✓ bridge complete
Known mitigationsINIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y + SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y (same as miro)hit rate reduced but feasible

Three empirical facts that overturn old assumptions + three items pending re-verification (kmalloc-cg-8k line count = 0, device BTF missing, DTB reg unreadable) + BL lock risk + precise next-step checklist, all in docs/03-probe-analysis.md.


1. What this vulnerability is

字段内容
CVE IDCVE-2026-64560
标题posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race
类型Use-After-Free(CWE-416),竞态条件
CVSS v3.17.8 High — AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H(本地提权,非远程)
公开日期2026-07-29
修复提交(mainline)920f893f735e92ba3a1cd9256899a186b161928d
引入提交(v5.7)55e8c8eb2c7b(2020)
报告者Wongi Lee、Jungwoo Lee
影响内核5.7 → 修复前(5.10.262 / 5.15.213 / 6.1.180 / 6.6.147 / 6.12.100 / 6.18.41 / 7.1.5 / 7.2-rc3 之前)

Principle (minimal): When a non-leader thread calls execve(), de_thread()→__exit_signal() sets the old leader's sighand to NULL; meanwhile, on another CPU, sys_timer_delete()→ posix_cpu_timer_del() looks up the old leader, sees sighand==NULL, and "does nothing and returns success directly", then free_posix_timer() frees the k_itimer. But exec (unlike exit) does not change the TGID; an already-armed CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID timer attached to signal->cpu_timers is inherited by the new leader and remains enqueued → afterwards run_posix_cpu_timers() / other timerqueue operations access the dangling node = UAF.

Key property: AV:L/PR:L — the attacker needs to already have low-privilege local code execution on the machine (e.g., an adb shell identity). It is not a remote vulnerability and cannot attack devices to which you have no physical/code access. This is consistent with dada/miro's use case: obtain temporary root of the current boot on a device you own (uid=0 + shell domain), then use it to load the KernelSU LKM. See section 4 of docs/05-technical.md in the upstream miro repository for the boundary discussion on "appification".


2. What I read in the three upstream repositories

This suite is based on a line-by-line reading of every .md file (19 in total) + PoC source code + patches + device constant headers + integration references in the following three repositories:

2.1 villager1314/CVE-2026-64560-Analysis (upstream analysis / trigger)

  • Contains only the race trigger (poc/cve_2026_64560_poc.c) + the full mainline patch + technical analysis.
  • Deliberately contains no privilege-escalation primitives (no heap grooming, no object placement, no RIP control). The README states explicitly: "Turning it into a privilege-escalation exploit requires a large amount of additional work... this repository deliberately does not include that part."

2.2 quyicheng03-boop/xiaomi15-dada-cve-2026-64560 (dada adaptation)

  • A genuinely complete exploit chain (Stage0 KASLR derivation → misc bridge arbitrary read/write → physical read/write → cred overwrite → SELinux permissive → temp-su daemon).
  • Exact kernel Image SHA-256 binding: the runner verifies the fingerprint, kernel release, page size, CPU topology, UHID minor, boot ID, and the hash of the decompressed Image; any mismatch causes a safe exit with TARGET_PROFILE_GATE_FAIL, without touching the kernel.
  • Provides docs/PORTING.md (porting workflow), docs/TECHNICAL.md (adaptation notes), and docs/TESTING.md (acceptance criteria). Upstream source = NebuSec/CyberMeowfia.

2.3 RMDycz/K80Pro-miro-CVE-2026-64560 (miro port)

  • A porting result produced by re-deriving addresses and constants for the K80 Pro on top of dada (already verified end-to-end to obtain root).
  • src/miro-profile.h is the model for porting constants: 24 link-layout symbols, struct offsets, direct-map aliases, and race tuning parameters, all annotated with [V]/[B]/[M]/[T]/[A] provenance + a compile-time _Static_assert integrity gate.
  • docs/05-technical.md is the most complete porting operations manual: what was derived, how it was derived, and which pitfalls were hit.
  • Key porting fact: dada→miro is the same SoC vendor (both SM8750/Snapdragon 8 Elite family), so of the 24 link symbols, 9 are identical and 15 are replaced with non-uniform offsets; the struct offsets were cross-validated via BTF and are all identical; the only physical_delta that cannot be read offline is inherited from dada because it is an SM8750 platform constant.

Of these three points, the "inheritance premise" of the last one does not hold on pond — this is the fundamental reason this suite exists.


3. Profile of the China-market Redmi 14C (why this is a cross-vendor port)

Attributedada (Xiaomi 15)miro (K80 Pro)pond (China Redmi 14C)
SoC vendorQualcommQualcommMediaTek
SoCSM8750 Snapdragon 8 EliteSnapdragon 8 Elite seriesHelio G81-Ultra (MT6769V/Z)
CPU topologyFlagship multi-cluster (prime+perf+e)Same as left2×Cortex-A75(big,2.0G) + 6×Cortex-A55(LITTLE,1.8G)
Process/RAM3nm / LPDDR5X 12-16GSame as left12nm / LPDDR4X 4-8G
StorageUFS 4.0UFSeMMC 5.1
Codenamedadamiropond (model 2409BRN2CC, China)
KernelGKI 6.6.118-android15-8Same as leftGKI 6.6.89-android15-8 (same android15-8 KMI line)
Kernel lineageGKI android15-8 / 6.6.118Same as leftTo be confirmed by you on the device with uname -r (MTK BSP, not the same GKI line)
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