
Research code and hardware for RPMC attacks: voltage glitching, SPI interposer firmware, and NV-state rollback to brute-force Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs.
This repository provides up-to-date information as well as supplemental material to our paper: "Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs" (originally published at ACM CCS 2026)
[!IMPORTANT]
tl;dr: If you rely on numeric Windows Hello or BitLocker PINs, increase your PIN length by at least two digits. Even in light of our attacks, this increases the time to bruteforce them from several days to months or even years.
In the paper, we introduce vulnerabilities in both RPMC flash chips (e.g., Winbond's) and RPMC controllers (e.g., AMD's). This repository is mainly a collection of code that helped us test for the respective vulnerabilities. It includes scripts to test a counter for integer overflows, conduct crowbar voltage glitching attacks to test for sensitive leakages, and firmware for an RP2350 allowing two types of interposition attacks: one exploiting AMD's unverified RPMC increments and another for forging RPMC replies when an attacker is in posession of an HMAC key (e.g., on a Winbond-based system vulnerable to voltage glitching). It also contains the hardware designs for our custom interposer PCB.
[!NOTE] With this repository, we try to make our code and data available for other researchers. Given the experimental nature of offensive hardware security research, reproduction of our attacks is not plug-and-play. Most importantly, it assumes access to our interposer PCB (v1 or v2).
In our paper, we claim that the Lenovo IdeaPad 5 Pro 16ACH16 from 2021 does not use RPMC. Technically, this is correct, as the used flash chip (Winbond 74M series) does not support a technology called RPMC. However, as we found out only after the final deadline of the paper, this flash series is already a so-called Authentication Flash that is functionally identical and uses the exact same commands as the RPMC version. We verified that it is used by tracing SPI flash during boot and our Saleae RPMC analyzer detected the commands right away. Most importantly, this falsifies our assumption that AMD prevents NV state rollbacks without RPMC (or Authentication Flash) on that system.
Secondly, we re-tested naive NV state rollbacks on additional systems, both by AMD and Intel, to better understand if pre-RPMC NV rollabck protection existed:
While the Intel sytems defended against the naive rollbacks, both AMD systems did not. They allowed us to reliably reset the TPM's dictionary attack counters only by reprogramming an old NV state onto the SPI flash using an SPI programmer; no interposer required.
While these two observations may not be representative of all AMD systems, our key insights are these:
Intel in contrast does seem to have their own pre-RPMC rollback protection, since we couldn't naively rollback the NV state on the Acer Aspire, whose Macronix MX25U25672G doesn't have a comparable feature.
A simple optimization of our KVM's attack loop sped up the overall duration of the 236-try brute-force campaign from 8min 40s to 6min 55s, so by ~ 20%. This decreases the worst-case brute-force times for a default-length 6-digit BitLocker PIN from 26 days to ~ 20 days.
As of now, two sorts of systems are affected by our end-to-end attacks enabling fTPM rollback (and therefore dysfunctional anti-hammering/brute-force protection):
On Windows, press Win + I, go to System -> About. Under "Device specifications", the Processor line shows the exact model.
On Linux, open up a Terminal and run lscpu.
If your system uses an AMD CPU, it is prone to either naive NV state rollbacks (using only an SPI Flash programmer) or, if it relies on RPMC to protect against NV state rollbacks, against attacks from our interposer suppressing the RPMC counter increments.
Unlike on Intel, AMD systems can tell from software whether RPMC is in use. Since Linux 5.19, the ccp driver exports the PSP's security attributes via sysfs (documentation), including:
rpmc_spirom_available: whether an RPMC-capable SPI flash is presentrpmc_production_enabled: whether RPMC has been enabledOn Linux (e.g., booted from a live USB stick), run:
grep . /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/*/rpmc_*
Alternatively, the firmware update daemon fwupd summarizes both attributes in its AMD SPI Replay protections attribute, displayed by:
fwupdmgr security
These reports match our results: The Lenovo IdeaPad 5 Pro 16ACH16, whose Authentication Flash supports RPMC commands, reports both attributes as 1 and detected naive rollbacks, whereas the Zen 2 desktop reports both as 0 and accepted them.
[!NOTE] The PSP exports these attributes only on select SoCs. If the files are missing (or fwupd cannot report the attribute), this does not imply that your system lacks RPMC.
Either way, an AMD system is exposed to one of the two rollback paths: the Unverified Increment attack via an interposer if RPMC is used, or a naive rollback via an SPI programmer if it is not.
For Intel systems, we are not aware of an interface comparable to AMD's (see above). Whether they rely on RPMC can, to our knowledge, only be identified through inspection of the mainboard and SPI bus traffic. Unfortunately, telling the SPI flash manufacturer from running OS is impossible on a lot of systems. Moreso, OEMs may source SPI flash from multiple vendors for a single model.
Open up the back of your laptop and look for a black rectangular chip with markings like Winbond, Macronix, GigaDevice. Winbond's RPMC-capable series are labelled 74M or 25R and it is very likely that those are specifically there to enable the rollback protection of NV state on both Intel and AMD.